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THE OLD THEOLOGY AND THE NEW

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

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By the old theology we mean the type of theology which, whatever its date, ignores the modern scientific movement and is unaffected in method by the results of that movement. By the new theology, conversely, we mean the type of theology whose method is determined by the modern scientific movement and which is hospitable to its results. The purpose of this article is to ask what is the relation of the two, what they have in common, wherein they differ, and what ought to be the attitude of the representatives of the one to the other.

By the modern scientific movement is meant the movement of thought whose chief marks on the outward side are the acceptance of development as the law of the physical universe, and on the inward side the recognition of the contribution of mind to the content of knowledge. It is a movement to which it is not easy to set exact chronological limits. While Darwin and Kant are the names that we commonly associate with its beginnings on the outward and the inward side respectively, it goes back in principle much further. When Copernicus substituted for the prevailing geo-centric astronomy his new helio-centric system, he was using principles of which our modern view of the world is only the fuller and completer expression.

The old theology, I say, is the theology whose method antedates this modern scientific movement and is unaffected by its results. All turns here on the term "method." The new theology is not a matter of date, but of principles. In all the different churches are men modern in the details of their theology, taking over

now this and now that result from current criticism and investigation, but in principle old theologians, because their method remains unaffected by the fundamental change in the principles of thinking which we call the modern scientific spirit.

There is, then, no lack of representatives whom we might take as illustrations of our subject. They might be drawn from the various schools of thought, Calvinistic, Arminian, Lutheran, Anglican, for in all these historic types the same fundamental difference of point of view may be illustrated. But for our present purpose we will take that particular theological system which is the most virile, clear-cut, and independent of them all, and which has, moreover, the advantage of being the school from which many of us can trace our own theological inheritance. I mean historic Calvinism. Whatever else may be questionable, we shall all agree that Calvinism is a typical representative of the old theology.

I

The first thing that strikes us as we approach the Calvinistic system is the fundamental dualism in its view of the world. The universe is divided into two parts, nature and the supernatural. The former is the world of law, in which everything takes place uniformly, that is to say, in which, when any event happens, you can predict with certainty that it will be followed by such and such other events. The latter is the world of grace, or, in other words, of miracle, that is to say, of those unpredictable divine activities which break in upon the uniformity of nature out of a clear sky, and have no known antecedents to which they can be referred. Nature can be known by human reason, but to the realm of grace we have access only through revelation. Man, as we know him today, is a member of the former realm. He is a child of nature, and his knowledge is limited to the orderly sequences of law. What God may intend in the higher realm we cannot tell, save as the Almighty graciously makes his purposes known through revelation.

This limitation of knowledge, to be sure, was not native to man. Man was created righteous, and in his original state was fully acquainted with God's purposes on his behalf; but this vantage-

ground of knowledge he lost through sin, and as a result the race as a whole is not only unable to do anything that is good, but is ignorant of the only remedy that could deliver it from its state of helplessness. If man is to be saved, God must intervene. He must impart to his sinful creatures the knowledge which they are unable to obtain for themselves; and in fact such gracious interventions have taken place from time to time in human history. God revealed himself to Adam in the garden, he revealed himself to Abraham, to Isaac and Jacob, to Moses and the prophets, and, finally, most clearly to mankind in Jesus Christ.

We can see now the great significance which the Bible has for the old theology. The Bible is the repository of divine revelation. In it the gracious God has gathered up the special communications which from time to time he has been pleased to vouchsafe to men, and they are here preserved in permanent form for the enlightenment and guidance of future generations. The Bible, therefore, is the one certain means by which man can find a remedy for the misery in which his sin has involved him. It is his only infallible rule of faith and practice.

But the Bible alone is not enough. Many men read the Bible who are not saved, and the reason is that they do not read it understandingly. For this there must be a special communication of God, a direct revelation to the heart of each man through the divine spirit. The supernatural activity of God without is matched by a similar activity within. Through the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* God assures the believer of the divine authority of his word, and in regeneration creates within him a divine life which makes it possible for him to avail himself of the gracious provision revealed therein.

This deep-cut division in the world and in human life goes back finally to God himself. The principle of law and the principle of grace are alike rooted in his nature. As holy, God is under law, bound by the necessity of his own inexorable justice to punish all sin; as gracious, he is able to show mercy or withhold it as he pleases, owning no sovereignty but that of his own inscrutable and self-determining will.

From this fundamental antithesis all the other articles of the Calvinistic system necessarily follow. It determines the con-

ception of punishment. Punishment is the price which divine justice exacts for sin. It determines the conception of salvation. Salvation is remission of penalty on the basis of a substitutionary atonement. It determines the doctrine of the person of Christ. Christ is both God and man, two natures in one person; man that he may make atonement, God that he may be able to make it. It determines the doctrine of the trinity. God is three persons in one substance, for if there be no such distinction in his being, it will be impossible for him in his capacity as Son, the representative of mercy, to make the atonement exacted by himself in his capacity of Father, the representative of justice. Finally, it determines the conception of the church. The church is the organization divinely intrusted with the means of grace, the one institution among men through which the divine revelation in the Bible and the sacraments is preserved and handed down from generation to generation.

We are not interested here in the details of the system. Our concern is rather with its consequences. First among these we may mention the definite standard which Calvinism gave its adherents. The writer was once walking through New York City with Dr. Wilfred Grenfell, the well-known missionary to Labrador. It was towards midnight, and we had been discussing some of the perplexing problems which the complex life of the city presents. Grenfell had been silent for some time. At last he said abruptly: "I wish I were back in Labrador. It is so much easier to know what is right in Labrador than it is in New York." No old-time Calvinist would have felt the impulse to express Grenfell's wish. To him right was right everywhere and always, in Labrador and in New York, and he knew what was right at any time or in any place, for it had been divinely revealed once for all in the Bible. His duty was simply to hear and obey.

A second consequence was the clear line drawn between the religious and the secular. The church and the world, God and Satan, confronted each other like two hostile camps, and it was the duty of every believer to come out of the one and ally himself with the other. The result was a lessening of interest in many things that other ages have valued, art, letters, the institu-

tions of civil government, culture and civilization in the broadest sense. All these were valueless in themselves except as they could be made instruments to promote the service of God and the welfare of his church.

A third consequence was the reinforcement of power which came with the consciousness of immediate dependence upon God. Duty was rooted in faith, and at every reading of the decalogue the thunders of Sinai still made themselves heard. To man the task required might seem hard, but with God all things were possible, and the man who put his trust in him might be sure that in the end he would prevail.

Such, then, is the old theology, in contrast to which the new theology must be judged. We have taken Calvinism for our example, but we might equally well have taken Arminianism, or Anglicanism. Arminianism gives the human will more place in its dealings with God. The will is an arm which man himself has the power to reach across the gulf separating him from God to clasp the hand outstretched from the other side. In Anglicanism the sacraments are given a larger place than in the more radical Protestant systems. God meets man not only or chiefly through the Bible, but in the sacraments, those mystic rites consecrated by immemorial usage, through which the guilt of sin is washed away in baptism, and the corrupt and mortal nature renewed by feeding on the body and blood of Christ. But these are differences of detail. The fundamental lines remain the same. In each case we face the same antithesis between law and grace, nature and the supernatural, the human and the divine. There is no place for toleration or compromise. We deal in absolute antitheses, realities that have remained unchanged from the beginning. The conceptions of development, of growth, of adaptation, of progress, are unknown.

What, then, shall we say of this old theology which we have thus briefly passed in review? What is its meaning as a phenomenon in human history, and what its value for human life? To answer these questions intelligently we must first ask and answer certain others. First, where did this theology come from? Secondly, what gave it its power over the men who held it? And thirdly, why is it no longer satisfying to us today?

And, first, where did the old theology come from? The answer to this is very simple. It was the outcome of the Protestant Reformation, that great protest against Catholicism which took place in the first quarter of the sixteenth century; and it bears the marks of its origin. Three different strands enter into it, which we must distinguish if we are rightly to understand it.

In the first place, there is the Christian element, which was preserved in Catholicism and inherited by Protestantism from it. The importance attributed to the Old Testament as a source of revelation, the central place given to Jesus as the founder of Christianity, the Saviour of men, and the Lord of his church, the conception of God as a God of grace, providing a way of forgiveness for the penitent sinner, the high ethical standard required of man as servant of his brother, the conception of the church as the community of the redeemed, bound together by common faith and consecrated to a common service, all these are elements which belong to primitive Christianity and which have passed over into the old theology through Catholicism.

In the second place, there are certain elements which Protestantism shared with Catholicism. Such are the dualistic view of the world, the conception of freedom as arbitrary choice, and sovereignty as the power to do as you please; the doctrines of total depravity and of original sin, as they were formulated by Augustine in the fifth century; the conceptions of verbal inspiration, and of imputation as a legal transfer of merit from one individual to another, on the basis of mathematical equivalence; the conception of regeneration as a magical change taking place in the subconsciousness, apart from any necessary connection with the faith which is its normal accompaniment and evidence in experience; the function assigned to the visible church as the guardian of the means of grace and the administrator of the divine discipline,—all these are inheritances of Protestantism from Catholicism, and all of them have passed over in one form or another into the old theology.

They are inheritances, I say, of Protestantism from Catholicism, but to say this is only to push the question one step further back. Whence did Catholicism derive them? How was it that it added to the primitive and simple Christianity of the New Testament this elaborate superstructure?

To answer this question in detail would carry us too far, but, in general, it may be said that these new elements represent the reaction of contemporary thought upon Christianity. They are the consequences for religion which followed from the view of the world which was built up little by little by the labor of the great thinkers whom we call the schoolmen. Many of the materials of their majestic structure are found centuries earlier. Greek philosophy contributed a part, Jewish legalism contributed a part, Eastern mysticism contributed a part, logical minds untrained in the methods of experimental science, working over generation after generation the problems that have always presented themselves to the mind, contributed their part. The result, I repeat, was a great system of thought which constituted the world-view of the Middle Ages. Catholicism took over this view of the world, used it in the formulation of its theology, and passed it on to Protestantism in its turn.

To us today there is so much in this old world-view that seems artificial and unreal that it is hard to realize what an advance it was upon the thinking that preceded it. In a world full of mystery and unreason, where the supremacy of law was only imperfectly recognized, where man felt himself surrounded on every hand by spirits, good and evil, who might at any moment break in upon his security by some malicious, or, at all events, some unpredictable act, it was a great gain to build a wall of division between nature and the supernatural which should at least set bounds to their activities. It was a great thing to know that there was a sphere in which law reigned and in which effect inevitably followed cause, even if there remained outside of it a territory impenetrable by reason, from which occasional messengers, celestial or infernal, might invade the common world. Here, at least, was a foundation for science, a territory in which the great achievements of human reason might find a home.

We must remember, then, when we estimate what we have called the Catholic elements in the old theology, that not religion but philosophy is responsible for them. They are, I repeat, the reaction of mediaeval thought upon the Christian religion, and our quarrel with them is not the quarrel of philosophy with religion, but of philosophy with philosophy.

Finally, there are the Protestant elements, the elements, that is to say, which represent the reaction of Protestantism against Catholicism, and its own distinctive contribution to the religious life of man. Among these may be noted the recognition of the direct responsibility of the individual to God, with its corollary in the right of private judgment, the insistence upon the Bible as the sole authority for faith and practice, over against the Catholic insistence upon tradition; the practical character given to doctrine as truth bearing directly upon personal experience, and therefore of the highest importance for every individual to understand, the wider extension of the sphere of religion through the doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers, and, finally, the insistence upon the same strictness of ethical standard for the layman as was required of the minister.

I have called these elements Protestant because they have found their fullest and clearest expression in historic Protestantism. Yet it is only just to Catholicism to remind ourselves that they have their parallels in the Catholic church. Catholicism too has always had its protestants, its men of immediate religious insight and of high ethical standard, who have dared to criticise the abuses of existing religion, and have pointed the way to a freer and more spiritual faith. The mystics who from age to age have made their appearance in the Catholic church have been such protestants. Francis of Assisi in the thirteenth century was such a protestant, Jansen in the seventeenth was another, Pascal and his friends of Port Royal were others. Had it not been for the work of such men in the past, not only would the position of the Modernists today be untenable, but their very existence would be inexplicable. Modernism is the fruitage within Catholicism of the same principles of freedom and individuality which in our own day have given birth in Protestantism to the new theology.

Such, in general, are the elements that have gone into the making of the old theology in its Protestant form, and which in their action and reaction explain the changes through which it has passed in the course of its history of four hundred years. These changes are due to the fact that the old theology is not wholly old, but at its core, in its doctrine of private judgment and individual responsibility, bears a germ of the new, which, when

furnished with the proper environment, is certain to spring up and bear fruit in surprising and far-reaching modifications. If it were not for the presence of this living germ at the heart of the old theology, enabling it again and again to push out fresh roots through the restraining folds of its inheritance of tradition and to renew its vigor at the pure springs from which Christianity first drew its life, our problem would be far simpler than it is today.

Our second question has to do with the causes which give the old theology its hold upon its adherents. Here too the answer is simple. The explanation of its power is found, where all theology worthy of the name finds its power, in the living experience from which it springs and of which it is in large part an expression. We misunderstand Calvinism when we think of it primarily as a system of doctrine. It was indeed a system, and faced the great questions with which philosophy has to do, but its interest in these was secondary. Primarily it seemed to the men who held it a transcript of experience which they could daily verify in their own souls. Doctrines such as election, preterition, regeneration, justification, effectual calling, perseverance, assurance, which to many in our day have lost their meaning and become empty words, were to them names for realities which had their verification every day in their own lives and in the lives of their friends.

In the fifth chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith we find this paragraph under the general head of the doctrine of Providence:—

> As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God as a righteous judge for former sins doth blind and harden, from them he not only withholdeth his grace whereby they might have been enlightened in their understanding and wrought upon in their hearts, but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had, and exposeth them to such objects as their corruption makes occasion of sin, and withal gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan, whereby it comes to pass that they harden themselves even under those means which God useth for the softening of others.

These sentences express one of the most rigid and repellent of the doctrines of Calvinism, the doctrine of reprobation. But

when we look at them not as theoretical statements, but as a leaf taken out of the book of human life, how true they are! How often we see just such experiences in the lives of the people we know, things that ought to be means of growth proving as a matter of fact causes of corruption and of weakness, the money that one man makes his servant becoming the master of another, knowledge resulting in pride rather than in efficiency, love leading to self-indulgence rather than to unselfishness, even the unfaltering trust, which is the best gift that one human being can give to another, made the occasion for carelessness and indifference.

Or take an illustration from the tenth chapter, another of the hard chapters of the Confession. It is the definition of effectual calling.

> All those whom God has predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased in his appointed and accepted time effectually to call by his word and spirit out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ, enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone and giving unto them a heart of flesh, renewing their wills and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

Reading this paragraph as a statement of theological doctrine we are repelled by its arbitrariness, but when we look at it as a description of Christian experience we find that it brings before us in living language the essential elements of the process which actually takes place in the soul of a man when he enters upon the religious life,—the enlightenment of the mind, the loosing of the pent emotions, the new purpose impressed upon the will, the sense of an external constraint laid upon one, yet in such form that the consent, when it comes, is most free. All this can be verified in countless lives.

But theology deals not with present experience only, but also with unseen realities. It formulates those great convictions which give support to faith when the shocks of life come and human strength alone seems too weak to withstand their strain. Here, again, the old theology reveals its strength. It brings man face to face with the eternal God and plants his feet upon a rock that

cannot be shaken. This sense of immutable security meets us again and again in lives that have been fed upon the old theology. Its artificiality, its legalism, its separation of things that seem to us to belong together, its pedantic weighing of merit against guilt, —all this disappears when the plan of salvation is contemplated as the purpose of the unchanging God for the redemption of man, his child.

Among Cromwell's letters, contained in Carlyle's classic edition, there is one directed to his son-in-law, General Fleetwood, then Lord Deputy of Ireland. It is dated at Whitehall, June 22, 1655, two years after the dismissal of the famous Rump Parliament. After treating of various matters of business, the writer, then ruler of one of the most powerful nations in the world, and bearing upon his shoulders burdens of responsibility that would have crushed any but the strongest man, concludes as follows:

> Dear Charles, my dear love to thee; and to my dear Biddy [his daughter] who is a joy to my heart, for what I hear of the Lord in her. Bid her be cheerful, and rejoice in the Lord once and again: if she knows the Covenant, she cannot but do so. For that transaction is without her; sure and stedfast, between the Father and the Mediator in His blood: therefore, leaning upon the Son, or looking to Him, thirsting after Him, and embracing Him, we are His seed;—and the Covenant is sure to all the Seed. The Compact is for the Seed; God is bound in faithfulness to Christ, and in Him to us: the Covenant is without us; a Transaction between God and Christ. Look up to it. God engageth in it to pardon us; to write His Law in our heart; to plant His fear so that we shall never depart from Him. We, under all our sins and infirmities, can daily offer a perfect Christ; and thus we have peace and safety, and apprehension of love, from a Father in Covenant,—who cannot deny Himself. And truly in this is all my salvation; and this helps me to bear my great burdens.

The literature of Puritanism is full of such examples. Our hymn-books witness on every page to the strength and peace which faith in the God of the old theology brought into the lives of those who put their trust in him.

> When I survey the wondrous cross
> On which the Prince of glory died,
> My richest gain I count but loss,
> And pour contempt on all my pride.

It is not strange that men who held such a faith should have done a great work in the world. Calvin in Geneva, Cromwell and Milton in England, John Robinson in Leyden, the Pilgrim Fathers at Plymouth Rock, all these are examples of what we might call the pragmatic value of the old theology.

II

But, if the old theology contains so much that is true and life-giving, why is it no longer satisfactory today? Why do we need a new theology? Has our experience changed? Has our need altered? Or is the cause to be found elsewhere in some new factor that has entered into our environment, but which was not present in the minds that formed the old theology?

We shall be helped to an intelligent answer if we begin by considering how this new theology came to be, and here again we must begin with a definition. What do we mean by the new theology? We mean, as has been said above, the theology whose method is determined by the results of the modern scientific movement, both on the objective side in the acceptance of development as the law of the physical universe, and on the subjective side by the recognition of the contribution which the mind itself makes to the content of its own knowledge. It is a theology which has come into existence as a result of the intellectual revolution through which thought has passed during the last century, and it expresses the reaction of that revolution within the realm of religion. It is not confined to any one country, nor restricted to any branch of the Christian church. It has sprung up independently in different places. In Germany its great name is Schleiermacher, in England, Coleridge. In the Catholic church it appears in Modernism, a movement whose wide ramifications and increasing influence are causing us ever new surprise. Wherever the modern view of the world has become a constituent part of human thinking, there, sooner or later, the new theology has made its appearance.

Let us look at this theology a little more carefully in order to see what it involves. And here, at the outset, we are met with a difficulty. The new theology has no formal creed, in which its

beliefs are embodied. It has no official representative who can speak with authority for the convictions of his fellow-theologians. It is a spirit and a method rather than a body of definite opinions, and any statement of its tendencies must be individual and provisional.

This lack of official standard has often been made a reproach against the new theology on the part of those trained in the old. It seems to them to be not so much a theology as a group of theologies, each inconsistent with the other. And indeed there is not a little in the attitude of the representatives of the new theology to give plausibility to this reproach. It is natural that men who are engaged in the details of investigation should feel more keenly the things which separate them than the premises in which they agree. When one hears in Germany the polemics of the Ritschlians against the Hegelians, or in England or this country the attacks of the pragmatists upon the absolutists; when one sees the Abbé Loisy pointing out how inadequate is the conception of Christianity set forth by Harnack in his *What is Christianity?* and how superior is the type of Catholicism provided by his own book, *The Gospel and the Church*, one is tempted to believe that here are fundamental differences, and to feel that the representatives of the old theology are right when they say that the new theology has no definite standards and no common agreements.

But one needs only to draw aside for a little and look at things in a longer perspective in order to see how misleading such a judgment is. Judged from the point of view which here alone interests us, the questions at issue between the various representatives of the new theology are only differences of detail. Like the differences between Arminianism and Calvinism of an earlier day they are compatible with the recognition of common principles. Indeed, the battle between the pragmatists and the absolutists is only the perpetuation on the new field of the modern world of the old battle which the Arminians and the Calvinists waged with their different weapons two hundred and fifty years ago. I do not say that these differences are unimportant. On the contrary, I believe them to be highly important, but as compared with the issues which we are now considering they are secondary and may be overlooked. As there are principles,

common to all the schools of the old theology, which constitute it a distinct intellectual and religious type, so there are principles common to all schools of the new.

The first and most striking characteristic of the new theology is its view of the world as a unity. The contrast between nature and the supernatural, which was fundamental for the old theology, has disappeared. To us moderns life is all of a piece. The universe is one undivided whole. The same law which holds the planets in their orbits governs the mote which dances in the sunlight outside the window; and the law without is matched by a corresponding law within. The mind has its uniform processes, too, in which cause follows effect in irrevocable sequence.

When we study this law more in detail we find that it is a law of development. Growth is characteristic of all living things, and even the great masses of matter that we call inorganic have been formed little by little through combinations of simpler elements. And it is so with the law of the mind. Thought grows, character develops, and through the reaction of will and feeling and thought upon a changing environment personality is ever becoming. To understand, therefore, the real nature of anything, we have to consider not what it is today, but to what it is tending, the immanent law of its development, the purpose by which character is dominated, the goal which society seeks to fulfil. Reality is teleological. We know what a thing is when we know whither it is going.

The consequence for theology of this change of the point of view is obvious. The premises of the old theology are gone. Nature and the supernatural are not two different kinds of reality, but two different aspects of one and the same reality. Nature expresses the law in the process, the supernatural the end to which it tends. Nature has to do with cause, the supernatural with meaning and value. Man himself partakes of the nature of both realms. He is at once a product of causes and a creator of values. He is limited indeed in power, but, so far as they go, his faculties are trustworthy, and the only way in which he can hope to attain knowledge of any kind is to trust the light that is in him. There are not two kinds of knowledge, the natural knowledge that comes from reason and the super-

natural knowledge that comes through revelation, but there are two aspects of knowledge, the knowledge of the causes which produce effects and the knowledge of the purpose which the effects are designed to serve. Revelation concerns itself with the latter aspect of knowledge. It is God's disclosure to the spirit of man of the meaning of the processes whose causes his reason discovers.

Applying these principles to the Bible, we see that it can no longer be isolated from other books, as was the habit in the old theology. Considered as literature, the Bible is a book like other books. We can trace its origin, follow its history, analyze and explain the processes by which its different elements were brought into the form in which we have them. The uniqueness of the Bible consists in its content, the ideals that it presents, the inspiration which it furnishes, the direct contact into which it introduces us with God and with the spirits of the great men of the past who have lived in daily communion with him.

What is true of God's revelation without, in nature and in the Bible, is true also of his activity in the spirit of man. Here too the abrupt contrasts of the old theology have disappeared from the new. Sin is not a foreign intruder making its appearance in the universe suddenly at a moment of time, and bringing about an abrupt transformation in human nature as a whole. Sin is the inevitable result of certain tendencies inwrought into the structure of human nature. It is the survival of the animal in man, his failure to rise to the higher capacities within him. So, salvation is not an act wrought once for all in some transcendent realm. It is a process going on through the ages, and rooted as truly as sin itself in the nature of man. Atonement is not the great exception, it is the universal law of all true living. Calvary is a principle as well as an event. As Horace Bushnell, one of the greatest of the new theologians, has put it, "A cross has been among the perfections of God from all eternity." So, under other names, justification and sanctification are experiences found outside of Christianity. The church is not composed of exiles from the world, it is the first-fruits of the society that is to be. Jesus is not God and man, he is God in man, the first-born among many brethren, but the type to which all mankind is ultimately destined to conform.

These changes in the interpretation of the divine activity involve a corresponding change in the view of the divine character and of God's relation to the universe. The dualism in the Calvinistic conception of God disappears. God is not thought of as separate from the universe, but rather as its immanent law. He is not a transcendent being living in a distant heaven whence from time to time he intervenes in the affairs of earth. He is an ever-present spirit guiding all that happens to a wise and holy end. We meet him in nature. We meet him in history. We meet him in the Bible. We meet him in the lives of great men, and supremely in Jesus, the ideal man, through whom he has given us the clearest revelation of his character and purpose.

And wherever we meet him he is always the same. He is not sometimes just and sometimes loving, but loving in his justice and righteous in his love. He has but one purpose, which animates him in all that he does, and that is to make individuals like Jesus, and to unite them through brotherly service in the ideal society. In a sense far higher than the old, the new theology makes earnest with the christlikeness of God.

Such, in brief, are some of the fundamental conceptions which meet us in the new theology. We are not interested to follow out the details. They differ in the case of individual theologians. What concerns us here are the practical consequences which follow from these principles for human thought and life.

It is evident that these consequences must differ in important respects from those which we have already considered in connection with the old theology. For one thing, the kind of authority presented is different. The old theology, as we saw, provided a clear-cut and invariable standard, valid everywhere, always, and for everybody. The new theology knows no such standard. It deals with principles rather than laws, and when conditions change, the application of principles has to be modified to suit the changing environment. Right and wrong are determined for us not so much by a standard established in the past as by a purpose affecting the future. As Christians it is our ultimate aim to establish the kingdom of God on earth, but what particular kind of conduct that purpose may involve under any particular set of circumstances can only be determined by a study of the

factors of the problem as they arise. What Dr. Grenfell could do in Labrador he cannot do in New York, and to the new theology that is as it should be.

It follows, in the second place, that the clear-cut line between the religious and the secular, which was so prominent a feature of the old ethics, has been wiped out in the new. There is no particular realm of human experience which one can isolate from the rest and say that it is more divine than others. All life belongs to God, and it is our business as his children to see that his purpose is accomplished in every sphere of human endeavor.

With this broadening of the sphere of religion goes, in the third place, a corresponding modification in the conception of God's relation to man. The consciousness of the immediate presence of God, which was so characteristic a feature of the older piety, is not so prominent in the new. It is not that the belief in the divine presence is lacking, but it is spread over so wide a territory that it is not as palpable to the emotions. It is easier to realize that God is speaking in the thunders of Sinai than to feel his presence in the air we breathe or in the gentle constraints of social custom. We may be no less sure of God's ultimate purposes, but we are more hesitant when it comes to interpreting his utterances in detail.

It is not strange, in view of these changes, that one trained in the old theology should feel a certain inarticulateness in the new. Its breadth seems to him vagueness, its flexibility absence of backbone. The extension of a religious meaning to phases of activity and spheres of experience formerly dismissed as secular seems scant compensation for the breaking-down of customs which have owed their strength and permanence to the religious sanction in a narrower sense. What is to become, we are asked, of Sunday-observance, church-going, family worship, the habit of Bible-reading and of daily prayer, if no firmer basis can be provided for their support than the generalities of the new theology? And we ourselves, when we consider the easy-going religion which is all about us, often share this feeling, and wish now and again that we could recover the unquestioning faith of an earlier age, even at the price of some of its intolerance and narrowness.

And yet, in spite of the manifest practical advantages of the old

theology, we know well enough that it would be impossible for us to go back to the world of Calvin and Edwards, even if we would, and that we would not if we could. Again we ask, Why is this true? Is our change of attitude due to an alteration in our experience, or to the presence of some new factor in our environment? We can now see that both these causes have been at work.

The latter cause is the more immediately apparent. Our primary reason for accepting the new theology is intellectual. We hold it because it explains the facts of life as a whole better than the old. It fits in with the habits of thought which we follow in other phases of our rational activity. When we turn to our Bible, we do not have to abandon the methods which we use when we study Shakspere or Homer. I once asked a friend, a professor of physical science, how he could oppose the application of critical principles to the study of the Bible. "In my brain," he said, "I keep two compartments, with a wall between them. On one side is my science and on the other my religion. If the wall should break down and the science should overflow, that would be the end of my religion." The new theology frees us from any such danger. It unifies our thinking, and that is in itself a great good.

It is worth while to linger upon this point, for it is of far-reaching importance. Intellectual influences did not play so prominent a part in the creation of the old theology as they have done in the case of the new. Neither Luther, nor for that matter Calvin, was a philosopher. Their interests were primarily moral and religious. We have seen that what we have called the Catholic element in the old theology, or in other words its underlying philosophy, was an inheritance from the past. It was taken over substantially unchanged from contemporary thought. It was a vessel found ready to hand, into which the new wine of moral and spiritual enthusiasm, which we call the Reformation, was poured. Whether it was the best possible receptacle is neither here nor there. It was the receptacle that was at hand and of which it was necessary to make use.

In the case of the new theology, the case is just the reverse. Here the motive at work was primarily intellectual. We have

a new view of the world growing up independently of the existing religion and reacting upon it. A new vessel has been formed, and the old wine is being poured into it. The vessel is strong and capacious, and can easily hold what it has received. Indeed, it is a question whether there is not room for a great deal more than it yet contains.

This explains the charge of indifferentism so frequently brought against the advocates of the new theology. They are called critical, destructive, sceptical, pullers-down rather than builders-up, and it must be confessed that there is truth in the charge. How can it be otherwise? The new theology is the outgrowth of a rational movement, and thought is necessarily critical, destructive, sceptical. The old view of the world which served for a thousand years has broken down, and countless builders are at work on the framework of the new philosophy which is to house our enlarged universe. But religion is not primarily interested in problems of thought. The interest of religion is practical, vital, personal. There must be new wine to fill the new vessel, if we are to have a religion for the modern world that will equal the old in power and vitality. The wine of religion is feeling. If the choice lies between an irrational religion that gives emotional satisfaction and a rational religion which does not, most people will choose the former without a moment's hesitation, as they have done again and again in the past.

But such a choice is not necessary in the present case. While intellectual influences have been prominent in the creation of the new theology, they have not been the only ones at work. Man is a unit, and no great change in thought takes place without producing corresponding changes in emotion and conduct. This is signally true in the case of the new theology. It makes its appeal to the heart and to the will, as well as to the mind. If it owes its origin to curiosity, it finds its verification in experience.

It makes its appeal to the heart. The God of the old Calvinism was a tower of strength to those who put their trust in him, but he was a consuming fire for those who felt themselves outcast from his grace, and the world of the old theology was a world that was full of outcasts. The records of the old insane

asylums have a pitiful story to tell. If one were elect and could know it, all was well, but outside lay the great mass of the unregenerate, for whom there was no hope; and none could tell but in this mass might be included a wife or a husband, a father or a brother, a son or a daughter.

In his famous sermon, "The End of the wicked contemplated by the Righteous: or the torments of the wicked in Hell no occasion of grief to the saints in Heaven," Jonathan Edwards, pleading with the impenitent in his congregation to turn from their sins, uses these words:

> You that have godly parents, who in this world have tenderly loved you, who were wont to look upon your welfare as their own, and were wont to be grieved for you when anything calamitous befell you in this world, and especially were greatly concerned for the good of your souls, industriously sought, and earnestly prayed for your salvation, how will you bear to see them . . . now without any love to you, approving the sentence of condemnation, when Christ shall with indignation bid you depart, wretched, cursed creatures, into eternal burnings? How will you bear to see and hear them praising the Judge for his justice exercised in pronouncing this sentence, and hearing it with holy joy in their countenances, and shouting forth the praises and hallelujahs of God and Christ on that account? . . . You that have godly husbands or wives or brethren or sisters, with whom you have been wont to dwell under the same roof, and to eat at the same table, consider how it will be with you when you shall come to part with them; when they shall be taken and you left. . . . However you may wail and lament when you see them parted from you . . . you will see in them no signs of sorrow that you are not taken with them.

If we are to realize what the new theology means for the emotions, we must try to put ourselves back for a moment into the world in which Jonathan Edwards's sermons could be preached and could be heard. The old theology gave us a God who was powerful but arbitrary. The new theology gives us a God who is everywhere and always consistent, a God who can be trusted not for me only, or for my children, or for my church, or for my nation, but to do that which is right and loving and wise for every child of man.

This is a distinct contribution to practical religion. It frees the heart from fear, and gives confidence and security. A God

who is like Jesus everywhere and always is a God in whom we may safely put our trust, and such is the God of the new theology.

But we do not fully measure the experimental value of the new theology until we consider the practical consequences which follow from this faith. To believe in a God of universal love enlarges and reinforces the motive to social service. Our dream is of a redeemed society, a city of God on earth, which shall involve the christianization of all the relations of life and the unity of all mankind in brotherhood, justice, and peace. This is an end that reclaims for divine use and meaning many sides of life for which the old theology could find scant value, and makes the old truth of the universal priesthood glow with a new and diviner meaning.

It is at this point that the practical appeal of the new theology is strongest. The characteristic note of our age is the new social spirit which is stirring all about us. The new theology provides the theoretical basis which is necessary to bring this spirit to self-consciousness. It rationalizes the instinctive faith in a better social order which animates so many of the men and women who are leading in the forward movement in church and state. In the Father who cares for men here as well as hereafter, and whose most acceptable worship is brotherly love, it gives us a God who can command the social conscience as well as satisfy the individual need.

For these three reasons, then, we find the new theology more satisfying than the old. It gives us a securer basis for our thought. It gives us a worthier object for our worship. It gives us an enlarged scope for our service. It is not something of which we need to be ashamed or for which we should apologize; but we may preach it with confidence, sure that when it is understood it will find response in the hearts and minds of men.

III

We have considered the old theology. We have considered the new. It remains, finally, to consider the relation between the old and the new. What ought to be the attitude which we, who

call ourselves representatives of the new theology, take toward the persons and the institutions which represent the old?

If the conclusions which we have thus far reached are correct, two positions which are often taken on this subject are excluded. The first is the position of those who maintain that there is an absolute antithesis between the old and the new theology, so that the only self-respecting position for the new theologian to take toward the old is that of Cato toward Carthage; the second is that which contends that the two are in substance identical, and that the apparent difference is a matter of phraseology and can be corrected by a change of words.

It is not true, in the first place, that there is an absolute antithesis between the old theology and the new. On the contrary, they have many things in common. Common to both are the fundamental elements of the religious experience, the sense of dependence and of reverence, the consciousness of sin, the longing for salvation, the joy of the soul in contact with God. Common to both are many truths and experiences which are specifically Christian. The conception of God as loving as well as just and powerful, the acceptance of Jesus as the supreme revelation of God, the substitution of an ethical and social for an individualistic and selfish conception of religion, the kingdom of God as the goal of effort and the unifying principle for thought. Common, finally, to both is faith that God is in essence rational, and the effort to give to the content of his revelation a form capable of rational understanding and defence. Here are great reaches of common territory, too broad to be overlooked, too valuable to be lightly abandoned.

Yet, though there is so much in common, there is a real difference between the two. There is, first of all, the fundamental difference in method, which we have already described, a difference which carries with it in either case a consistent view of the world and leads to corresponding differences in practice. The old theology retains in its thought of God an element of arbitrariness and of mystery, and this sense of the unknown hampers it in its practical activities. There is a realm of effort and of aspiration, congenial to the Christian spirit, from which it feels itself debarred. There is a great gulf fixed between world and

church, secular and religious, and that gulf must remain for all time. The new theology recognizes the separation, but refuses to regard it as permanent. The gulf is here to be bridged, sin to be replaced by righteousness, ignorance by knowledge, selfishness by love, the kingdoms of the world by the kingdom of the Lord and of his Christ. This difference is a real difference, and the new theology would not be true to itself if it did not make it apparent.

The true attitude of the new theology to the old, then, would seem to be that of a criticism which is rooted in sympathy. A part of its effort should be to give a more adequate intellectual expression to the body of convictions which the two hold in common because they grow out of similar religious experiences; a part should be to draw the consequences of the deeper religious and ethical insight for which the new view of the world makes room, and so to open the way to a better and more satisfying experience.

You will note that in both cases the stress falls upon experience. Theology, like philosophy, cannot create, it can only interpret; and the material with which it deals is religion. It is one of the unfortunate effects of the period through which we have been passing that this fact has so often been forgotten. Criticism has been exalted from a means to an end, and the great convictions by which the soul of man lives have been treated simply as curious historical phenomena, the unravelling of whose rise and fall constitutes a fascinating problem for the mind. This unsympathetic attitude is, I believe, one of the chief reasons for the wide-spread suspicion of the new theology, but it is a phase which is sure to pass. Indeed, I believe that it is rapidly passing. As the new view of the world becomes more familiar, and the results of criticism more assured, men will gradually come to see more clearly how impotent is thought apart from faith. They will value theology, whether new or old, in the measure in which it deepens, enriches, and purifies experience.

It is through our common experience, then, that we have to seek our approach to an understanding with those who hold the old theology. We have to show that the region which the new knowledge opens for thought to explore is at the same time,

as is always the case with human discovery, an invitation to new experiences. But we have also to show, and this is no less important, that with the intellectual resources which the new knowledge puts at our disposal we can give to the old convictions a surer and more satisfying expression than they have ever received before. If the new theology can do this, it will last; if not, it will have to give place to a newer.

THE SHEPHERD OF HERMAS AND CHRISTIAN LIFE IN ROME IN THE SECOND CENTURY

KIRSOPP LAKE

University of Leyden

It was once remarked with much truth that the non-fulfilment of the expectation of the Parousia was the principal factor in the development of early Christianity. This is all the more important, because it was not the custom of the first Christians to speak of the "second" coming—that is a modern point of view —but of the "coming" of the Messiah. To them the Son of Man, Jesus, had come, and the resurrection proved that he was now the Messiah in heaven, but, as Professor Burkitt has recently pointed out, "Son of Man" does not mean "Messiah" in the full sense, but is rather the description given of the predestined and pre-existent Messiah, before he actually came as Messiah in function. The Parousia of the triumphant Messiah whom they expected was as much future for Christians as it was for Jews, and on this point the main difference between the two was that the former believed that they knew who the Messiah was.

Yet, though the coming of the Messiah was future, it was imminent, and hourly expected, and this expectation was the background of all the thought of the early Christians, which enabled them to accept such a method of life and series of doctrines as were only permanently possible if society underwent a radical change. As a matter of fact society did not undergo a radical change, and thus the main problem for the second generation of Christians was to accommodate to a society which after all showed no signs of passing away, beliefs and doctrines which had been based on the expectation of its transitoriness. In the end, therefore, it was the Christian doctrine and practice which underwent the change, and society which remained. Instead of entering a new world the Christians found themselves busy with the task of improving the old one. That is one aspect of the

picture. The other is that in this task Christianity owes most of its success to the expectation which it had once cherished. The Messianic kingdom, its laws and its teaching, ceased to be an expectation, but survived as an ideal. Gradually, in practice if not in theory, men gave up looking for the coming of the kingdom in which sin, suffering, poverty, and death would be miraculously abolished; but nevertheless they had enjoyed the vision of the time when these things would happen, and pressed forward to make the world in which they were living—and would continue to live—correspond somewhat more closely to the city which they had seen.

It would of course be absurd to suggest that the second or third generation of Christians would have expressed themselves quite in this fashion: no generation is ever fully conscious of the changes of thought which later historians find important. But the readjustment of thought went quietly on for nearly two centuries, and the struggle to which it gave rise between practice and theory is really the most important thing in the history of this period. Such a process of readjustment is, however, so complex that it is impossible to follow it clearly except by taking special examples from the history of a single community, and by noticing how in the first half of the second century changes were introduced by reason of this gradual alteration in the point of view, and the consequent conflict between theory and practice.

For this purpose the church at Rome is the best one to study, and for the first half of the second century practically the only source of information is one book, the Shepherd of Hermas. This curious book is in form an apocalypse, divided into Visions, Mandates, and Similitudes. It was written about 140 A.D. by Hermas, brother of Pope Pius I, but it is probable that it contains various pieces, all written by Hermas, varying in date between 110 and 130. It is an apocalypse, but a practical apocalypse, and although the writer chose to express himself in this, as it were, old-fashioned and conservative form, it is plain enough that he was really a progressive thinker, and deliberately chose this form of expression because he knew that human nature will often listen to a reformer who wishes to change either appearance or

substance, but not to one who attacks both simultaneously. That is why progress is never direct, but spiral: one generation alters the substance, but leaves the appearance; the next sees the inconsistency, and changes the appearance as well. It takes two generations to complete the process, and that is reform; if the attempt be made to do both at once, it becomes revolution.

Hermas was a reformer: he was busy introducing changes in thought and practice, to recommend which he used an old and popular form of statement, and in the present article it is proposed to trace the way in which these changes affected, in the first place, the doctrine of baptism, and in the second place the position of prophets in the Christian community.

I

Whatever may have been the position of baptism in Palestine, it always held the central position in Christian doctrine and practice in the Graeco-Roman world. Christians regarded themselves as men who had accepted the Messiah, and had in some sense entered into his kingdom before his coming in power; they were "proleptic" members of the kingdom. The condition of their entry into it was acceptance of the Messiah, but the actual method of entry was baptism. In Christian baptism the convert was said to be born again to eternal life, to become a new creature, to be set free from evil spirits, and to be cleansed from sin. The importance of this doctrine for the propagation of Christianity in the second century can scarcely be overestimated. Baptism was the great "mystery" of Christianity, just as, for instance, the "taurobolium" was the great "mystery" of Mithraism. The oriental religions were all mystery-religions, or, as we now should say, sacramental: that is to say, they offered to their votaries participation in eternal life. The differences between them in this respect were formal rather than essential, as can be illustrated from the fact that the phrase "born again into eternity" (*in aeternum renatus*) is applied in an inscription to worshippers of Mithra as well as to Christians. Thus the Christian teachers had the great advantage, from a missionary point

of view, that they were teaching not only in a language, but also in a form of thought, which was understood by their public.

It cannot be accidental that all the forms of religion which became popular at this time in Rome were sacramental, and the explanation is probably to be sought in psychology. In the language of William James, there were in the beginning of the second century a number of "sick souls," who found a remedy in a combination of faith and outward acts to which a specifically healing character was given, and it is worth noting that, whether we accept the sacramental theories of the second century or not, the actual psychiatric efficiency of the sacraments themselves is undoubted. The theory was that baptism admitted to the Messianic kingdom, and incidentally, because all evil was excluded from that kingdom, gave release from sin. The fact was that the sick soul who believed was healed,—whether it would equally well have been healed if it had believed in something else is a question which is exceedingly important in itself but not important for the pure historian.

That Hermas fully accepted this central position of baptism is clear from *Vis.* iii. In this he describes a great tower, built over a spring of water, and explains that the meaning is, "your life was saved, and shall be saved, by water," and adds that the tower (the church) is founded on "the word (ῥῆμα) of the almighty and glorious Name." The reference to water and to the "Name" in baptism calls for no further comment. Or again in *Sim.* ix, 16 he says:

> For before man bears the name of the Son of God he is dead, but when he receives the seal, he puts off mortality and receives life. The seal, then, is the water. They go down, then, into the water dead and come up alive.

The doctrine of baptismal regeneration, taking place *ex opere operato*, could scarcely be more clearly expressed.

Such teaching was probably typical of all the mystery-religions, and it is plain that in the use of such modes of thought the danger of an absolutely unethical development was considerable. Theoretically, indeed, there is no room in such a view for a moral or ethical element. The baptized Christian was *ipso facto* a mem-

ber of the Messianic kingdom, had obtained eternal life, and was free from sin. In practice, however, it soon became clear that on the one point which could be observed—freedom from sin—the Christian was by no means safe. Theory and practice were in collision, and the problem as to what should be done became serious. As always happens, attempts were made—not wholly unsuccessful—to make the theory answer the facts, and at the same time to raise the practice to the level of the theory.

The theory had the necessary corollary that sin after baptism was unforgivable (cf. Heb. 6 4–6): practice had shown that if this were so, baptism was likely to be valuable only to men at the point of death. Sinlessness was to be a characteristic of the members of the Messianic kingdom, and it had therefore been supposed that it could and would be a characteristic of Christians; but experience proved that this was not the case. The theory obviously failed to satisfy the facts, and the result was, if we may read between the lines of *Vis.* iii, that it was becoming more and more frequently the practice to postpone baptism in order to avoid its responsibilities. In this vision Hermas sees the preparations for building the tower (the church) beside or over the water. The imagery is clearly drawn from the hills which surround the Campagna, where stone is quarried from a precipice and allowed to fall by a kind of chute.[1] This is, however, an inaccurate method of guiding the blocks, and many go far away from the place intended for them. So Hermas sees many stones which cannot be brought to the water, and therefore cannot be used for building the tower. These, he explains, are "they that have heard and are minded to be baptized in the name of the Lord. Then, when they bethink them of the purity of the truth, they repent, and go again after their evil desires." That is to say, they are intended to represent those who postpone baptism too long, and are prevented by death. For them Hermas gives no hope of entry into the church, though he does not absolutely condemn them to final reprobation. "They may

[1] I saw exactly the sort of scene (except that there was no tower) between Grotta Ferrata and Frascati, when the electric tramway was being laid. The stones slid down the cliff to their destination, but, just as Hermas describes, many of them failed to reach it.

repent, but they cannot fit into this tower. But they shall fit into another much lesser place, and this after they have been tormented and have fulfilled the days of their sins." It is not quite clear what Hermas means by this: I am inclined to believe that he refers to a repentance after death, and to something closely resembling purgatory.

In any case it is plain that the suggestion that baptism should be postponed was well known in Rome when Hermas wrote, and that he rejected it. Moreover history tells us that his view was ultimately accepted, and that ecclesiastical practice went to the other extreme by instituting infant baptism, of which there is no trace till the second half of the second century.

Nevertheless the refusal to accept a postponed baptism as satisfactory did not help to solve the original problem. The theory or doctrine still remained that the baptized person ought to be sinless, and practice still proved that he was usually nothing of the kind. Hermas recognized the latter fact, but did not wish to abandon the theory entirely. In *Mand.* iv, 3, therefore, he presents the problem to the angel who is instructing him: "I have heard, sir, from certain teachers [2] that there is no other repentance than that one, when we went down into the water and received remission of our former sins"; and the angel replies that this is indeed the case. Thus the theory was not abandoned. But it was altered, for the angel goes on to explain that in the future there will be one further opportunity of repentance, and a great part of the book after this is given up to the explanations of the working of penitence, which is so realistically handled that it is clear that the first steps have been taken on the road which led to the institution of Penance.

Similarly, an effort was made to improve the practice so as to correspond more exactly with the theory. Clearly, the danger was that men should argue to themselves, "We are saved through baptism, we have been made sinless, and no act of ours can affect

[2] When one remembers that the Epistle to the Hebrews was well known in Rome before the time of Hermas (cf. the long quotations in 1 Clement), it is difficult not to think that this is a reference to Heb. 6 4 ff. It will be noted that Hermas does not deny the truth of what Hebrews says; he only claims to supersede it on one point by a more recent revelation.

this happy result." There were indeed heretics who actually argued in this way, and thus no doubt gave color to the accusation of immorality which was so often brought against the Christians; and the natural answer to, and reaction against, their contention was to insist on the necessity for a higher ethical character in the Christian life.

Probably we can find an earlier trace of this tendency in 1 Peter. Whether that epistle was really written by St. Peter or not is a most difficult question. Personally, I am inclined to think that there is a shade of superior probability for the traditional view that it was written by St. Peter from Rome in the time of Nero. If so, it falls too early for our period, and it is a proof that the problem existed in Rome from the beginning. But there is also something to be said for a later date, which places the epistle in the beginning of the second century. In any case, it almost certainly came from Rome. Now, in speaking of baptism, the writer says that Noah and his family were "saved through water, which also in the antitype doth now save you, even baptism, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the interrogation of a good conscience towards God." The phrase translated "interrogation of a good conscience" is ἐπερώτημα τῆς καλῆς συνειδήσεως, and probably refers to some sort of moral vow made by the baptized person. Perhaps it is not rash to see in the Didache the best illustration of the probable nature of this vow. In it, as will be remembered, the ethical or moral treatise which we call the Two Ways, is used as a manual of instruction for catechumens.

In any case, if we read between the lines, it is easy to see that the writer of 1 Peter is afraid of a non-moral view of baptism. Still plainer is it in Hermas. In the ninth Similitude he sees twelve maidens gathered round the tower which represented the church, and is told:

> These are holy spirits, and a man can in no wise be found in the kingdom of God unless they clothe him with their raiment. For if thou receive the Name only, but receive not the raiment from them, thou shalt profit nothing, forasmuch as these maidens are powers of the Son of God. If thou bear the Name, but bear not his power, in vain shalt thou bear his name. The stones, said he,

> which thou sawest cast away, these bore the Name, but put not on the clothing of the maidens. What, said I, is their clothing? Their very names, said he, are their clothing. Whosoever beareth the name of the Son of God ought to bear their names also, for the Son himself beareth the names of these maidens. And their names are Faith, Continence, Strength, Patience, Simplicity, Innocence, Purity, Joy, Truth, Prudence, Concord, Love.

The meaning is obvious; not only baptism, but a moral life is required: and Hermas is clearly protesting against the view that in baptism, by a purely magical use of the name and of water, the Christian obtains eternal life or membership in the Messianic kingdom, and is trying to impress his hearers or readers with the necessity for moral virtue as well as for the sacramental efficacy of baptism.

It would be interesting if we knew whether the other sacramental religions, such as Mithraism, went through the same development. In the absence of evidence, certainty is of course impossible, but I think the probability is that the course of events in the other mystery-religions was somewhat different, and that for a reason which is important because it points to one of the most serious differences between Christianity and the other oriental religions. Christianity made from the beginning a special appeal to the failures of society, to the "submerged tenth," the poor and the wretched. In this respect it differed sharply from the other sacramental religions which offered their privileges only to respectable and desirable persons. This distinction was clearly noted by Celsus,[3] who, in a manner which finds a curious echo in some modern forms of thought, heaped scorn on the Christians for admitting to their church all the undesirable elements which other religions excluded.

The result was, first, that the necessity for emphasizing the moral standard among the initiate was from the start far more urgent among Christians than among the votaries of the other mysteries, which appealed to the ninety and nine righteous

[3] Cf. Origen's quotation from Celsus in Contra Celsum iii, 59: *οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τελετὰς καλοῦντες προκηρύττουσι τάδε· ὅστις χεῖρας καθαρὸς καὶ φωνὴν συνετὸς . . . καὶ ὅτῳ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν συνοῖδε κακόν, καὶ ὅτῳ εὖ καὶ δικαίως βεβιώται . . . ἐπακούσωμεν δὲ τίνας ποτὲ οὗτοι καλοῦσιν· ὅστις, φασίν, ἁμαρτωλός, ὅστις ἀσύνετος, ὅστις νήπιος, καὶ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ὅστις κακοδαίμων, τοῦτον ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ δέξεται.*

rather than to the one sinner who repenteth (and has a tendency to backsliding), and, secondly, that, so far as the need was felt in the other mystery-religions, they were inclined to meet the claims of morality by raising their standard of admission, and warning off all who in any way fell below it, while Christianity, which could not adopt this method, was forced to try to insist on a high standard after admission. It had started with the theory that its sacrament not only admitted to eternal life, but removed sin, and though experience had shown that this view was untenable, and that Christians were after all sinful, it could at least try to make them as little sinful as possible, and so render the gulf between theory and practice somewhat less terribly evident.

Moreover, this fact probably stands in an intimate relation to the problem why Christianity, which welcomed all the socially and morally inefficient elements in the Roman Empire, survived more successfully than the cognate mystery-religions which appealed only to the efficient.[4] The main reason, I think, is to be found in the fact that morality, or ethics, is not the same thing as religion, and cannot be regarded as a perfect measure of it. Christianity, Mithraism, the religion of Isis, and the other mystery-systems were quite definitely religious, not ethical, systems. They made their appeal to the religious, not merely to the moral and respectable, and by their success or failure in attracting them they stood or fell. Religion is, as it were, one of the senses of the soul, morality is another, and both are distinct from logic. You will often find religious people who are neither innately moral nor logical, and naturally moral persons who have no sense of religion. Not only so, but there is even the same principle of compensation visible in the spiritual senses as in the physical. We all know that a blind man develops an abnormal sense of touch which to some extent compensates for his lack of vision. Probably it is the same with our spiritual senses: the man who has naturally no sense of morality, as such, often has an extraordinarily high degree of religious feeling, which helps to compensate for his defect; and, on the other hand, those who have no sense

[4] It might probably be added that Mithraism, which was in the end the most serious rival of Christianity, approached most nearly to its practice in this respect.

of religion have frequently an extraordinarily high moral standard. The point is of considerable importance in practical work, and, as practical psychology comes to be better appreciated, will no doubt be consciously used as a principle of social work.

Let me guard, however, against overstatement or misunderstanding. I hope it is clear that I do not mean that religion can ever really be satisfactorily expressed in immoral conduct. What I wish to say is that morality is not a measure of religious experience, and that in any case conduct is not religion itself, but only a translation of it. Perhaps it may be put in this way. Let us say that religion is the conversation of man with his heavenly Father; it is then quite clear that morality is something different, because it is not conversation, but action. The conversation of father and child may lead to the child's doing what the father wishes—or it may not. But if it does not, that is no proof that the conversation has not taken place; nor if a deaf child, who cannot hear his father's voice, does what his father wished, is he any the less deaf. My impression is that there are many in the human family who are deaf, so that they never hear the Father's voice, yet do his will; and many others who hear his voice quite well, and have frequent conversation with him, but are quite unsuccessful in translating into action what they have heard in this way.

To come back to history: the importance of this point of view is that it explains why Christianity succeeded and Mithraism failed. Christianity did not in the beginning make the mistake of confounding morality with religion, but accepted all those who felt the religious impulse, in spite of the fact that morally and socially they often belonged to the ranks of the inefficient and undesirable. From this point of view the importance of Hermas is that he gives us a glimpse of the church at Rome wrestling with the problem of making this class of converts understand that, though religion be not morality, its truest manifestation in life is nevertheless to be found in morality.

The increased attention which was thus directed to what may be called the practical study of ethics had at least two important effects. Previously the Christians had regarded themselves as those who were destined to be the members of the Messianic

kingdom, just as Jesus was destined to be the king, and it had been assumed that they possessed the qualities which would distinguish alike the king and the members of his kingdom, especially sinlessness, or, to express it in positive terms, righteousness. Experience forced them to admit that this was not always true, and Hermas formulated the view that the permanent retention of membership in the Messianic kingdom depended not only on the miraculous sacramental virtue of baptism, or on the power of the name of the Messiah, or even on the faith which accepted Jesus as Messiah, but also on the possession of various personal ethical virtues. This was bound to lead to a distinction on the one hand between sin and sin, and on the other between virtue and virtue. The distinction between sin and sin is made in 1 John, where a difference is drawn between sin unto death and sin not unto death; and thereby was taken the first step on the road leading to the later ecclesiastical doctrine of deadly and venial sin, and the elaborate casuistry of the Middle Ages. Hermas himself, however, did not pursue this line of thought; to him sin was sin, and his doctrine of penitence is the only concession which he makes from the teaching that sin after baptism is fatal. But on the other side—with regard to a distinction between virtue and virtue—he makes an important development, and formulates a teaching which in essentials does not differ much from that of supererogatory virtue. That is to say, he admits that there is a degree of virtue above that which is necessary for salvation, and that it will have a suitable reward in the future. This is clearly stated in his treatment of fasting (*Sim.* v, 3), in which he says:

> Keep the commandments of the Lord, and thou shalt be in favor with God, and shalt be inscribed in the number of them that keep his commandments. And if thou do any good thing beyond God's commandment, thou shalt win for thyself more exceeding glory and shalt be more honorable with God than thou wouldst have been.

The "good thing beyond the commandment" is

> To eat nothing but bread and water, and when thou hast told the sum of that day's expenses to which thou wouldst have been put for the meats consumed in it, thou shalt give it to a widow or orphan or one in need.

It is instructive to compare this with the story of the young man in Mark 10 17–31 who asked what he should do to inherit eternal life, and with the recension in Matthew. In Mark he is told that keeping the commandments is insufficient; in Matthew, that it is insufficient *if he wishes to be "perfect."* There is a radical distinction in thought between the two things, and Hermas and Matthew seem to represent the same kind of divergence from primitive thought, though I see no reason—rather the reverse—for thinking that there is any literary connection between them. They both point to the time when Christians began to distinguish between membership in the Messianic kingdom or salvation, or eternal life, or whatever other name they may have given to it, and high or low position within the kingdom, and to speak of those who were "perfect" in distinction from those who, while unquestionably members of the kingdom, did not reach to the highest position.

It is plain that we are here at the beginning of that development which led to mediaeval casuistry with its nicely graded apportioning of an appropriate label for every possible human act, varying from deadly sin to supererogatory virtue; nor is it, I think, less plain that this development was due to the gradual change of attitude towards life involved in the passing away of the expectation of the coming of the Messianic kingdom and the corresponding rise of the Catholic church. Primitive Christianity meant the change of life from bad to good. It thought in absolutes. The Catholic church meant the transformation of life from worse to better; it thought in relatives. The change was enormous; it is the most important thing in early church history, and obviously was necessary to make Christianity the practical power for good which it became. Yet, however paradoxical it may be, it is profoundly true that the success was possible just because the change was never complete. However much the church was occupied with making men better, instead of making them good, it never wholly forgot the splendor of its first vision of a sinless world, and centuries later, when the memory of its early hopes had grown dim, and the church was degenerating into a society whose motives were dubious and practices lamentable, the power of the Reformation lay largely in the

fact that its leaders recognized the ideal of Christianity to be the formation of a new creature rather than the improvement of an old one.

II

Just as the gradual movement of the centre of the Christian life from the expectation of the Messianic kingdom to the practical needs of the Catholic church influenced the development of doctrine, as was shown in the instance of baptism, so it produced an even more remarkable change on the side of organization. It is plain that a community which is momentarily expecting a complete and catastrophic change in the character of society is unlikely to possess more than the necessary minimum of organization; it is not less plain that as soon as this expectation passes into the background the need of organization will be increasingly felt, and those who have some official place in the organization will gain an importance hitherto denied to them. This is what happened in the early church, especially in Rome, and the importance of Hermas is that it gives us, if not exactly an account of the change, at least a picture of the state of things which previously obtained, showing us the points which necessitated this organic development.

This question brings us into some disputed matters, and I think that the study of history shows that the truth has not been the monopoly of either party in the dispute. If we ask who were the most important people in the Christian church in the first generation, the answer undoubtedly is, the Apostles and Prophets. If we go on farther, and ask who was the most important person in the church at Rome at the end of the second century, the answer unquestionably is that it was the Bishop. But the difficulty comes when we inquire how this change took place; for that is precisely the problem to which no undoubted or unquestionable answer can be given. The importance, therefore, of Hermas is that, with some help from cognate documents, he throws enough light on the question to enable us to reach a solution which possesses a very high degree of probability.

It would not be unfair to say that on the main question students have been divided into two parties. One party has argued that

the bishops of the end of the second century represent the apostles of the first, and has based its contention on certain references which go to show that in the first century the apostles appointed bishops (or presbyters—probably the two words applied to the same office [5]) in various communities. Against this view another party has emphasized the distinction in function between the early bishops and the apostles, has disputed the reasoning of the opponents, and in the heat of argument has very foolishly thrown unnecessary doubt on facts vouched for by excellent evidence. The facts seem to be opposed to the extremists of either school. It is clear, on the evidence of the New Testament and all succeeding literature that in all important communities there were from the beginning local officials, appointed in the first place probably by the apostles, and that they were sometimes called bishops, sometimes presbyters. Thus the apostolic appointment of some presbyters is probable: but, on the other hand, it is not less clear that the functions of an apostle were quite different from those of a presbyter or bishop, and that functionally the apostle is akin to the prophet, not to the presbyter.

The discovery of the Didache in 1883 is really the starting-point of progress in the solution of this problem. It corrected once for all our ideas as to the meaning of the word "apostle," and as to the importance of the Christian prophets. We are apt to regard "apostle" as meaning one of the twelve disciples, and even when we outgrow this untenable view (untenable because the word is applied in the New Testament to several outside the number of the Twelve) we remain under the influence of a false, or at least unnecessary, interpretation of 1 Cor. 9 1. Here St. Paul, arguing that he is at least the equal of the other apostles, says, "Am I not free, am I not an apostle, have I not seen Jesus our Lord?" and this has been explained to mean that an apostle must have seen Jesus. There is nothing in the context to justify this view. "Have I not seen Jesus?" is more probably additional to "Am I not an apostle?" than explanatory of it, for the question was not whether Paul was an apostle, but whether he

[5] Some years ago one would have made this statement with much confidence. But J. Réville's book Les origines de l'épiscopat suggests other possibilities. They do not, however, seriously affect the present question.

was the equal of the original apostles. It is true that the question has usually been taken by commentators as if it were explanatory. But this is merely the after effect of the old view that apostle must mean "one of the Twelve," and that it is historically improbable is clear from the Didache, in which "apostle" is not a title given to a special class of men who had once been in the company of Jesus, but to men inspired by the Spirit who went about spreading the gospel among those who had never heard it, and founding churches wherever they met with success.

These "apostles" were closely connected in character with the prophets. According to the Didache these also travelled about, but their object was the edification of existing churches rather than the foundation of new ones. The difference between apostle and prophet was therefore functional, not essential, for both were men through whom the Holy Spirit spoke, and they revealed truth to the world through his inspiration. But a prophet—and probably not an apostle—might settle in a definite community, and it is quite clear that wherever prophets were, they were the spiritual leaders of the Christians in that place, not because they had a definite office, but because they had a special gift.

The outburst of prophesying was one of the marks of the Christian community, and, as the account of the Day of Pentecost in Acts 2 shows, it was recognized as a definitely eschatological sign that the Messianic kingdom was at hand. The writer of Acts explains the phenomena of Pentecost as the fulfilment of the words of Joel, "It shall come to pass in the last days I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions, and on my servants and on my handmaids in those days will I pour out my Spirit, and they shall all prophesy." That "in the last days" is not in the original, but in Luke's correct explanation of the context, is worth noticing because it shows that to him the eschatological significance of Pentecost was the principal thing. It is also noteworthy that the last phrase, "and they shall prophesy," is not in the original. If it be a true canon of exegesis, as I believe, that divergence in quotations from the original often indicates the point

which the quoter regards as important, then clearly Luke regarded prophecy as one of the signs of the coming of the kingdom. The position of prophets in the early church is thus seen to be the natural consequence of the eschatological Messianic expectation, and, as this expectation began to be falsified by time, the position of the prophets lost at least part of its basis.

Thus at the beginning of the second century prophets were the most important people in the settled order of the community, but the eschatological reason for their importance was gradually weakening. This, however, would not have been sufficient to destroy their position (for the eschatological expectation was not the only reason for honoring them) had not a new and serious problem arisen. This was provided by the "false prophets" and is dealt with by Hermas in the eleventh Mandate. In this Hermas says:

> He (the shepherd) showed me men seated on a bench and another man seated in a chair; and he said to me, "Seest thou them that sit on the bench? These are faithful, but he who sits on the chair is a false prophet who destroys the sense of the servants of God,—of the doubleminded, that is, but not of the faithful. The doubleminded, then, come to him as a soothsayer, and ask him what haply shall befall them; and the prophet, having in himself no power of the divine Spirit, answers them according to their demand and according to their unholy desires, and fills their souls as they wish."

That is to say, he recognizes that there were in the church not only the true prophets, but also false prophets, and that this gave rise to the double problem,—how is it that there are false prophets, and how can they be distinguished so that the true may be accepted and the false rejected?

To the first of these questions Hermas never gave the answer that the false prophet was an impostor; such an idea would have been completely opposed to the whole trend of thought in those days. He did not hesitate to proclaim the inspiration of the false prophets to be as certain as that of the true prophets. All prophets are inspired; only some have the wrong sort of inspiration. The false prophet prophesies "because the devil fills his spirit."

This view is characteristic of early Christianity, and is very

important for any right appreciation of the growth of doctrine. The Christian of the second century explained all psychological phenomena, including religion, in the terms of obsession. The world, so one may express the theory, is full of all sorts of spirits or angels: some of them are good, some are evil, the good proceed from God, the evil from the devil, and all, whether good or evil, have the power, under favorable circumstances, of taking possession of men and inspiring for good or for evil. This belief was derived by Christianity from Judaism, and Judaism probably obtained it from Persian sources; it is therefore one of the points in common between Christianity and Mithraism, and this fact is rather important, not only because it explains some of the great resemblances between Christianity and Mithraism, but because it brought Christianity into the main stream of thought in the Roman Empire. When a Christian spoke of obsession by an evil spirit or inspiration by a good one, he was not talking in a language other than that which men were accustomed to hear; he was using the same *Weltanschauung* as his hearers. The tendency to explain psychology and physiology in terms of spirits was as common then as is now the attempt to explain them in terms of microbes.

Nor must it be thought that "spirit" was used in the modern sense of an influence or an essential characteristic. The Christians of the second century, like most of their contemporaries, thought of spirits as real beings. The difference between those days and ours may be illustrated by saying that when we speak of a "spirit of holiness" we are scarcely conscious that we are personifying an abstract quality,—all the emphasis is on the "holiness"; but when a second-century writer used the same phrase, the emphasis was all the other way,—on the "spirit," not on the "holiness," and he was so conscious that he was speaking of a definitely existing being with an individuality as great as his own, that the idea of the abstract quality was quite secondary. To us such phrases are the personifications of abstractions, to them they were the qualities belonging to persons.

This theory of the universe, that it is full of spirits whose working explains the phenomena of natural and spiritual life, was applied widely. Disease was explained as an attack from

an evil spirit, so also was sin, and so was magic, soothsaying, and false prophecy. In the same way the Christian was a man who had been taken possession of by a good spirit, and a true prophet was a man possessed by a divine spirit of prophecy which had a message to deliver. Thus not only prophecy, but all religious or psychological phenomena, true and false, were explained as various workings of different spirits. As an illustration may be taken the interesting passage in which Hermas explains the reason why bad temper leads to sin (*Mand.* v, 1):

> Be long-suffering and prudent, said he, and thou shalt have dominion over all wicked works, and shalt do all righteousness. For if thou be long-suffering, the Holy Spirit which dwells in thee shall be clear, and not darkened over by another evil spirit. . . . But if any ill temper approach, immediately the Holy Spirit, which is delicate, is straitened by not having clear space, and seeks to depart from the place, . . . for that both the spirits then should dwell together is unprofitable and evil for the man in whom they dwell.

The answer, then, of Hermas to the first question, What is the nature of a false prophet? was simple: he is a man whom an evil spirit inspired to prophesy, and for his generation this answer was satisfactory and decisive.

The second question was far more difficult, and of greater importance for the church life of the time. How is it possible to tell the difference between the true and the false prophet, or, in the language of 1 John, to "try the spirits"? Hermas gives his answer in the eleventh Mandate. He suggests that we can tell the difference between a true and false prophet by noting their conduct (*Mand.* xi, 9–14).

> From his life prove the man that has the divine Spirit. First, he that has the divine Spirit which is from above, is meek and peaceable and lowly, and refrains himself from wickedness and vain desire of this world, and makes himself poorer than all men, and answers nothing to any when insulted, and does not speak solitarily, nor does the Holy Spirit speak when a man would speak, but when God wills that he should speak, then he speaks. Whenever, therefore, the man who has the divine Spirit comes into a meeting of righteous men who have faith in the divine Spirit, and the congregation of those men make their prayer unto God, then the

> angel of the prophetic spirit which obsesses him fills the man, and the man, being filled with the Holy Spirit, speaks to the congregation as the Lord will. . . .
>
> Hear now about the spirit that is earthly and void, and hath no power, but is foolish. First, the man who thinks that he has the spirit exalts himself and wishes to have the preëminence, and straightway he is heady and shameless and full of talk and conversant among many luxuries and other deceits, and he receives pay for his prophecy, and if he receive not he prophesies not. Can, then, a divine spirit receive pay and prophesy? That a prophet of God should do so is impossible, but the spirit of such prophets is earthly. And then he never at all approaches an assembly of righteous men, but flees from them. And he joins himself to the doubleminded and empty, and prophesies to them in corners and deceives them by speaking in all things emptily according to their lusts. . . . When however he comes to a full assembly of righteous men who have the divine Spirit, and intercession is made by them, that man is emptied and the earthly spirit flees away from fear of him, and he is struck dumb and utterly crushed, not being able to speak a word.

The policy here suggested was not a new one. We find it first in Matt. 7 15–20.

> Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.

Whether this passage was really spoken by Christ, or represents rather the special exegesis of some saying of his which the church gave at a later time, is impossible to say. The principle, "by their fruits ye shall know them," was no doubt in the section of the source (Q) on which the Sermon on the Mount is based, for it is found both in Matthew and Luke: the question is whether the reference to false prophets was in Q but omitted by Luke, or is simply a redactoral comment by Matthew. For myself I think it more probable that Matthew inserted than that Luke omitted it. But this is not important for the present point:

the text of Matthew, as it stands, is almost certainly earlier than Hermas, and represents the same policy of a "conduct test" applied to prophets in order to distinguish the true from the false.

The same policy can also be found in the Didache (xi, 3 f.):

> Now concerning the apostles and prophets, according to the decree of the gospel so do ye. Let every apostle that cometh to you be received as the Lord; but he shall not stay save for one day; but if there be necessity, the next day also; but if he stay, then he is a false prophet.

That is the rule for apostles; they are missionaries, and a missionary has no business to wish to stay too long away from his work, which is among the unconverted, not among those who are already Christians.

> And every prophet speaking in a "spirit" ye shall not try nor judge, for every sin shall be forgiven, but this sin shall not be forgiven.[6] But not every one that speaketh in a spirit is a prophet, but only if he have the ways of the Lord; from their ways then shall the false prophet and the true prophet be known. And no prophet appointing a table [probably this means ordering an Agape to be held] in a spirit will eat thereof, unless he be a false prophet.

It is interesting to notice that the Johannine epistles represent a different point of view. They wish to apply to prophets a dogmatic test.

> Beloved (says the writer of 1 John 4 1–2) believe not every spirit but try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world. Hereby know ye the spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth Jesus as Christ come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that confesseth not Jesus is not of God. . . . Hereby know we the spirit of truth and the spirit of error.

Contrast this with Hermas and with the Didache, and I think we must admit that we have to do with two independent attempts in the different localities to deal with the question of the false

[6] Note here the earliest and undoubtedly correct interpretation of the "sin against the Holy Spirit," namely, to reject the message of an inspired prophet, because he is the mouthpiece of the Spirit.

prophets. Hermas is an undoubted proof that the question was very important in Rome in the first half of the second century, and that then the conduct test rather than the dogmatic test was applied.[7]

The difficulty of the policy supported by Hermas was practical. Who was to apply it? Who was to judge between prophet and prophet? Ignatius had already given the answer: it was to be the bishop. It is uncertain whether the writings of Ignatius were known in Rome in the first half of the second century, but it is surely obvious that the solution he suggests was certain to be made. Perhaps it is worth while recalling the evidence which exists as to the bishops or presbyters in Rome at this time. Hermas helps us here but little. He refers to the bishops, but only in passing, and the source of our knowledge is Clement, who wrote in the last years of the first century (1 Clem. 42 4, 44 1–3). He states that the apostles appointed the

> First-fruits, when they had proved them by the Spirit, to be bishops and deacons unto them that should believe, . . . and afterwards they provided a continuance, that if these should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed to their ministrations. Those, therefore, who were appointed by them, or afterwards by other men of repute with the consent of the whole community, . . . we do not think it just to cast out from their ministration.

If we take this passage in connection with the various references in the New Testament to bishops or presbyters (and Clement, like St. Paul, used the words as synonymous), here is sufficient proof that there was in every community an organization of administrative officers, called either bishops or presbyters. They were not apostles, and they were not prophets—from these they differed both functionally and essentially—but they were the administrative heads of the community, and as such would naturally be the mouthpiece of opinion, and have the last word of judgment in matters of fact, such as the behavior of some stranger who claimed to be a prophet, was suspected of

[7] Hermas may indeed even be used as an argument to show that the Johannine literature was not introduced in Rome until after the time of Hermas. It is not impossible that Justin Martyr brought it with him,—but this question deserves separate treatment.

being a false prophet, and had to be tested by the rules laid down in the Didache, in Hermas, and in Matthew.

Moreover, we know, if Epiphanius may be trusted, that at all events Marcion, when he came to Rome, applied to the presbyters for recognition and failed to obtain it, so that we shall run little risk of error if we say that by the middle of the second century the prophets had so far come under the control of the administrators of the church that the latter had the power of deciding who was and who was not a genuine prophet. Thus the result of this problem of the early church—the question of true and false prophets—was the subjection of prophets to bishops and the beginning of that long chapter of history in which the episcopacy became not only the administrative arm of the church but the tribunal which judged the quality of men's spiritual life and the accuracy of their theological statements.

That this solution had its dangers is obvious from the study of history; but under the circumstances it was absolutely unavoidable, and it belongs to the general process of readjustment which was rendered necessary by the passage of the church from a community living in the momentary expectation of the coming of the Messiah to one in which that expectation was gradually fading into a hope for a more or less distant future, and Christians were settling down to the more actual problems of life. The extreme importance of Hermas is that it gives us glimpses of this process of readjustment.

THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENT AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

GAYLORD S. WHITE

Union Settlement, New York

More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since a letter, written by a passenger on an English railway train as he sat on the bank beside the track waiting for a broken-down engine to be repaired, resulted in the founding of the first Social Settlement. The writer was the Reverend Canon Samuel A. Barnett, then Vicar of St. Jude's Church, Whitechapel, in East London, and the settlement was Toynbee Hall. Mrs. Barnett has recently published an interesting account of the steps that led to the realization of the settlement idea. She describes the lack of knowledge of the poor on the part of earnest, thinking men, when she and her husband took up their work at St. Jude's, and tells of the visits they made to Oxford from time to time to talk to little groups of cultivated, serious young college men to get them to care about the poor and their problems. Some of these men came to Whitechapel for a visit, to see for themselves the conditions of poverty, and occasionally some would take lodgings in East London, when they left the university to begin their life-work. In this way a connection was established between Whitechapel and the university, and discerning spirits were able to see that each side had contributions of value to make to the other.

It was not strange that when Mr. Barnett was asked to give advice to some men at St. John's College, Cambridge, who were desirous of doing something for the poor, and were not quite prepared to start a college mission, he should have suggested that "men might hire a house, where they could come for short or long periods, and, living in an industrial quarter, learn to 'sup sorrow with the poor.'" This suggestion was made in the letter to which I have referred, and "that letter," says Mrs. Barnett, "founded Toynbee Hall." The letter was expanded into a paper read in

November of the same year (1883) at a college meeting at St. John's College, Oxford. The idea was taken up with enthusiasm, and on Christmas Eve, 1884, the first settlers took up their residence in the new building which had been erected adjacent to St. Jude's Church. The story of the naming of the new enterprise, as Mrs. Barnett tells it, is interesting. Arnold Toynbee, a rare spirit, was one of the group of young men at Oxford who had been deeply interested in the welfare of the poor. An intimate friend of the Barnetts, he had been a frequent visitor at St. Jude's vicarage, and for a brief period had lived in lodgings in East London. But his health, never vigorous, soon gave way and he was removed by an untimely death. Mrs. Barnett writes:

> The 10th of March was a Sunday, and on the afternoon of that day Balliol chapel was filled with a splendid body of men who had come together from all parts of England in loving memory of Arnold Toynbee, on the anniversary of his death. Dr. Jowett had asked my husband to preach to them and they listened, separating almost silently at the chapel porch, filled, one could almost feel, by the aspiration to copy him in caring much, if not doing much, for those who had fallen by the way or were "ignorant of our glorious gains."
>
> We had often chatted, those of us who were busy planning the new Settlement, as to what to call it. We did not mean the name to be descriptive; it should, we thought, be free from every possible savor of a Mission, and yet it should, in itself, be suggestive of a noble aim. As I sat on that Sunday afternoon in the chapel, one of the few women among the crowd of strong-brained, clean-living men assembled in reverent affection for one man, the thought flashed to me, "Let us call the Settlement Toynbee Hall." To Mr. Bolton King, the honorary secretary of the committee, had come the same idea, and it, finding favor with the committee, was so decided, and our new Settlement received its name before a brick was laid or the plans concluded.

It was two years later that the Neighborhood Guild, which subsequently became the University Settlement, was founded in New York. From these beginnings the movement has spread until in this country alone are now counted some five hundred social settlements. If the name is often loosely used, implying a somewhat vague conception of the essential idea, it has ceased to be an unfamiliar term. Indeed "settlement work" is used by many persons as a generic expression to denote such ac-

tivities as are usually associated with a settlement—the clubs, classes, and social gatherings that are so much in evidence in most settlements.

All this means that the social settlement has gained a certain vogue. It has become a popular method of modern philanthropy. It has reached a well-established place in social amelioration and reform. If the name is claimed by organizations which miss the essence of the thing, this in itself is an evidence of the settlement's popularity.

Time was, in the early days of the settlement, when its friends felt obliged to ask that for a while judgment be suspended. The idea was too new; perhaps by reason of its breadth it appeared too vague. Just because the settlement was designed to touch life at every point, to include within its view the whole range of human interests and needs, it was not easy to give a concrete and specific statement of its aims and purposes, such as would be entirely satisfactory to that somewhat over-rated individual, the practical man. Still, the practical man has his rights. The settlement can no longer ask exemption from criticism on the ground of its experimental character. In this age of "efficiency tests," applied not only in the field of industrial and commercial enterprise but also in that of education and charitable effort, the settlement cannot hope to escape. Nor do its friends desire that it should be exempt from the necessity of rendering an account. They believe that it has fulfilled a useful function in the community, and they are not prepared to agree with those of their critics who, while they admit the value of the work accomplished, maintain that the method has about reached the limit of its possibilities as a factor in social progress. It is a fair question to raise—this question as to the relatively permanent value of the social settlement. When a certain settlement was closed last winter in New York, the impression got abroad that the House was no longer of vital necessity to the neighborhood, owing to the extension of social opportunities by the municipality, a condition which was generally supposed to be attributable to the influence of the settlement. As a matter of fact this view of the case was erroneous, but such a situation is quite conceivably possible. There is an aspect of the settlement in which its very success in

bringing about a variety of needed local reforms, such as the socialization of the public schools, the extension of playgrounds and the like, might be supposed to put it out of business; much as a physician might seem to terminate his usefulness by the success with which he pursued preventive medicine and social hygiene. Hence it is high time to inquire what the settlement has accomplished and what promise for the future the method possesses.

The question is sometimes asked, how far the settlement has fulfilled the hopes of those who took the lead in the early days. It would be interesting to ascertain what the founders of the work had in mind, and to determine how far their expectations have been realized. Thus, for example, Canon Barnett declared long ago that the aim of the residents of Toynbee Hall was "first to form friendships and then through friendship to raise the standard of living and of life." Professor Graham Taylor tells us that the purpose of the founders was "to democratize culture and to humanize city politics." Writing, while the settlement was still young, of "the subjective pressure towards social settlements," Miss Jane Addams distinguished a threefold motive, namely, "the desire to make the entire social organism democratic, to extend democracy beyond its political expression"; then "the impulse to share the race life in order to bring social energy and the accumulation of civilization to those portions of the race that have little; and, finally, a feeling that springs from a certain renaissance of Christianity," especially in its early humanitarian aspects. The object of Hull-House is described as being "to provide a centre of a higher civic and social life; to institute and maintain educational and philanthropic enterprises, and to investigate and improve the conditions in the industrial districts of Chicago." Somewhat differently phrased is this statement from Chicago Commons: "We, who are at Chicago Commons to share the common lot, choose to live, for our own and others' sake, where we seem to be most needed, rather than where the neighborhood is supposed to offer the most of social privilege and prestige. . . . We assume the full obligations and claim all the rights of citizenship in a community with whose interests we identify ourselves, whose conditions we share, and for whose home

happiness, material welfare, political freedom, and social privilege and progress we try to do our part."

It will be noted that all of these statements of purpose are concerned not with definite and concrete details, but rather with certain broad principles of good citizenship and neighborly service. I think it may be said that the early leaders in the movement did not aim at accomplishing this and that definite object, so much as at the expression, in the midst of the life about them of which they had voluntarily made themselves a part, of the spirit of neighborliness. They were thorough-going democrats who sought to make the privileges of the few the opportunities of all. They set about their task in the scientific spirit, seeking to know the facts of the situation with which they were dealing; and they brought to it the desire "to serve by sharing." This has been, perhaps, one of the distinctive contributions which the settlement has made to the work of social reform—this combination of the scientific spirit with the humanitarian. It is probable that those who struck out on this untrodden way would not have ventured to predict whither it would lead them; but the prospects must have been alluring. Unforeseen opportunities and possibilities were constantly unfolding to the view, and now, as one looks back over the years, it is not difficult to see some marks of progress toward the goal of democracy. Just what value to assign to the settlement in the process, just how much to claim for it in reviewing the progress that has already been made, is more difficult, but that it has played an important part no one who is familiar with the movement can doubt.

Before we attempt to indicate what the settlement has accomplished and to estimate the value of the idea, it will be worth while to clear the air of certain misconceptions. It is somewhat surprising to find how general, at this late day, is the confusion of mind regarding the method and the aim of the social settlement. There are, for example, those who confound it with "mission work," as if it were some new form of religious propagandism; others think of it as some fresh departure in organized charity; and still others conceive of it as chiefly concerned with educational effort. Such misunderstanding is, after all, not so much to be wondered at. Just because the settlement sought to touch

life on every side, it laid itself open to misunderstanding on the part of the casual observer. And most people, moreover, are slow to grasp a new idea. They can think of it only in terms of something they already understand and in association with some institution to which the new idea appears in some way related. And those who confounded the social settlement with enterprises of education or undertakings of religion or organized charity were not altogether at fault. For the settlement has been brought of necessity into intimate relations with these and other phases of work.

Settlement workers have always been vitally interested in questions of education, and nearly every settlement has some educational features among its activities, such as a kindergarten or library or classes in manual training and household economics. But in nearly all cases these features will be found to have been introduced either as supplementary to the educational facilities of the public schools, or as experiments whose value must be demonstrated, before Boards of Education can be asked to incorporate them in the public-school system. There may also be instances in which sewing or cooking or carpentry is taught, either as a means of bringing a personal influence to bear upon the characters of the children or of getting in touch with certain elements of the neighborhood.

But the settlement does not exist primarily to do a work of education. Such educational features as settlements may have included in their programmes are, in a sense, accidents of the work. And yet the subject of public education is very close to the heart of every settlement resident. All his experience goes to convince him that the field of education must be broadened and socialized and that whatever of educational opportunity society owes to the individual must be paid for by the people as a whole. Some of the most notable work of the settlements has been accomplished in connection with the public schools, but of this I shall speak later.

If it is a mistake to think of the social settlement as an educational institution, it is still farther from the truth to consider it simply as a fresh departure in charitable work. This is not to say that there are not many cases where the lines of settlement

work and interest run parallel to those of organized charity. If, for example, organized charity is everywhere throwing the emphasis on the importance of preventive work in dealing with the social problem, the settlement is in full agreement, and hopes no less ardently than organized charity to see the day when poverty shall be abolished, and to have some part in bringing that happy day to pass. But the settlement is not dealing primarily or as an essential part of its work with the dependent class. It is simply a neighbor among neighbors. And just as one neighbor lends a helping hand to another neighbor in distress, so the settlement tries to bring the needed help to those of its neighbors whose lines have fallen in grievous places. This may mean giving temporary material relief. It will more likely mean putting the unfortunate individual or family in touch with the appropriate agency of organized charity. No settlement would wish to acquire the reputation of being a centre for the administration of material relief. It is true that the modern charity-organization society includes among its functions many things beside the administration of relief. The field of charity has expanded with the expansion of social vision and the deepening of the sense of social responsibility. And if thus both in interest and in method charity and the social settlement have drawn closer together, the enthusiastic advocate of settlement work might claim, with some show of reason, that the situation was in a considerable degree due to the reaction of the spirit of the settlement upon the work of charity. Doubtless a more temperate statement of the case would be that the settlement is itself one expression of the new social spirit which has profoundly influenced all philanthropic effort.

There is perhaps no more serious blunder concerning the social settlement than that which confounds it with the "mission." For there are those even today who conceive of settlement work as only another name for "mission work"—not, to be sure, the old-time sort of mission work, but none the less an effort through the preaching of a gospel to save individual souls. Now there is a sense in which the settlement idea grew out of the mission idea. I do not mean simply that there is a deep religious motive, whether it be consciously acknowledged or not, underlying the settlement. What I have in mind is the fact that when Canon Barnett first

proposed the establishment of a social settlement he took occasion to point out the shortcomings of the then popular "college missions," centres of religious work in the crowded sections of London, supported by university men, and suggested that university settlements would better express the idea that these missions sought to realize. But those who think of the settlement as a centre of religious propagandism might defend their attitude by citing the fact that not a few settlements are carrying on some sort of definite religious activity. A recent study of "Religious Work in the Settlements of the Borough of Manhattan," New York City, covering twenty-seven houses, showed that eleven were maintaining some form of religious work. Nine of these were Protestant in their connections, one Roman Catholic, and one Hebrew. There are, of course, other organizations directly connected with churches and known as church settlements, but of these the study above referred to took no account. Now it might be maintained that the settlements which are conducting religious work are very far removed from the traditional "mission" both in method and spirit. In most cases this would be true. But in my judgment it is far better for the settlement to leave distinctively religious work to the church and confine itself to the kind of neighborhood work which it is especially fitted to do and which no other organization yet devised is so well adapted to accomplish. Those settlements which on the whole have exerted the widest influence have followed this plan, not because of any inherent hostility to organized religion, but because it seemed the wisest course. And I am convinced that their policy has proved itself thoroughly sound. Any other course must tend to confusion. To mix religious activities with the work of a settlement is to run a serious risk of imperilling some of the settlement's most important interests. And it is difficult to see what can be gained by such a course which could not be better accomplished by a church or mission with a thoroughly socialized ministry. I think I can make clear what I mean by calling attention to two aspects in which the functions of the church or mission and the settlement are differentiated. These points of difference concern, first, the approach to the neighborhood and, secondly, the contacts with the neighborhood.

The mission is established in a given locality for the purpose

of declaring a message—a gospel that is well developed and clearly defined. It has a distinct work of propaganda; and it seeks to persuade men to accept its message and act upon it. It knows at the outset exactly what it proposes to do, for it deals primarily with well-ascertained human needs which it believes to be universal.

In this respect the mission differs radically from the settlement, which does not approach its neighborhood with preconceived notions as to what must be done for the neighborhood's regeneration. It has no definite propaganda, no clear-cut social theory to apply. It conceives its first duty to be to make the acquaintance of its neighbors, to study its field with a view to knowing the conditions under which the men and the women and the children are living and working. Policies, remedies, gospels, must come later and only as a result of this knowledge. And, furthermore, its method of work is not so much through the preaching of any gospel as through the organization of its neighborhood—of all the local forces for good, in some co-operative programme for the common welfare.

The other aspect in which the mission and the settlement differ is found in the character of the neighborhood contacts of the two institutions. This is an important difference to bear in mind. Obvious as it seems, it is often overlooked. If a church or mission be located in a given neighborhood, and the people invited by the most cordial methods to come and adopt the view of truth contained in its doctrinal standards and denominational platform, it requires little experience to forecast the result. One may be sure that the appeal of the mission, however broad and genuine, will be effective only with a certain class of the people of the neighborhood. Those who like the particular sort of thing for which this particular ecclesiastical organization stands will gather to its support, while whole sections of the neighborhood will stand entirely aloof. It will be a case of natural selection. If the mission is supported by Protestant interests, it will be vain to expect to attract Jews and Catholics; if it is a Catholic organization, nothing can be hoped for from the Jews and Protestants; and if the Jews are the promoters, Protestants and Catholics will leave it severely alone. This situation is as deplorable as it is

real. In the crowded sections of our cities and amongst our immigrant populations, serious problems growing out of the very general indifference to religion press for solution. Materialism in many forms presents itself, and the feeble efforts of religious bodies to cope with the tremendous need are pitiable. The situation possesses elements of tragedy. One may discern hopeful signs of a growing tolerance in the representatives of the three great religious bodies of the western world, but, as with neighboring nations between which exists an *entente cordiale*, let one overstep the boundaries of the other, or let any conflict of interests arise, and cordial relations are abruptly terminated. In spite of the broad-minded attitude of many religious leaders of different faiths, and in spite of the greater tolerance of the present day, we have not yet reached the point where all religious men, regardless of creed, can readily co-operate for the material and spiritual good of all. As long as this continues to be the case, no church of any faith can hope to make really broad contacts with a neighborhood whose religious and social interests are varied.

With the settlement, however, the case is quite different. The very first duty of the settlement is to get as far as possible into neighborly relations with every element of the surrounding life. Race, religion, social conditions, and class feeling need present no barriers to friendly intercourse between people who live on the same block or in the same district. And the settlement resident is not satisfied to let such barriers exist between himself and his neighbors. He meets the people among whom he lives not on a professional basis but on the basis of neighborliness—on the broad basis of a common humanity. And I think it may be said that, other things being equal, a settlement is successful just in so far as it comes into effective relations with Jews and Catholics and Protestants, the political leaders, the city officials, the organized workingmen, the socialist group, and all other groups that affect the social life of the neighborhood. This is the ideal the settlement holds before it, and it is an ideal that some settlements have realized to a considerable degree. And there is a distinct value in this, when so many influences in our modern life are making for division into social groups and tending only to accentuate class consciousness. The settlement stands pri-

marily for those influences that unite and that tend to promote social consciousness.

From what has been said regarding the relation of the settlement to other social activities it will, I think, be obvious that the social settlement worker has come to know the life of industrial neighborhoods from a new point of view. Others have labored in the same field. The teacher, the charity worker, the mission worker, the student seeking data for some task of social research, —each may claim to be familiar with the neighborhood, but the knowledge of each will almost inevitably be limited and qualified by his special interest. The settlement worker has in a true sense no special interest. He is interested in everything that has any human bearing upon his neighbors. He has no special end to serve beyond the simple end of getting acquainted, knowing facts about the struggles, the difficulties, the aspirations, of his neighbors, and the conditions under which their work is done and their lives are lived. Just because the settlement worker does not "profess" anything, he escapes the narrowing influence of the professional point of view and is not met by that defensive attitude on the part of his neighbors which the visit of the professional worker calls out. When the minister calls unexpectedly, the chances are that the mother of the family will hastily throw her apron over the can of beer that stands on the table; when the settlement resident calls the chances are that he will be cordially invited to share the contents of the can. This may shock the nerves of the reader, but one comes to feel, on reflection, that there is an immense advantage in this frank and open relationship.

This knowledge of things as they are, of life as it is, among that class of the community upon which the burdens of poverty rest, this first-hand knowledge of conditions through living in close contact with the conditions, is the settlement's peculiar treasure. That such knowledge could be had by living in neighborly relations with people, and that it was worth having, was the settlement's discovery, a simple and obvious thing, as it now seems, and yet a discovery that has modified all social work and supplied a necessary corrective to much scientific social inquiry.

As we come now to discuss certain elements of value in the

settlement method, the influence of this knowledge of conditions through acquaintance with one's neighbors will reveal itself. For example, it fits the settlement to interpret the life of industrial neighborhoods. In a democracy nothing but harm can result from a failure to understand and appreciate the conditions under which different sections of the community live and work, and the ideals and aspirations which govern them. Progress rests upon intelligent public opinion, and this is the result of mutual understanding. How little the people of some social groups know of the life of those of other groups!

Here, for instance, is a vast number of immigrants herded together in a corner of a great city, alien in race, in language, in customs; yonder is a great group of workingmen strongly organized and striving for justice in industrial conditions; here, again, is an active body of earnest men laboring with whole-souled devotion to reorganize society and place it upon a socialistic basis; and besides all these are the multitudes of people of moderate means, and the smaller number of the rich, most of whom fancy, when they give the matter any thought, that so long as they are comfortable the rest of the world must be,—except, of course, the shiftless and criminal who deserve their lot. With our population sharply divided into such groups as these, each with little vital contact with the other, there is abundant opportunity of misunderstanding and prejudice, which unfortunately are all too common. Perhaps still more unfortunate is the dense ignorance of one group concerning the most important interests of the other. Much social injustice is due to lack of knowledge. With persons of intelligence and sympathy, to know is commonly to act. If, for example, women generally knew from frequent and neighborly observation the burden of sweated labor under which multitudes of their sisters suffer that the bargain counters may be heaped high, the work of the Consumers' League would be considerably simplified.

Indeed, hardly anything seems of more importance just now than that a better and more sympathetic understanding of each other's point of view should exist between the widely separated groups of society. If there had been such an understanding on the part of the ministers' association of Bethlehem, Pa., and the

striking steel workers, the ministers would not have put this question to the strikers: "Is it reasonable to expect that by attacking your employer openly and in secret, by trying to destroy his property and his business, you can best persuade him to deal generously and magnanimously with you?" Nor would it have been necessary for the committee appointed by the Commission on the Church and Social Service to use such language concerning this question as the following: "There is evidence that the ministers were sincerely desirous to serve the best interest of the workmen, including the strikers, but the question addressed to them, and quoted above, is proof positive that they were too far aloof from the workingman to understand him and to win his confidence. Nothing could be more exasperating to the workingman than to assume that he desires to persuade his employer 'to deal generously and magnanimously' with him. What he desires and demands is not generosity and magnanimity at the hands of his employer, but simple justice. Not until ministers get close enough to the workingman to gain his point of view can they hope to influence him to any extent." It is safe to assume that none of these Bethlehem ministers had ever enjoyed the privilege of settlement residence. For the settlement resident, if he has eyes to see and ears to hear, gets the point of view of the labor man and would never have committed such a blunder. It is just here that the settlements have rendered an important service. They have not only acquired knowledge of the conditions under which their neighbors live and labor, but they have been a medium through which this knowledge has been spread abroad. The knowledge which the residents of settlements have gained has been based upon concrete instances of injustice and suffering and need on the part of their neighbors and friends. And the knowledge thus gained has been used to mould public opinion and to create a background for intelligent efforts for reform. This function of the settlement as an interpreter of the life of the crowded sections of our cities has received its finest expression in the genius of Jane Addams. It would be hard to overestimate the value of such work as she has done through her writings and addresses. Nothing could be finer than her book, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets*, as an interpretation of the

environment of the city youth, and as an appeal for a more intelligent handling of the question of public recreation. It needs, of course, something more than settlement residence to qualify one to render such service, but there are few seasoned settlement residents who have not in some degree done a similar service. They have made valuable contributions to the work of social interpretation through reports and published studies, as members of, or witnesses before, official commissions, and as advocates of social legislation before legislative bodies.

It is perhaps in relation to our immigrant populations that the settlements have been most effective in the exercise of this function of interpretation. Some of our most difficult social questions grow out of the presence of the multitudes of immigrants who crowd into the already congested sections of our cities, throng the ranks of unskilled labor, and bring with them habits and customs of primitive rural life which are ill-suited to city dwelling. Their presence complicates the problems of sanitation, of housing, and of industry. And yet there are contributions of value which every immigrant race and nationality is capable of making to the sum total of our composite American character. If, on the one hand, we are to profit by these contributions, some group of people must have the insight to recognize such elements of value and the skill to draw them forth and preserve them. And if, on the other hand, we are to give to the new-comers something more than material goods, something of the best of the spirit of our traditions and institutions, some group of people must make it its business to see that this is done with tact and sympathy and judgment.

To many of our foreign-born neighbors the night-stick of the policeman is the sceptre of authority in America; and the first contact with our civic institutions which makes a lasting impression on him is often effected by a liberal application of that same sceptre, followed by an arraignment in the police-court. The public schools are doing an important work in americanizing the children of the immigrants, but what of the adult? Shall we leave his education in civic and moral ideals to the tender mercies of the politician and the saloon-keeper? These men take a very practical interest in him and have a corresponding influ-

ence over him. Through the joint good offices of these worthy citizens the Italian laborer gets a job—when he is able to pay for the privilege; and the politician obligingly puts him in the way of getting naturalized; indeed, he is always ready to be his friend, if always with the expectation of some suitable *quid pro quo.* I recall the significant inquiry with which a young man was met who was endeavoring to organize a class of Italians for the study of English in a New York settlement. As he went from store to store, where the men congregated in the evening, giving his invitation, he was more than once asked, "Are you from Tammany?" When he disclaimed any connection with that organization, they shrugged their shoulders and turned away. Apparently they could not conceive of any other organization, or group of citizens, taking an interest in their welfare! It was an unintentional rebuke to the settlement, which was not lost upon it. The settlement worker who is thoroughly at home among his Italian neighbors has an unusual chance to serve both his neighborhood and the community at large. Through a dozen natural channels he comes into friendly contact with his neighbors, and with sympathetic understanding helps them to adjust themselves to the new and strange environment; and through his contacts with the larger world outside of the "Little Italy" or the Ghetto the settlement resident has a chance to correct mistaken impressions and to dispel unfounded prejudices concerning the people among whom he dwells.

Another useful purpose that the social settlements have served has been as initiators of movements for social advance and as experiment stations where new proposals for community welfare could be tried out. I know of no other organization which is quite so well fitted, by its very nature, to perform the service of interpretation. And naturally growing out of this is the effort to meet the needs that are discovered.

In this latter particular the field is less peculiarly the settlement's. Other organizations have had a large part in the work of social progress, but the settlement has done its share. Within recent years large foundations have been established for the purpose of initiating and furthering movements for community welfare. Before these great gifts were made, leaders in

charitable and correctional activities were demonstrating the possibilities of preventive work and setting on foot new enterprises of philanthropy. And it is not too much to claim that the social settlement was a potent influence back of much of these more modern efforts. Not that the settlement undertook at the outset to accomplish any definite reform. It set itself to get acquainted with people. And this simple undertaking produced results which could not possibly have been foreseen. That something must happen as a consequence of knowing one's neighbors the early leaders felt assured, but just what that something would prove to be, the most sanguine of them would scarcely have ventured to predict, even though they cherished their dreams of what it might be. One thing that followed was the influence on all enterprises of philanthropy and religion coming from the settlement method of learning to know people's needs by sharing their experiences of life and using this knowledge as the basis of reform and preventive work. Another thing was the necessity which at times the settlements themselves felt of initiating reform and preventive work and of using their facilities for testing the worth of new propositions. A concrete case of individual need comes to the attention of a settlement resident, and in the attempt to meet the need it is seen to be only a symptom of a larger social need. Then follows an effort to meet the larger need, and the settlement is the natural place for the effort to be tried out. It is in this way that settlements have become experiment-stations in social work. Examples may be cited in the field of public health, education, and recreation.

The settlement's intimate relation to the homes of the neighborhood has naturally given it a deep, though by no means exclusive, interest in the problems of child-welfare. Many of the efforts of residents are directed toward securing for the children of the tenements such opportunities for development, physical, mental, and moral, as intelligent parents of ampler means consider essential for their children. Questions of health naturally come in for a large share of attention where so many influences are at work to retard sound development. What, for example, was more natural than for Miss Wald, of the Henry Street (Nurses') Settlement in New York, with her professional training and intimate

knowledge of the homes of her neighborhood, to see how much could be accomplished by having a trained nurse co-operate with the doctor who was assigned to inspect the children in the public schools? The next step was to try out the plan, with the consent of the public authorities, in the neighborhood of the settlement, using the settlement nurses for the experiment. The nurse could give general supervision to the cleanliness of the children, call the attention of the doctor to cases of special need, and follow up in the home or the dispensary any prescribed treatment. After a little experimental work the value of the plan is determined, and we have our staff of school-nurses working under the Board of Health, later merged, as a further development of the idea, into the Division of Child Hygiene of the Department of Health.

Kindergartens and free libraries commonly found a home in the settlements before the community was ready to support them out of public funds. When the public was convinced of their value by practical tests, they were largely transferred to public administration and support.

Much of the process of socialization which the public schools have undergone with such beneficent results has been initiated by the settlements. Experiments in "home and school visiting" were being made in the settlements, in the ordinary course of the day's work, long before any one realized that there was enough value in the scheme to organize it and put a tag on it and develop it into a distinct department of social activity. The first boys' club in a public school in New York was organized by a worker in the University Settlement who had successfully developed the club work of the settlement boys. This may be regarded as the entering wedge in the use of school-buildings as recreation centres.

The whole question of public recreation is one which has always come to the front in settlement experience. The "organization of leisure" is a familiar phrase in descriptions of settlement purpose. Not only do many persons need help in utilizing their spare time in a way to minister health to the body and refreshment to the spirit, but also the opportunity for safe and wholesome recreation must often be created. At present the needs of the community in the matter of recreation are left largely to the

exploitation of those who see in them simply an opportunity of commercial gain. Towards many of these enterprises of private business the attitude of the municipal authorities has almost always been repressive, and rightly so. But the community has offered little to meet in a wholesome way the legitimate public need which the cheap theatre, the uncensored motion-picture show, the dance hall, and the like, are meeting for pecuniary profit and at a frightful cost in human character.

It has remained for the social worker to recognize the immense importance of sane, wholesome recreation as a powerful character-builder and to move for larger municipal provision for this need of the city-dweller. The playground has always been a cherished object with the settlement resident, and scarcely a settlement can be found in a crowded district which will not have converted its little two-by-four back yard into a pathetic apology for a playground. In the early days of the movement for playgrounds the settlement people were among the most ardent advocates and the most active workers. And it is with no small satisfaction that social workers in New York reflect that the present Commissioner of Parks for the Boroughs of Manhattan and Richmond was an old settlement resident and for years has been the foremost promoter of playgrounds in the city. But I have said enough to indicate how the settlements have acted as initiators of movements and served as centres for social experimentation.

Such things as I have mentioned, and others similar to them, have been accomplished, sometimes under the lead of the settlements and more frequently in co-operation with other groups of social workers, because there were persons of intelligence, sympathy, and some leisure living among the people, sharing their experiences, studying the neighborhood needs, and finding out what ought to be done.

Other uses of the settlement might be mentioned. One is tempted to speak of its "get-together" character, to point out the service it has done in bringing together on neutral ground representatives of different social groups, and giving them a chance to meet face to face and to exchange ideas and view difficult problems from each other's point of view. They have helped in this way to promote a true democracy of feeling. The part the settlement

has played in quickening social consciousness may be difficult to estimate, but it has undeniably been large. Today, for instance, we hear much less than a few years ago of the "institutional church." The social mission of the church is, fortunately, coming to be taken as a matter of course. We expect every live church to be conducting, or taking part in, some form of social work. And I believe that the settlement through its influence in stimulating a sense of social responsibility has reacted directly on the churches to produce these results. There is a sense in which the settlement in its earlier days acted as a challenge to the churches. The churches naturally looked somewhat askance at the settlement, which undertook work, with a careful avoidance of all religious features, in quarters regarded by the church as its own preserves. This in itself was enough to arouse suspicion against the movement on the part of the church, but there were further grounds of complaint. It was soon apparent that the settlements were absorbing many of the more thoughtful young people, who had been brought up within the churches. Not a few college men and women, coming to take up the active work of life and finding little sympathy in the church for their intellectual and social convictions, turned with a sense of relief and satisfaction to the opportunity which the settlement offered of practical work in simple, genuine, human ways. This fact did not pass unobserved by the churches, and in addition they could not but recognize that the settlements were achieving results in the very districts in which they were compelled to admit utter failure. The situation stirred the church to action. Methods of so-called "settlement work"—clubs and classes and a variety of social activities —were adopted, and the institutional church was developed. I do not wish to appear to claim that the settlement was the sole influence in quickening a sense of social responsibility in the church. If the settlement had never been, the church could not have failed to feel the touch of the spirit of the age. Its social conversion was inevitable. Still it remains true that the church and the settlement had too many common interests to escape the effect of mutual reaction. Friction was sure to result unless extraordinary care and forbearance were exercised on both sides.

It was hardly to be expected that on either side there should

be a conscious effort to allay distrust and promote a good understanding. The definition of the institutional church given by one of the leaders in that movement is significant. He defined the institutional church as "the social settlement plus religion." I think one may detect here a hint of the influence of the settlement upon the social movement within the church, and also a suggestion of the church's estimate of the social settlement. Evidently, from the point of view of the church the settlement lacked the one thing needful. Happily much of this feeling has passed away. A more sympathetic attitude has taken its place. And yet the feeling still lingers to such an extent in the minds of many persons identified with the church that it may be worth while to add a word concerning the matter. If those who today complain that the settlement lacks "religion" mean thereby that in their judgment it ought to conduct organized religious activities, I have already expressed the reasons why I think their point not well taken. To do that would be to introduce the very element that prevents the broad neighborhood relations so essential to the settlement's success. It places the settlement in the category of a mission. It would be far better to decide at the outset whether to establish a mission or a settlement, and then determine the question of religious work accordingly. And if this complaint means, as it sometimes does, that there is anything in the nature of the settlement that makes it intrinsically hostile, or even unfriendly, to religion, I should have again to take issue with the complainant. Any doubt about the religious character and value of the settlement is based either upon a misapprehension of the settlement or an extremely narrow view of the significance of religion. I believe the present social movement is essentially a religious movement. It springs from human sympathy and expresses its sympathy in intelligent practical form for the welfare of mankind. If the chief object which the truly religious man holds before his mind is the advancement of the kingdom of God through a life of loving service, the social-settlement worker can clasp hands with him. Some settlement people may prefer to use a slightly different terminology in stating their aim,—to call things by different names,—but the things are not altered by the difference in the labels. And if it is further

urged that religion is concerned with the salvation of the individual as well as with bringing men into right relations with their fellow-men, the settlement can help even in this phase of religious work. It does not presume to attempt to convert men in the conventional sense, but if individual salvation is understood to include saving man's body and mind, as well as his spirit, it can make an important contribution to this larger process of redemption. We are at last coming to realize the need of a sound physical basis for a normal moral and spiritual life, and the settlement is a force in the readjustment of the physical and moral life of the individual, as well as of the environment in which he lives. Service is not all of religion, but it is an important element, and the social settlement is a synonym for service.

If there is, as I believe, a better understanding of the settlement on the part of those who represent the church, it is likewise true that settlement workers generally are realizing the need of a closer co-ordination of all the moral and spiritual and social forces of the community. The settlement worker and the socialized church-worker are finding much common standing-ground. Religion is no longer tabooed in settlement circles, if it ever was. And I believe the churches on their part will come to see that in some neighborhoods, at least for the present, a settlement without organized religious work can do a useful work which neither a mission nor even an institutional church can do. Must we not rid ourselves of the idea that "Christian work" is one thing and "humanitarian work" quite another? Does any one doubt that Jesus was fully as religious, and quite as much engaged in "Christian work," when he was ministering to the sick and feeding the hungry, as when he was preaching to the multitude or gently revealing the Samaritan woman to herself? Both functions are of importance. The one must supplement the other. Not all organizations doing useful philanthropic and educational work and liberally supported by church people are required or expected to open their meetings with prayer or conduct revival services; and it is hard to see why the settlement, which is first of all a home, should be viewed with misgiving, because it concludes that its wisest course is to leave to the church all forms of active religious work.

But I believe the settlement will come to see more clearly the value of those spiritual processes and the power of that inspiration which it is the function of the church to generate and set in motion. And thus the church, the synagogue, and the social settlement will more effectually supplement each other's work and bring about a correlation of spiritual and moral forces that will hasten the coming of that day when justice and good will shall rule in all relations between man and man.

It remains now to consider the question of the future of the settlement. There are not wanting those who believe that the settlement will soon have served its generation and ought then to follow the example of the ancient leader of Israel who, as we are told, under similar circumstances fell on sleep. Is this the case? Is there sound reason to believe that the settlement method has accomplished about all that can be expected of it and that its days are numbered? We are reminded that more and more the activities of the settlement are being turned over to the appropriate departments of the city government, and that the settlements themselves desire this and are constantly endeavoring to promote it; we are told that when the process is complete and all activities now carried on by the settlements are municipalized, the settlements may take in their signs, put up their shutters, and close their doors. For the sake of argument we may grant that in time all the familiar activities of the settlement will be carried on by the community, and we may assume that no new ideas will be evolved to require "trying out," although that is a somewhat improbable assumption. But, even so, I think the settlement would still have a place of usefulness. For one thing, it would doubtless be necessary to have a voluntary organization or group of people experienced in social work, to co-operate with the city officials who were charged with its social enterprises. If politics is to be kept out of the administration and the evils of mechanical methods reduced to their lowest terms by means of intelligent, sympathetic, human supervision and leadership, some group of private citizens who care about these things must be in close touch with the situation. Today we have State Charities Aid Associations, Public Education Associations, and the like, exercising a similar function. What group would more

naturally take up this matter as its business than the settlement group? At a recent conference it was stated that the social work of the public schools in one of the larger Western cities had been successful only in those sections in which there were settlements.

Furthermore, is it not worth while to have a group of educated people, with social and civic ideals, living as citizens and neighbors in the industrial quarters of great cities? It does not require an active imagination to conceive of many services such a group could render. In all large cities startling changes are taking place, due to the movements of nationalities and races, changes so rapid that often within a few years a neighborhood will undergo a complete transformation,—the Jews, for example, crowding out the Irish, to be themselves displaced later by the Italians. To be a constant factor in the midst of such kaleidoscopic changes, the one established neighbor, rooted, and grounded in the neighborhood, persistently gathering facts, supplying leadership, and forming a rallying-point for all good citizens, this is a service no other organization could render so effectively as the social settlement.

As to the character of the settlement of the future one hesitates to venture a prediction. I think, however, that one may detect a tendency to revert to the simplicity of the early days of the movement. Much passes today for "settlement work" and the "settlement idea" that is only loosely related to that for which the settlement really stands. It began, as I have pointed out, with a group of people of education and culture making their home in a neglected neighborhood with the idea of being good neighbors and of sharing the common life. From this simple beginning it has developed in most cases to include a large plant, a staff of paid workers, and a great variety of activities. The effect has been to obscure the simplicity of the early idea. The institutional settlement has always been regarded by the friends of the movement as in a measure a necessary evil,—a development which was required by the situation, but permitted with regret. The tendency now seems to be to a more decided reaction against the institutional type, and this tendency gives promise of permanency for the method. The older settlements will doubtless

continue to endeavor to meet the needs that arise in their neighborhoods, as long as the municipality lags behind in its enterprises of social service, even if this necessitates a further development in the way of institutions. But where new settlements are organized, their promoters will do well to consider whether their opportunity does not lie in the direction of the simpler, residential type. Such a settlement could direct its energies chiefly to increasing still further the social usefulness of schools, public libraries, gymnasiums, playgrounds, recreation-houses, and the like, and would take a lively interest in seeing that all such work was efficiently maintained. Its residents would not lack neighborhood work, and, freed from the exacting duties of much club and class work, they would have more time to devote to such important services as those which I have mentioned,—the interpretation of life and the initiation of, and co-operation with, new movements for social welfare,—services which the settlement is peculiarly equipped to perform. This seems to me to answer, as well as it can be answered, the question of permanency; for it is difficult to believe that the time will arrive within the next few generations when social justice will be so firmly and widely established that such efforts will be altogether out of date. When that happy day comes, the settlement, along with many other forms of philanthropic and charitable effort (about which, by the way, one wonders why the question of permanency is never raised), may be cheerfully relegated to the scrap-heap of social endeavor. In the mean time we may safely conclude that the settlement has a contribution of peculiar value to make to the work of setting up that new order of society which those who follow the lead of the Christ believe shall be eventually realized in the kingdom of God.

IS FAITH A FORM OF FEELING?

A. C. ARMSTRONG

Wesleyan University

Like the appeal to faith at large, the tendency to conceive faith as emotion may proceed from various motives. In contrast to an arid intellectualism, or with a view to curing practical corruption, it is urged in furtherance of earnest religious experience. This was the case in the pre-reformation and the Reformation age, and again during the revival in the eighteenth century in England. In eras of doubt the faith of feeling is commended as a substitute for the halting processes of reason, with their dubious or negative conclusions. This motive also was active in the era of renascence and reform, and it has markedly influenced the religious development of later modern times. Such motives, moreover, rest upon a basis of truth. The heart has its rights as well as the head, and its deliverances possess an evidential value. In periods of intellectual change the witness of the heart gains special importance as an aid to faith until the reason can adjust itself to the new conditions. The faith which purifies and the faith which inspires is always the faith which is experienced. These principles need emphasis now less than ever before, for there has never been a period in which they have been so often advocated, and with so great authority, as in the last century and a half. In our own time, in part by voices which have only lately ceased to speak to us, they have been urged with a persuasive eloquence that has carried them throughout the civilized world. Formulated in technical fashion, they have entered into the reflection of the age until they have become one of its most characteristic and most significant philosophies of religion.[1]

For practice, however, as well as theory, much depends upon the form of the doctrine. The interpretation of faith solely in

[1] See the writer's Transitional Eras in Thought, chap. vi.

terms of feeling contains as many pitfalls as the purely intellectual view of it. Scarcely less dangerous is the view which constantly emphasizes the emotional phase, although it partly recognizes the element of knowledge which is involved in the discernment and in the application of religious truth. From the point of view of logical theory the errors of this emotional interpretation have often been criticised. It has been less commonly noted that it neglects essential laws of the emotional life itself, that the psychology of emotion confirms the logic of belief in its rejection of the sentimental theory. This will appear if we consider in outline the varieties of emotional consciousness. The affective side of consciousness includes phenomena of less and greater complexity and development. Lowest in the scale come the feelings which accompany the exercise of the senses or the simpler impulses and activities. Higher than these, more complex, more developed, more wide-spread in their influence on life, more dependent on individual and social history, on culture, on social as well as physical evolution, are classed the emotions in the stricter meaning of the word. Among the emotions psychology assigns the highest place of all to those which have been termed the sentiments, the intellectual, the aesthetic, the ethical and religious sentiments of the mind. In some of its forms the conception of faith as emotion tends to class religious consciousness with the simpler rather than with the more developed types of feeling. The mystic's yearning for direct communion with his God, still more his aspiration towards union with the Deity or absorption into him, brings perilously near a sensitive analysis of piety. The apologetic demand for an immediate and certain substitute for reason leads many advocates to a virtual adoption of the same erroneous conclusion. For the sensational view is negatived by psychology as fully as it is by logic and by practical experience. In its beginnings the religious feeling no doubt manifested itself in the simpler and less developed forms of the affective life. And it continues to sustain close relations to the sensitive, and even to the organic and physical, phases of human nature. But from the first it contained in germ the elements of true emotion; while evolved at all, it belongs where by common consent it has long been classed, among the distinct-

ively spiritual phenomena. To refer it now to sense means a return toward primitive attitudes, however lofty the motive by which the retrogressive interpretation is inspired.

Religious feeling, therefore, must be counted emotion in the technical sense. But the established psychology of emotion forbids the resolution of faith into feeling only. An emotion consists of three factors, the idea about which the feeling gathers, the element of feeling proper, the bodily phenomena which follow from this affective state, or, as some contend, precede and produce it. Since the promulgation of the celebrated theory of James and Lange there has been much debate concerning the order of these last two factors and their relative importance. Does the emotion proper affect the body, according to the traditional view? Or does the bodily excitement precede and cause, or by its reflex effects on mind constitute, that which we commonly term the emotional condition? Do we tremble because we are afraid, or are we afraid because we tremble? Do we weep on account of grieving, or is grief the reflex of tears? This discussion, however, hardly affects the principle which we are now considering. Professor James applied his theory primarily to the "coarser emotions," those in which the bodily element is most prominent. But from these the sentiments have long been distinguished, among other differences by the absence of this pronounced physical factor. Or, if this distinction in the scope of the theory be not maintained,[2] the present argument still remains intact. Whether the emotion produces the bodily echo or the physical excitement produces the affective reflex, in either case a cognitive idea forms the groundwork of the total phenomenon. Pathological and unmotived cases apart,[3] we rejoice or grieve over something, we are amused or saddened or incensed or calmed by something, we regret something, we hope for something, we shrink from something, perceived or represented in memory or imagination. More abstractly, we are devoted to truth, we appreciate beauty, we cleave loyally to the good, we fear God and strive to do his will. Man's emotional life is essentially connected with

[2] See James's unconvincing discussion, Principles of Psychology, vol. ii, pp. 468–470.

[3] Cf. James, vol. ii, pp. 458–462.

his cognitive thinking. The phenomena of the one gather about elements which the second supplies. Emotion is not mere feeling; its bodily side apart, it is feeling related to ideas.

These facts make it imperative to take account of the intellectual aspects of religion. The ideas and principles to which faith relates are of moment for faith, even in its emotional phases. The cognitive state around which a religious emotion gathers is a determining factor in the feeling itself. Not, indeed, the sole determining factor. The feeling is essentially a function of the idea, it depends upon it and follows from it. But there are numerous other tendencies which affect the joint result. History, habit, training, culture, even that vague physical and mental complex called temperament, even circumstance and passing conditions, all enter into the possible antecedents of a given emotional state. Individual belief and the collective faith of social groups are alike determined by these and similar causes. But though there are many factors in the genesis of piety, it remains established that the ideas about which pious feeling centres form leading conditions of its appearance and its character. Emotion, moreover, varies with the cognitive content to which it is attached. The element of knowledge is an essential component in the emotional complex; if it be altered, the feeling proper loses its determining basis and is itself liable to change. An apparition, for instance, is shown to be a shadow, and fear gives place to calmness or to amused reflection on the illusion of the immediate past. Good news turns to tidings of disaster, and the once happy throng disperses in sadness or lingers only to give expression to its grief. The shadows fall on distant summits, and delight in the sunset-glow fades into the sterner moods which are also inspired by the view of peak and glacier.

So also with the more personal emotions of which this paper treats. The allegiance of the savage to his chief, the subject's loyalty to his sovereign, the devotion of the citizen to his country and its interests, are examples which may be classed together under patriotic feeling, but it is evident that the several manifestations of the type differ with the stage of political evolution reached, evident also that these variations have to a large degree depended on changes in political ideas. The tribal head, the monarch,

the fatherland, on the one hand, the war-pledge, feudal submission, enlightened patriotism, on the other,—the evolution of ideas and the development of feeling have gone on by parallel stages. The ethical and religious emotions follow the same law. In part the content of duty varies with the view of moral obligation; the moral feelings also experience change, even though duty retain its constraining power. Moral rules may be construed as divine commands, or considered self-evident principles, or conceived as conditions of social welfare. The accompanying moral feelings may in the several cases bear the same names, but in character they inevitably differ. Even if for a time the effects of inheritance and training outweigh the influence of personal reflection, in the event the several tendencies will work out their due results. Of this the history of morals supplies abundant experimental proof.[4] The case of religion is even clearer than the case of morals. Fear has grown to reverence, propitiation has developed into worship, other-worldliness has been so far replaced by the religion of the present that it is not always easy to maintain our devotion to the Unseen. It would be idle to contend that these alterations of attitude and feeling have gone on independently of intellectual change. Analysis and history combine to show the contrary. It is impossible to construe such phases of the religious consciousness merely in terms of emotion, if one mean by emotion feeling devoid of cognitive attachments. Fear and reverence and worship and devotion,—the terms themselves connote a mingling of cognitive and affective states.

The emotional analysis of faith misconceives these aspects of religious experience. Religious consciousness contains cognitive as well as emotional (and volitional) elements. The affective factors depend upon the cognitive, and vary with them. Hence the resolution of faith into mere feeling overlooks an essential element in the total phenomenon, while the predominantly sentimental interpretation is in part guilty of the same mistake. On the other hand the emotional analysis is not entirely erroneous. It may be relatively justified by historical conditions, as shown

[4] The evolution of French culture since the beginning of the Revolutionary era may be cited as one of many illustrations which cannot be considered here.

in the beginning of this paper. It rightly distinguishes between primary religious ideas and their reflective interpretation in terms of abstract dogma. In addition it can plead a basis in general mental fact, even though its principal contentions run counter to the results of psychological inquiry. For in the psychology of religious feeling, as everywhere in the emotional life, the laws established are subject to marked limitations. The emotion proper depends upon cognition, and changes with this. But the element of feeling, as we have also noted, is but one among many constituents of the joint affective state. That is to say, we are dealing with an exceedingly complex phenomenon, whose complexity, moreover, is accentuated by other conditions characteristic of emotional states. Emotions are characterized, for instance, by a wide range of divergence, so that even those which are classed together may also greatly differ. We speak of fear, or love, or grief, and these class-designations rest upon fact; but psychologists recognize that such names denote no fixed and self-identical types. There are different fears and loves and griefs—and so with the rest—into whose composition, still to borrow the figure from the physical world, there enters not merely a large, but also a highly mutable, body of constituents. Once more, emotions are unstable, as well as complex and mutable. The many diverse factors out of which they are built up are not compacted into a closely integrated whole. In them the web of consciousness is loosely, rather than compactly, woven. The strands are not so knitted together that to separate them will destroy the fabric. On the contrary, the looseness is equal to the differentiation, and is the ground of a parallel function. The several factors in an emotion not only differ with varying conditions; they are so loosely joined that substitution becomes an easy process, often without notable change in the phenomenon as a whole.

Hence follow several limitations of the general law which are relatively favorable to the emotional theory of faith. Religious feeling depends on knowledge, but not on knowledge alone. The religious emotions centre about ideas and doctrines, but the connection is not so close as the intellectualist, not to say the dogmatist, maintains. Changes of religious sentiment accompany alterations in belief, but the variation of the two factors is not

always direct, or immediate, or equal in extent. The cognitive phase may greatly alter, and yet for the time the phase of feeling undergo but little change. Under certain conditions, when the intellectual variation is in incidentals rather than in essentials, in particular if it concerns the dogmatic formulation rather than the primary content of religious belief, the affective factor may continue permanently the same. Here is evident the foundation for the claims of the sentimental view. Since the dependence of feeling on cognition is not absolute, the way is open to declare the former independent of its mate. As the co-variation may fail to be immediate or complete, it is possible to dwell upon the persistence of pious feeling amid the vicissitudes of doctrinal change. The necessity for religion of a living personal experience reinforces the tendencies born of intellectual need. In times of doubt the doctrine, exaggeration though it be, is often nobly used to confirm belief or to encourage troubled souls in their search for peace.

Certain of our examples of the general law may serve to illustrate its limitations also. The evolution of loyalty has paralleled the evolution of political ideas, but patriotism persists in a remarkable measure. Ethics changes, but the present generation has learned with pleased surprise how strong the sentiment of duty may remain amid the fluctuations of ethical theory. Few phenomena of the second half of the nineteenth century have been less expected than the maintenance, even the deepening, of moral feeling which has gone on, although several of the prevailing forms of thought have included elements which tend to undermine it. In regard to religious faith the matter was finely stated by Auguste Sabatier in his *Philosophie de la religion*. Dealing there with the evolution of dogma, he thus describes a religious assembly:

> Here, in one of our temples, is assembled a great company for worship. Among this audience perchance there are poor old women, very ignorant and somewhat superstitious, men of the middle class with a little literary culture, scholars and philosophers who have reflected on Kant and Hegel, even professors of theology penetrated to the marrow by the critical spirit. All bow in spirit and worship; all use the same language learned in childhood; all repeat with heart and lips: *I believe in God, the Father almighty.* I do not know whether there is on earth a more touching spectacle, anything nearer heaven.

> All these different souls, who perhaps would be incapable of understanding one another in the realm of mere intellect, really commune with one another; a common religious sentiment penetrates and animates them. The moral unity of which Jesus spoke when he said, "That they may be one as we are one," is for the moment realized on earth. But do you believe that the word God, pronounced by all lips, arouses in all these souls the same image? The poor dame, who remembers still the illustrations in her big Bible, imagines the Father eternal with a long white beard, and eyes shining and burning like coals. Her neighbor would smile at this naïve anthropomorphism. He has the deistic notion, rationally demonstrated to him in his course of philosophy at school. But this notion in turn would seem crude to the Kantian, who knows that every positive idea of God is contradictory, and who, to escape the contradiction, takes refuge in the idea of the Unknowable. For all, however, God subsists, and it is because God is present and living in all, that the word lends itself to so many different acceptations; but, note this point, the word lives only because it serves to express a piety which is felt (*ressentie*) and common. The life of dogma is in piety.[5]

The law of the concomitant variation of idea and feeling is thus limited and not absolute. But it is to be noted that the limiting conditions do not make void the underlying principle. They remain limitations merely, so that when a certain measure of alteration is passed, the phenomena revert to the type which the law demands. If patriotism persists amid political change, it encounters perils unknown before altered conditions, among them strange conceptions of the state, had led on to anti-militarism, internationalism, or even to anarchistic views. There is nothing finer in later modern culture than the union of moral earnestness with negative opinion; nevertheless it is clear that ethical positions have altered with the intellectual development, and further, that several of the moral dangers of the time depend on conclusions which follow from agnostic premises. And Sabatier's argument itself, despite the glowing spirituality by which it is pervaded, suggests an inference contrary to the view which he defends. In an age of religious transition it is indeed well to draw the boundaries of faith as wide as the truth will in any wise permit. The

[5] Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire, pp. 303 f.

spirit of the time requires support beyond that which the precisian of intellect would grant. Burdened individual souls should not be held too straitly to theoretical formulas. And the thinker who does not feel the need of relief has himself scarcely experienced, or has happily surmounted, the tendencies of his own time. In the event, however, individuals and ages must conform to the inevitable law. It might almost be said that there is a duty laid upon us so to adapt our feelings to that which we hold to be true. As sincere and reasonable men, ought we to worship an unknowable force as though it were a personal God? Are there not ethical questions involved in our spiritual attitude as well as doctrines and religious interests? But this phase of the matter need not now be pressed. It has often been brought elsewhere to the attention of thinking men. And it is the psychological aspect of the problem which is here especially in point. Whether or not we believe that feeling ought to follow knowing, it is certain that eventually it will follow it. It is in the nature of the psychical conditions that, when the cognitive basis fundamentally varies, the emotional accompaniments will also change. They may not do so at once, or completely, but in the end essential variation is sure. Analytical psychology, moreover, is confirmed by historical psychology. The biographies of religious thinkers often show the alterations of feeling which accompany changes in belief, albeit these may have been reached only after hesitancy and suffering. The history of religion at large—notably in the modern age—is evidence of the same concomitant evolution. Faith, therefore, cannot reasonably be analyzed into feeling alone. For feeling here is in part a function of knowledge. The sentimental theory is almost as one-sided as the intellectualism which it seeks to supplant. If it lays stress on factors in belief which need to be emphasized, over-emphasis involves both theoretical and practical dangers. Religious faith includes elements both of knowing and of feeling. These interact in an organic and living way. Psychology, as well as logical theory, forbids the endeavor to construe it in terms of either one apart, or to minimize either at the expense of its fellow.

THE SYNOPTIC MIND: AN IDEAL OF LEADERSHIP

GEORGE R. DODSON
St. Louis

To be able to reflect the mind and sentiment of one's own generation and be the interpreter of its aspirations is a great thing, but to succeed in giving to a noble and enduring ideal of humanity its classic expression, to voice clearly the deepest needs and highest dreams of many centuries, is the supreme performance, which is beyond the power of all but the few geniuses who are large enough to represent our race. Of all the saints, sages, and saviours who have studied the drama of human life, no one has ever surveyed it from a greater height than Plato, nor has any mind surpassed his in comprehensiveness and insight. And his conclusion, his matured conviction, was that humanity's most urgent need is for adequate leadership. The goal of the ideal system of education which is outlined in the Republic was the discovery, selection, and training of what he calls "synoptic-minded men" to be the leaders of the state. The youths to be prepared for this high function were first to be selected from those apparently most promising, and then submitted to a course of physical and mental discipline lasting through the greater part of life. This was a sifting process, and from time to time the failures were dropped. The finer natures continued their elementary studies till the age of twenty, when they were submitted to a new test of their capacity for leadership. Up to that time their manner of study was to be appropriate to youth. Their knowledge, being necessarily a mass of unconnected and unrelated fragments, could not be embraced in a unitary view. But when the synthetic powers ripen, the time arrives to attempt an organization of the mental content, to put together the things that have been, and are being, learned, and comprehensiveness becomes an ideal of the mind.

Plato's statement is as follows: "The sciences which they have learned in their early education without any order will now be

brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being." The Greek word for the ideal aimed at is σύνοψις; that is, these hitherto unrelated subjects will be combined into a synoptic view. The possession of a talent for doing this, of a synoptic mind, is the criterion by which selection is to be made for still higher advancement. Plato has another name for minds of this type; indeed, he generally calls them "dialectical," but he explicitly states that in his usage the two words mean exactly the same thing, and his whole theory of education is based on his conviction that only those minds that possess the capacity for putting things together in a comprehensive view and thus seeing them in their natural relations are fitted for the higher studies which equip men for leadership.

The experience of the ages has confirmed the insight of this famous thinker. That one of the greatest needs of humanity is for a supply of synoptic-minded men to manage its affairs and direct its development is as nearly an unquestioned truth as we are likely to meet with in these critical days. And it is of the most profound and even vital significance for all who are set to be leaders, and not least for the ministers of liberal churches. There are those who look to us for guidance in the conduct of the greatest and highest of human interests. It is not only our privilege, but our business, to be men with a cosmic outlook, and to strive toward a comprehensive and unitary view, even though it must necessarily be tentative and incomplete; and, while no one can reach the height of Plato's ideal for the philosopher and be a "spectator of all time and existence," we can and ought to have some sense of the frame in which our human life is set, to look down the long vistas of evolution, and attain to some inspiring conception of our place in the great process, of the achievements of the past, and of humanity's reasonable hopes for the future.

And how sublime is the vast drama! Science cannot fill out the details, but its outlines of the magnificent scheme are doubtless something like the truth. Standing by the seashore last summer, my imagination vainly tried to picture what I know must have taken place,—the living jelly coming out of the water, organizing itself, multiplying and specializing its cells, acquiring

skeleton, organs of sense and locomotion, nervous system and brain, until distinctively human activities appear and humanity with its advancing intellectual, moral, social, and religious life is an established fact on the earth.

And because the great process is still going on, because in us it has become self-conscious, because humanity is not only being pushed up by cosmic forces as formerly, but is now also deliberately climbing up, striving toward its native ideals and thus cooperating in its own evolution, because it is in need of leaders who can help to clarify its thoughts and bring into distinct consciousness the noble ideals that lie implicitly but obscurely in its heart, the moral and religious teacher has a work to do, a work which he can hope to perform successfully only as he is a man whose habit of mind is comprehensive and synoptic, and whose ideal and constant effort is to see life sanely and see it whole. I venture, then, to offer some thoughts on the present situation, and to suggest an answer to the question, What o'clock is it in the evolution of human life? For, I think it safe to assume, what we are chiefly interested in is not religion only, but the evolution of human life on this planet. It is not possible to detach the religious aspect of life from the rest of it, since religious thought and feeling are the blossoming, the outflowering of the whole process. The higher life must be cultivated, as indeed it must be lived, as one life. And if I emphasize the intellectual phase of this higher life, it is because this emphasis seems at present to be sorely needed. The philosophers and religious writers of today vie with one another in exalting the importance of the voluntaristic aspect of our human existence, and in disparaging the activity of the seeker for truth who loves it for its own sake as well as for its uses, who believes with the noblest minds of all ages that the knowledge of truth is a good in itself, that θεωρία is one of the natural goals of human striving. A flood of books, essays and sermons, is coming from the press the avowed purpose of which is to establish the irrational and, in practice, largely immoral principle of the "will to believe," that is, to justify the procedure of those who assume to be true any mystical or irrational doctrine which they may conjecture to be of help in the business of life.

Jesus is said to have looked on the multitudes with compassion, regarding them as sheep without a shepherd. The situation has improved somewhat, but the multitudes need compassion still. Many of its leaders have lost their way, and are seeking in the bogs of pragmatism and other forms of anti-philosophy for humanity's highway. Some have even given up rational ideals, and profess no longer to believe that the universe is an order the truth of which it is possible for us to know. To understand how this disqualifies them for leadership, it is only necessary to remember that all inspiring preaching, every message that has ennobled the lives of men, has been marked by two characteristics, namely, faith in the worth of human nature and in the reality of truth.

In order to make it perfectly clear that the greatest need of our excessively specialized and subdivided modern life is for synoptic-minded men, it is necessary to consider in the large the development of humanity's higher life as it appears from the point of view of the philosophical psychologist. Other classifications may, of course, be made by those who have other interests at heart, but I think it will be recognized that the picture to be presented is no mere fancy of mine, but that what I am saying the facts themselves say to all who can appreciate their significance.

There are, then, three great stages in the evolution of thought, namely:—

1. The primitive confused awareness.

2. The clearing up of this confusion through the making of distinctions.

3. The synoptic view in which the things distinguished are seen together.

The first stage need not detain us long. Everyone who has studied the history of thought knows that distinctions which are familiar to us were not made in ancient times. Thus there was a period when the problem of the relation of mind and body had not arisen because these two aspects of reality were not yet clearly distinguished. Matter and spirit were regarded as different forms of a single substance. "Whatever acts is body," it was said. "Mind is the subtlest form of body, but it is body nevertheless." The soul-atoms were thought to differ from those

of the body only in being very small and smooth and not in fundamental nature. The problem of interaction, therefore, presented no special difficulty. Early theories of exorcism and baptism betray this confusion of conceptions. As Edwin Hatch has shown, it was imagined "that demons might be the direct cause of diseases because the extreme tenuity of their substance enabled them to enter, and to exercise a malignant influence upon, the bodies of men. So water, when exorcised from all the evil influences that might reside in it, actually cleansed the soul. The conception of the process as symbolical came with the growth of later ideas of the relation of matter to spirit. It is, so to speak, a rationalizing explanation of a conception which the world was tending to outgrow."

In the course of time problems are disentangled. Matter came to be thought of as that which has extension and weight, and mind as that which thinks and feels. This was a great advance, and this differentiation is a necessary step in mental progress. But at this stage a new difficulty arose. Men fell into the error of supposing that things which they can distinguish in thought are in fact separate, or even opposed, They made their useful distinctions too absolute, and the evil consequences, for practical life as well as for the understanding, immediately appeared. The differences between the various aspects of human life were exaggerated until they appeared to be antagonisms, and men took it for granted that if they chose the one they must reject the other. And so we have the spectacle of the saints, in both the Christian and non-christian worlds, identifying themselves with the part of life which they considered noblest, and despising and mistreating and occasionally, from a different application of the same logic, even indulging their bodies. The horrors of asceticism and the bestiality in which it not seldom ends are familiar, and to describe them here would serve no good purpose. What is useful, however, is to see that the logic of asceticism is simple. Since the body is not the soul, and since the two are opposed, let us mortify the deeds of the flesh. Or, in the other case, since the body has nothing to do with the soul, let the swine feast and satisfy its base nature.

History shows that the result of overdoing this useful distinc-

tion between body and mind is always the desert, physical, mental, and moral. Specialization and differentiation are necessary phases of intellectual progress, but not its goal. It is necessary to go on to organization, to keep clear the things that have been shown to be different, and yet to think them together in their natural unity. While it is a great advantage to the physiologist to be able to study bodily processes without troubling himself about the mental life, and to the psychologist to be free to investigate psychic processes pure and simple, it must never be forgotten that the two sets of processes are actually very closely related, that mental and nervous life do in fact go on together, and are both parts of the real, concrete life that we know. The goal of thinking is the comprehensive view of the synthetic mind. No other view is true, and every other view leads to bad results in practical life. And today there are evidences that this is being felt, witness the growing recognition of the fact that there are psychic factors in health and physical factors in morals. We are beginning to see clearly the truths which the old Greeks felt when they treated life as one. In the education of their youth, gymnastic was not merely for the body nor was music exclusively for the soul, but both were for both.

Hegel saw this clearly enough in his day, but the form in which he cast his thought, his rigid scheme, and his defects as a writer make it easier to condemn him off-hand than to appreciate his great, fruitful conceptions, which may easily be stated in a simpler and more intelligible way. His vision was perfectly clear. He saw that the distinctions which we find it useful and necessary to make are not absolute, that life includes tendencies that seem opposite, and that it is thus larger than the logic of acute and consistent, but narrow, minds, and that to see life sanely and do justice to all the phases of its development requires what may be called the dialectic, synoptic, synthetic, or comprehensive mind.

What a pity that Hegel's power of clear exposition was not equal to his insight, and how much we need his message in the United States today, in spite of the progress of the last eighty years! For minds with the requisite scope are still rare. Even our leaders are for the most partisans. As Emerson said, each

sees but one aspect of the total situation, and it generally takes two to make a man. Nor is the case very different with our intellectual *élite*. Their specialization is usually so extreme and exclusive that although they know their subjects, they do not see them in perspective and in their larger relations, the result being that they are all too often poor teachers. How rare it is to find a mind able to take the results of investigation in one department, and unite them with the truths reached by workers in other fields! The ideal is to carry specialization to the utmost and then to organize the truth discovered into a unitary view, that is, not to leave the materials of the house of thought lying around in separate heaps, but to build, to think together again, without blurring them, the things that science has distinguished, but which after all have their place in the organic unity of the living whole.

In Plato's phrase, the opposite of the ideally organized mind, the comprehensive intelligence, is the "crippled soul." This is his name for the imperfect, deformed creature whose scope of vision is so limited that it can embrace but one aspect of our many-sided life. And no doubt the Greek thinker would have accepted Muirhead's definition of philosophy as a "lifelong struggle with one-sided ideas of life." One who meets many highly educated men must often be struck with the felicity of the term "crippled souls." Each man seems to rationalize but a small section of his mind. In some regions he is mature, in others he is about five years old. An eminent naturalist will tell us that he has communicated with the dead, or a fine mind like that of Maeterlinck, able to produce the beautiful essay on "Sincerity", or that on "The Dog", will also profess belief in childish superstitions, such as those set forth in the essays entitled "The Star" and "The Pre-destined."

And here it is well to consider that, if comparatively few have attained to the third stage of intelligence, this is but natural, for the work of distinction-making is by no means ended. Our thought is still too much of a blur, and our problems too complex and in need of disentangling. For instance, one reason for the frequent failure of educational methods is the lingering error that each child has a number of faculties, such as memory and

reason, which, it is supposed, may be developed by discipline. The truth is that these distinctions are crude in the extreme, and that the mind is a name for a vast number of specialized capacities. Strictly speaking, we have, not a memory, but a multitude of memories, good, bad, and indifferent, and we find that men generally reason well about the things which they have studied, but that their judgment is not to be trusted when the subject under consideration is unfamiliar. This discovery dissipates into thin air the notion of formal discipline, and is of the greatest importance for the art of education and for correct judgment of the characters and capacities of men. Many such useful distinctions are doubtless yet to be made, for our natures are far more complex than was formerly supposed. The psychologists are showing that below the threshold of consciousness great numbers of tendencies, memories, fears, and longings live and work, either singly or in associative systems, that they affect our disposition and sometimes our health. We have as yet by no means been able to take stock of all that is in the obscure reservoir of life, and it will be a long time before we can say of any psychologist what the author of the Fourth Gospel said of Jesus, that "he knew what was in man." Just now this truth needs to be emphasized, but erelong, in virtue of our constitutional tendency to excess, we shall probably have to protest against its overstatement, and to recall the fact that the mind, in spite of the abundance of its organized reactions and special capacities, has a certain unity after all.

This tendency to hypostatize distinctions is one of the chief characteristics of popular thinking. There are, for example, many people who are sufficiently developed to appreciate the importance of moral education and who become in consequence its ardent promoters. But they usually proceed on the false assumption that because the instruction given in the public schools and colleges is predominantly intellectual, it is without any moral result, and that it needs to be supplemented by an education that is purely ethical. But of course only those who linger in the second stage of intellectual development can think in this way. Education is one, and, while its aspects may be distinguished, it cannot be actually separated into independent

parts. There is no purely intellectual education, no moral or religious education which is just that and nothing else. The habits of study, order, neatness, punctuality, accuracy, thoroughness, politeness, and co-operation, which are developed in school life because they are its necessary conditions, are all moral. So with all instruction in history and literature that goes beyond the most elementary stages. As the student proceeds, his intellectual interests are awakened, the spirit of the great writers touches his spirit, he catches something of their enthusiasm for noble ideals, his horizon is enlarged, and he is enabled to observe the effects of good and bad actions as illustrated on the stage of the world, and this is only another way of saying that he is being built up in his moral life. To fail to see this truth, and to suppose that the moral is a separate or separable section of life which can be advanced only through the reading of a particular book or through instruction which is "purely moral," is to misunderstand, and so to be incapable of adequately meeting, the real situation.

In this respect, however, the people are not sinners above many who speak from the pulpit and the professor's chair. Much preaching and passionate utterance on social matters is based on a superstitious notion of the nature of right. The moral sense can be truly estimated only when regarded in its natural relation with the other aspects of life. To isolate anything is to distort it, and much teaching and preaching is vitiated by a too sharp sundering of the moral and the rational. The conscience is assumed to be a sort of divine ingredient in a nature otherwise unmoral or else fatally determined to the bad. Those who speak in its name too often seem to feel justified in pronouncing on complex social situations which they give no evidence of having adequately studied. They apparently do not doubt their competence to decide what rates railroads should charge, what wages they should pay their employees, and what is extortionate and what fair in many similar cases, without any considerable experience with the business in question or knowledge of the actual conditions.

Yet it remains true that the right is only the rational viewed in a certain light. It is what is on the whole, and all things con-

sidered, the wisest and best thing to be done, and what this is in complex cases can only be determined by patient and careful study. Only in simple situations is the decision easy. The possession of a monitor like the inward voice of Socrates is not an adequate equipment for an adviser of men in our complicated social and industrial life. What is right is that which does justice to the widest and highest interests involved, and, since these frequently in some measure conflict, the right can only be a conciliation. It is never something abstract to be followed, regardless of its effects on the interests involved; rather is it that which secures for all normal and legitimate human interests their maximum fulfilment. In great matters the "crippled soul" cannot do right because it does not see the total situation, because it sees but a few of the interests that must be cared for; such a one is likely to become a fanatic who may be praised a little for an upright purpose, but who must be much condemned for the social harm he is sure to do.

The Republic clearly states that in the production of the trained intelligences, who can do right because they are large enough to take into consideration the many varied interests of humanity, nature as well as education plays a part. There are some minds with which nothing can be done. After being tested and found wanting, they are quickly dropped, the philosophic natures alone being able to profit by the highest training and ultimately becoming capable of wise leadership. It would be very easy to make fun of this idea; nevertheless, it is true. Nor do we have to look very far for an illustration. In the recent history of this country a great part was played by a man who had the native qualities in question, although he did not have the advantage of an academic education. I refer to Lincoln, our supreme type of the synoptic-minded man. The men about him, with all their earnestness and acuteness, were most of them but "crippled souls," in that they were partisans, representatives of certain special or local interests and blind to all others. Lincoln felt the total situation, and was perhaps the only man in the country who could do right, because he was the only man large enough to see it. With a few more leaders like him, and fewer anti-slavery orators and Southern hot-heads, we should undoubtedly have settled

the questions of slavery and states' rights without a civil war. That is always the case. When men are not large-minded and rational, they must fight. The most eloquent denouncers of wrong are apt to be half-wrong themselves, for in promoting the interests they have at heart they are wounding others just as precious. And men who live in a world that has been evolving for ages, a world in which things get to be wrong because they are out of date, a world in which readjustments of all kinds have constantly to be made, cannot do right, whatever their intentions, until they learn to see together the many various interests involved and to patiently use evolutionary methods in promoting desirable conditions.

A similar situation confronts us today. There are men who are industriously preaching the doctrine of class consciousness, and calling upon all to line up for or against, and, if they are not checked, we may have another illustration of the ravages wrought by a superstitious moral sentiment which assumes that the good is the promotion of a single interest in the world, and not the conciliation and adjustment of all interests. Our hope for a continued peaceful social evolution depends upon the existence of a majority of sensible people, led by men of great sanity and wholeness of view.

The fact that many who are sufficiently educated to get a hearing and have their utterances printed still linger in the second stage of development comes out clearly in the current discussions concerning the relations of the individual and social life. Certain writers who start from the individual give the impression that they have not advanced beyond the position of Rousseau. The absolute individual they talk about is an abstraction, and never was on land or sea. They betray no appreciation of the fact that every civilized man is shaped by the society in which he grows up, that he is nourished on its ideals and saturated with its traditions, and that his whole higher life is social just because it is human. On the other hand, those who are emphasizing the social aspects of education, morality, and religion, not infrequently seem to have forgotten that there is no society apart from the individuals that constitute it, that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a social conscience, no conscience, that

is, which is not somebody's conscience, and no general happiness that individuals do not feel. They do not think as clearly as the boy of six who was discussing with his little sister the purpose of human life. The latter had retained in her memory some of the pious instruction given by her teachers, and when the question was put, "What are we here for?" said at once, "Why, we are here to take care of other people"; to which her still unsophisticated brother replied, "No, that cannot be; for what then are the other people here for?"

The crippled souls are prolific writers, and it will be a fortunate thing for humanity when they are offset by greater activity on the part of those who realize that the concrete human life that we know is one, that it has both its individual and its collective aspects, that this distinction exists within a living unity, and that to take it absolutely is to push men back into the old way of fighting out their problems instead of thinking them out. He who can see but one thing at a time is but a fraction of a man, and fractional men, the representatives of special interests, are socially inefficient, despite their appearance of force. They often settle conflicting claims on the field of battle, because they know of no other way of getting their claims allowed. But the man who is able to see things together is of the highest value to the state, and is the supreme type of efficiency. His mind is like a deliberative assembly in which all great human interests have representation. Because he is able to make the necessary adjustments and effect the conciliation which life requires, he makes fighting unnecessary. Understanding perfectly that society is a balance of forces, some of which are now too strong and some too weak, he will actively aid the cause that for the time needs assistance, and promote the interest that is being oppressed or overlooked. He will work with a clear head and with steadfast good will in his heart, knowing that he is not an enemy of those whom he must for the time oppose. And if, in spite of his efforts, a crisis comes, and a situation arises in which it is necessary for him to fight, he will do his duty, not as a partisan, nor as the enemy of any man, but as the real friend of all. The spirit in which he will act is that of one of Victor Hugo's heroes, who in order to protect the precious interests of society aimed his

gun at the leader of the mob, the bearer of the red flag of anarchy, and pulled the trigger, not in hate, but with tears of sorrow streaming down his face.

The philosophic nature, the synoptic-minded man (would that we had a simpler, homelier term by which to designate him!) is, therefore, not developed for contemplation only, but for wise social action. Although he will feel the blessedness of the mind's higher life, the joy of seeking and learning truth, he loses nothing of his efficiency because of the clearness and wide sweep of his vision. He is socially valuable because he knows when and where to help. He aids a cause when it is too weak and resists it when it is too aggressive.

To give a concrete illustration, a mind of this type will take a lively issue and an active part in the present controversy over the open and closed shop. Believing in the value of organized labor, he will not hesitate to oppose it in so far as he considers its principles to be wrong. In this case his course seems clear. For, stripped of all confusing associations and set in the clear light, the establishment of the closed shop means that workingmen will have to get a license from some labor organization to live in the United States. So far, the majority of wage-workers in this country have shown by their actions that they prefer to remain outside the unions, and this in spite of the persuasive arguments and coercive methods of many years. To work for the closed shop is to force these men to surrender a hardly-won freedom; it is to say to them, "You must come to terms with a certain private organization. If it permits you to live and work, very well; if not, we will not employ you, buy your goods, or accept your services in any way. Submission or death by starvation is your alternative." Stated thus simply, this seems hard, but that is what the closed shop comes to in the end.

Now the large-minded man who is compelled to oppose what he deems a mistaken, and hopes is but a temporary, policy of a great organization which in other ways is potent for good, can do so with the greatest energy. Of course he will deeply regret to seem an enemy when he is really a friend, yet he has no ill-will, since he knows that many men are still in the stage of development where they cannot understand what is not partisan,

and where they suppose that he who is against them on one point is against them all along the line. And while today he does his utmost against the closed-shop policy of organized labor, he knows that he is not opposing labor's true interest, and is well aware that at no distant date, when other issues are joined, he may find it necessary to fight for this organization. Even now he may find interests in common with it and work for them, even though his efforts are for the time not appreciated.

In a similar way he will not hesitate to oppose his friends, those whom he meets at the church or the club or in business life, if they seek to gain exclusive privileges through legislation. He will do all he can to promote the spirit of fair play that would give everybody a chance, and that jealously opposes every attempt to monopolize the market either for labor or for any of the necessities of life. Indeed, one of the most admirable things about the ideal type we are describing is the quality of his spirit. The comprehensive view goes with, and to some extent produces, a universal sympathy. While the partisan is always and everywhere a hater, the characteristic of the mind that surveys life from a sufficiently elevated point of view is geniality. It sees everything in the world with sympathy, that is, it appreciates the relative justification of the various points of view, and gladly does justice to ideas and institutions and policies that have served their purpose and have passed or are passing away. Such a one has no blind animosities or furious antagonisms. He will see the fanatic and his cause, and all around both. The attitude of the protestant, whose reason for being is the wrong he protests against, he will recognize as occasionally necessary in certain situations, but not as the normal and desirable attitude of the human spirit. And not only will he be tolerant of intolerant fanatics, but he will have deep sympathy with the great world of men and women who largely follow their instincts and traditions and do not always take their reformers seriously. For he sees clearly that this world of average men and women manages to get on, and so maintains the possibility of further development, while our race would long since have ceased to be if it had followed all its passionately earnest reformers. Such a mind is genial, because it is human and humane, and reflects in its large-

ness something of the greatness of the majestic march of life upward through the ages and of the complexity and variety of interests of the inhabitants of the great, round world.

Leadership belongs exclusively to no one group or profession, but there are two classes in which above all others it should naturally be expected,—the professional teachers of philosophy and the ministers of the liberal churches. To take the philosophers first, the present situation in this country would be depressing were it not evidently swiftly changing and were there not hope that a higher and nobler conception of philosophy's true function and ideal service will some time be attained. What is that function? What, indeed, can it be but the unification of knowledge? What service is so needed today as that of assisting young men and women to organize the detached bits of their information into some comprehensive view of the world? Mental progress consists essentially in a constant reorganization of the mental content, and the essential condition of this is a preliminary organization. It matters not so much what the first synthetic view is, provided it is flexible and capable of revision, as knowledge grows from more to more and the constructive powers develop. The philosopher ought to be the broadest man in the university, and his department is ideally the clearing house of the sciences. The students should learn in that department to seek the organic place in the one body of truth of the truths they learn in their separate studies, and to acquire the habit of seeing things together. Only in this way can the mind have a life, and be something other than a lumber-room in which each new acquisition is piled, regardless of its consistency with what is already there. Such philosophic organization and construction is a tremendous stimulus to the intellectual life. No one wants facts so much as he who wants them for the light they shed on some great problem. In this region, as in so many others, the current of interest flows downward, and interest in great questions, such as that of man's place in the cosmos, fertilizes all the sciences, and inspires and sustains research. Such an influence is needed in the university for the teachers' sake. The great teacher is a man who not only knows his subject, but sees it in its larger relations, and is able to make clear its significance for

other studies and other human interests. The young man who studies the cell-structure of a fern, or dissects the brain and nervous system of a fish would be a pitiable object if he saw no further than the poor dismembered fragments before him. What really makes such activity valuable is that the mind looks not only at the cells and fibres, but through them into the great world of organic relations, that world of which man himself is a living part. An ultimate synthetic view is the justification of his special studies.

To one who holds this conception of the nature and function of philosophy the present situation is matter for sincere regret. For instead of regarding it as their business to unify knowledge and help their students to some mental organization, some flexible progressive world-view, a large number of our philosophers are epistemologists, and consider that their main vocation is to discuss the possibility of knowledge. Now epistemology is a legitimate subject of inquiry, and logically prior to other investigations; yet it is of very subordinate importance, and this for the evident reason that it is bound to come to a positive conclusion. Otherwise it undermines its own foundations. For if the mind is not to be trusted in the creation of other sciences, it is equally unworthy of confidence when it examines the nature and conditions of knowledge. The epistemologist uses the same mind as the chemist, and, if the latter cannot attain to knowledge, neither can his critic. It may be decided that the best name for all our constructions, no matter how frequently verified, is faith rather than knowledge. The name matters little, so we are agreed upon the use of our terms. But this would not affect the point I make, for it would remain true that the chief function of the philosopher is to contribute to the organization and constant reorganization of such knowledge as we have. For him to be a narrow specialist, wasting his time in quibbles about the possibility of knowledge, is an anomaly. His great function remains unperformed, and philosophy, as he represents it, falls into deserved suspicion and discredit.

When this view is stated, some one is almost sure to say, "No one can know all science, and this conception is therefore not possible of realization." Of course, no one can know all science,

nor even all of one science, but it is perfectly possible for a diligent man to be acquainted with the leading conceptions of the various sciences and to know what their larger problems and mutual relations are, and it is precisely with these that the philosopher is concerned.

Without some such general view of life, we are like men studying a canvas a square inch at a time and never seeing the picture. It is with a life, a human society, or a world just as it is with a child's picture-puzzle: the separate and isolated parts are largely without meaning, and only when put together do they make sense.

The world has need of philosophers. They could be of great assistance to us all in helping us to a general view of life that would give meaning and dignity to its disconnected parts. And some day there will be a happy conjunction of a philosopher with the true conception of his primary function and a university president able to appreciate and willing to support him. The department they will establish in their university will not be obsessed by Kantian ideas and run after "pure knowledge *a priori*," but will return to the nobler and more useful conception held by the world's greatest thinkers generally down to what, I believe, will ultimately be recognized as the German episode in the history of philosophy. The students fortunate enough to receive instruction in this university will be conducted to a unitary and comprehensive conception of the world, and not be lost in the endless maze of *Erkenntnisstheorie*. The teachers will cherish an ideal of mental organization which may be likened to the Republic of the United States, which grows constantly with the growth in population, intelligence, and wealth of its component states and by the admission of new states. So taught, the young men and women will have a place for everything they learn. They will attain to an ordered inner life, and have some sense of the result of the ages of the growth of life and the development of thought, and some knowledge of the larger features of the vast process in which our life has an organic place.

With regard to the liberal minister, it is clear that he has a similar function, although it is to be performed for a different constituency, for the men and women whose college days are

over and who are now carrying on the world's work. They, too, need help in synthesizing and conciliating life's varied and conflicting interests. For them the churches ought to be graduate schools where they may be assisted to a great, courage-inspiring, and effort-sustaining *Weltanschauung*. Such a view of the world is not a philosophic luxury, but a practical, religious necessity, when the mind reaches a certain stage of development. When a soul in trouble exclaimed, "I will lift up mine eyes to the hills whence cometh my help," he referred to the summits of his thought, to an inspiring conception of God. This is the picturesque Hebrew way of expressing the soul's joy and strength in a great thought.

Nothing is more relevant to the present situation than this fact. In spite of the low views of truths urged upon us today and the depreciation of the importance of constructive thinking for religion, there is no successful preaching, no inspiring gospel, which does not present a sublime world-view. No one has ever succeeded who has not been able to set forth a conception that stirred the mind and fired the imagination by its grandeur. The Hebrew prophets have had the greatest influence on the religious life of the world. They were the most important factor in the transformation of the national religion of Israel into a universal religion, and their utterances, even in translation, have been the strength and consolation of the centuries. And, though they had moral passion in abundance, they were fundamentally thinkers. They were the first philosophers of history, and their utterances were lofty because their thoughts were lofty. They saw their God actively directing the destinies of nations, and conceived the unfolding of a divine purpose to be the highway of history. Amos rises to the magnificent conception of Jahveh as the world-ruling God of justice; for Hosea he is the universal Father; the first Isaiah is a statesman seeking to conform the foreign policy of his fatherland to the divine plan of which he assumes to be the interpreter; and Jeremiah reaches the thought of an inner law and a human instinct for God. The second Isaiah is literally carried away by the glory of his religious idea, and his trumpet tones calling his people to encouragement and trust thrill the reader of these far-off days.

The same principle is repeated in the history of Christianity. Paul, the great apostle, who saved the religion of Jesus from perishing as an obscure Jewish sect, who planted churches over the Graeco-Roman world, and who was a marvel of energy and activity, was inspired by his philosophy of history. For him the history of the world before Jesus was merely a time of preparation, and everything before him merely led up to the truth he had to preach.

There is, then, no such thing possible today as a religion out of relation to the intellectual conceptions of the age. Of course, it is known by all that religion is impulsive in its origin and emotional in its nature, and that, though it defends itself with arguments, it is not based on reasoning. But it is also true that there has not been any simple impulsive faith among civilized people for centuries, any faith uninfluenced by the reflective intelligence. Faith does begin in feeling, but by a law of its nature it goes on to reason, to a believed conception that remains after the critical intelligence has pruned away the superstitious elements which were associated with it in the early stages of its growth.

The man who said that he hated theology and botany but loved religion and flowers was, therefore, more epigrammatic and sensational than wise. It is pleasant to be a child, and live by impulse, habit, and authority, but when we become men we must accept thought for our portion. The poet may sing

> "Backward, turn backward, O Time, in your flight,
> Make me a child again,"

but the process of life is irreversible. To reach a simple faith without any thought in it, it would be necessary to go back beyond Christianity and beyond the prophets of Israel to the world's childhood. The attempt to do this would make us not children, but sophisticated men. There is nothing for us but a rational faith, and we can have no noble feeling in the absence of great thoughts. Moreover, the distinction between the intellectual and the emotional life can be made altogether too sharp and too complete. These two aspects of our existence are in organic relation, and neither can be successfully isolated. Indeed, a common but very precious experience proves that the difference

between faith and reason may easily be exaggerated. The highest moral truths and deepest religious insights seem to grow out of a feeling or instinctive stage into clear self-consciousness. When we have had an hour with Emerson, or have heard some inspiring sermon, do we not often say that we have learned much and yet in a sense have learned nothing? For all that the teacher has helped us to see we knew before, but in us it was inarticulate and unclear. What has happened is that now we know what we meant, we see what we felt, we can say what we did not know how to utter. Perhaps the greatest service of the preacher is that he helps men to be their noblest selves. He does for his congregation what Socrates did for the youth of Athens. The old philosopher-inquisitor realized the nature of his function, for he said that while his mother was a midwife he was an accoucheur of souls.

But when our ideals are born and we see them in all their beauty, we naturally desire a view of life in which they shall appear legitimated, and we are strengthened and made happy if philosophy offers to us a conception of the world as a place congenial to these highest interests. Israel's prophets inspired the nation with a religious interpretation of history. Our corresponding problem is to give a religious interpretation to the doctrine of evolution, and to other true and approved ways of thinking concerning the world and our place therein, and thus to enable the life of aspiration to feel at home.

It is vain to try to isolate the moral and religious life from the intellectual life of our time. Neither ethical culture nor religious faith can thrive entirely apart. Both are for men in a certain situation, and what that situation is it is the function of the intelligence to determine. We do well to admire the statement of Micah, "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God?" But we must not forget the last three words, for they are essential. One may do right desperately in a universe which he believes to be indifferent or even bad, but he is a stronger as well as a happier man for a conception of the cosmos in which his passion for right has significance, and in which his love of goodness is seen to be the heart of reality coming to consciousness in him. To have

the conviction that our ideals are at home in the world that has produced them, that they are factors in evolution and guide life in the making, is to be freed from fear and assured that, as we work out our salvation, it is after all God that works in us both in the will and the deed, in the beautiful dream, the aspiration, the prayer, as well as in its realization. The synthetic view of the moral life, the religious life, and the life of thought is thus the fruitful view, and when the mind has been properly educated the three blend in one life. The attempt to ignore any one of these aspects of what is normally a concrete, organic whole weakens them all, and history shows that when religious men ignore the intellectual life of their age they relapse into mysticism and suffer mental and moral decline.

In these days certain substitutes for thought, for an inspiring outlook, have been proposed, but the help they offer is illusive. Thus we are told that there are unknown spirits who may come to us in the darkness of the subconscious regions of our life. But this suggestion is unattractive. Religion is surely something other and nobler than a subterranean or kitchen-door connection with we know not what spiritual powers. No, we must try the spirits, all spirits, as the Scripture says, and they must come to the front door of our nature and show their credentials. It is the goals of life that are divinely beautiful, and we can never worship other than our highest thought of God, the One in whom our noblest ideals are united. We look for him not in the region of the abnormal and pathological, but in the other direction, knowing well that our highest thought falls short of the reality we worship, and that the sweetest and divinest human ideal is but a lure to keep us in the path that leads to him.

It remains to show that the synoptic view of life is the religious view, and that the reason why so many feel themselves to be orphans in the world is the fragmentariness of their thought. This is best illustrated in the history of the relation of our concepts of man and the world. Long ago the distinction between them was drawn, although we have evidences of a time anterior when it was still unmade. But, once established, it was soon exaggerated, and man began to think of himself as an alien, and opposed to the world, which was then conceived of as a dead

mechanism, a piece of machinery, or as under the control of an evil spirit. For a long time religious feeling was well expressed in the old hymn,

"I'm but a stranger here;
Heaven is my home.
Earth is a desert drear;
Heaven is my home";

and many who sing no hymns are oppressed by the fear or the suspicion that a materialistic philosophy will prove true, and thus negate their dearest longings and hopes.

Now in the interest of clear thinking, of wise social action, and ultimately of the religious life, it is essential that the distinction between the human and the natural be drawn with the utmost rigor. We cannot reach the third stage of human intelligence by skipping or slurring over the work of the second. There are many people who are still fascinated by the idea of a primitive natural life that never has been lived on earth, and who admonish us to follow nature without realizing that the methods of nature in the lower stages of her development can never be imitated by man. We cannot imitate her in farming or rearing our children. Her method in improving forms of life is to produce a great excess of individuals and destroy all but a few. We must understand natural processes that we may use them, but it is mere superstition to regard them as examples for human imitation.

On the other hand, the biologists have made it clear that man is no stranger here, but that he is a child of the world's life, an organic part of the one great process, and there is every reason to believe that this is as true of his mind and spiritual nature as of his body. He is thus domesticated in the world; all that he is, and all that he aspires to be, all his heroes draw their being from this nature which men in the second stage of development considered alien or positively hostile. The result is the naturalization of religion. For the old ways of thinking, which accounted for the world on some materialistic theory, are forever impossible. No view of the world can for a moment be treated as worthy of consideration that offers no explanation of the highest product of evolution, the intellectual, social, moral, and religious life of man.

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And since this life actually is, since we are absolutely compelled to regard it as an organic part, a result, of the world-process, it follows that that process must be interpreted in terms of its outcome. It was a great saying of Aristotle that "what each thing is when fully developed, when its growth has been brought to perfection, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family." And we may add that this principle holds when we are speaking of the world of which these are but parts.

We have, then, only to keep clear the distinction between man and nature and then combine them in a synoptic view, that is, see them in the organic unity which is the concrete reality and not in the opposition which is only an abstraction of thought, and the result is as much religion as philosophy. If we have no life that is not natural, then the divinest prayer of the divinest man in history is but the world-life become conscious and articulate, and as from this elevation we view the task before us, of building up, teaching, and ennobling our race, we understand perfectly how a great genius could say, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." When naturalism is thus made thorough-going, it is transfigured. It does not mean that man is swallowed up in a process that goes mechanically on, but rather that he must change his conception of that process, since he is its outcome. Put together the two things that belong together, man and the universe, and then ask what kind of a universe it is that is flowering out into a human world of thought and love and righteousness, of joy and peace and hope. A materialistic philosophy is possible only when the part of nature that lies below the realm of life and purpose is under consideration. But there is no such nature. The only nature we know is the nature that has produced and sustains human life, and the only rational way to interpret that nature is by its product and fruit rather than by its lower stages and earlier phases. If you try to study either man or nature in isolation, you necessarily fail of understanding, for both are actually parts of one organic whole. But combine them in a single view, enlarge the scope of your vision, and you attain to a religious interpretation of reality that is sublime, that conserves all values and sustains all that is dearest and most precious in humanity's faith and hope. So far from being a stranger, a

lonely wanderer in an alien universe, the philosopher-saint, with his thoughts and his aspirations, is the consummate product of the age-long process of its growth. And as we survey the world from this height, we can say with Jacob of old, "Lo, God was in this place and I knew it not."

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

IRVING KING

State University of Iowa

The reviews of my recent book, *The Development of Religion*, have revealed certain misunderstandings both as to the general point of view and as to the meaning which it was intended to convey in specific places.[1] The problems discussed are fundamental ones, and the present article aims to restate some of them in the hope of making more clear the precise points at issue.

Some of the criticisms seem to show a misconception of the nature of the science of religion, as well as of the point of view of this particular book. The scientific discussion of any series of phenomena gives an essentially external view of them. Thus, to give a scientific description of an emotion or an idea is not equivalent to possessing the idea or being thrilled by the emotion. Consequently the scientific account always seems cold and unsatisfactory to the person who has the actual experience. This is particularly true in the case of all attempts to describe religious phenomena in the exact terminology of science. In reading such an account the person who is fortunate enough to possess a well-developed religious experience inevitably feels that something has been left out, that the description does not seem real, the vital essence of the matter has been left untouched. But this is one of the necessary limitations of the scientific treatment. It is not that there are phenomena which science cannot describe, but rather that any and all descriptions of an experience are cold as compared with the experience itself. What description of a color of the spectrum could take the place of one glimpse of that color by the organs of sight?

Now religion presents to the scientific investigator a series of phenomena, and all these phenomena are capable of descrip-

[1] See George A. Coe, "A New Natural History of Religion," in the Harvard Theological Review for July, 1910.

tion. In some cases the description will not be very adequate, because the data necessary to an adequate description are lacking; but we must nevertheless proceed upon the hypothesis that a full scientific account is possible. This is nothing more nor less than what the physicist does, although he knows that there are regions which he has as yet failed to penetrate with his hypotheses. He does not dare to set absolute limits to his investigations, for to do so would practically vitiate much of his work. Science must work upon the assumption that it has a closed system of relations within which it can state every phenomenon. This theoretical presupposition renders science possible, even though we may have to admit that no science has actually carried its work so far as the working hypothesis assumes to be possible. In my book I have made the statement that a scientific account of a set of facts "has no meaning except within a closed system of definite relations." This was intended to mean that, while no science may actually be a closed system, it deals with each phenomenon on the supposition that certain universally valid and inclusive principles exist,—for example, that of causation, of the conservation of energy, of the perfect elasticity of the ether. It may finally turn out that these hypotheses are not true, but for the time being the student of science goes ahead with his work on the supposition that they are true.

In just the same way, if there is to be a proper science of religion, there must be the hypothesis of a closed system within which every observable fact of religion can be explained. We must be free from the apprehension that we may have to inject here and there some supernatural element, a *deus ex machina*, in order that the account may be rendered complete. It is said that when the astronomer and mathematician Laplace presented to Napoleon his work on celestial mechanics, Napoleon remarked in substance, "I understand that you have written a book upon the heavens in which the name of God does not appear," and that the answer of Laplace was, "Sire, I have no need for such an hypothesis."

Laplace was right, and no one imagines that the modern astronomer is atheistic if he fails to supplement his account of the heavens by introducing now and then a supernatural element.

No more is the science of religion atheistic, if it deals with religious phenomena in the same way. God appears in the science of religion, not as one among other factors, as the specific source of certain impulses and ideas, which are, therefore, peculiarly divine. God is not one factor among others, but rather the obverse of the whole process. He is not an element present in some phenomena more than in others, an element which, therefore, we might presumably weigh and measure. We have no terms with which to describe the nature of the relation which he sustains to the natural world, unless we adopt the makeshift of calling him the element of *meaning* or of *value* present in the whole process of the religious life, an element that must be appreciated rather than described.

The *concept* of God, however, is legitimate material for the science of religion, and it is part of the business of the investigator to find out what that concept is, and how it was acquired, or built up. I have called the deity a "symbol of values," and I do not see how the psychologist, as a man of science, can take any other position than that indicated by this rather awkward phrase. God may be very real to us in our religious life, and yet no one of us would hold that that reality affects the human consciousness in the same way that a beam of light does. The problem here is to find a terminology which will express that reality without confounding it with the reality which belongs to the world of phenomena and which affects consciousness through the senses. If I have read Professor Coe's interesting discussions of mysticism aright, he interprets the phenomena of mystical experience from some such point of view as this, notwithstanding his strictures upon my discussion of these points.

There is a slightly different aspect of the problem of the relation of the divine to the human which may also be referred to here. Some psychologists have spoken of the human consciousness as a part of a larger, cosmic, presumably divine consciousness. If this is merely a symbolic method of describing the fact of human interrelations, the influence of one person upon another, it may be regarded as admissible, but if it assumes an interrelation of natural and supernatural, it is an assumption that needs justification. When I have said that the human consciousness "is not . . . a

part of a larger life, either social or divine," I have had in mind to deny the view held by some that there is a sort of mystical essence of a social or divine life pervading the atmosphere, into which each of us dips to some extent. Perhaps a metaphysics of existence might be worked out on some such hypothesis, and many writers on mysticism seem to assume something of the sort, but I do not see how a strict psychologist can harbor any such notion. As a psychical existence each individual life, as far as we now know, is separate and distinct from every other individual. To say this is not to deny the reality of social interactions or the mutual influence of mind upon mind. In this sense, but not in that of a mystic "social mind," sociality is a precondition of religion.

Returning to the previous question, then, I may say that my book does not attempt to present a "closed system," and yet it is written upon the hypothesis that every observable religious fact is capable of being put in some definite natural system of relations within which are all other observable facts. Such a method will of course shock those who are continually trying to find some place in religious experience which requires the introduction of a force from without, or an idea or feeling which has no natural antecedents; they imagine that if they are able to discover such gaps, or lacunae, they will thereby contribute to the value of the religious force, idea, or emotion. I do not see how the assumption of injected supernatural elements can have anything to do with making an experience more genuine or more valuable. As is pointed out over and over again in the book, these qualities are ultimately determined by the part the experience plays in the rest of the individual's life and in the general plexus of social experience.

Another word regarding the general point of view of the book. The ideal continuously held in mind in attempting to make a scientific description of religion has been to describe what exists, to take an inventory, as it were, of the facts and forces of the religious consciousness. It has not been the object either to discredit or to establish as true any part of this consciousness. The purpose was simply to hold it up, to expose it to view, to pull it apart, as it were, for the sake of determining what from a scien-

tific point of view is actually there. If some say that it is a shameless if not a sacrilegious proceeding thus to pick coldly to pieces what is so full of rich and precious meaning to many a heart, I can admit that the task is largely a thankless one, but must maintain that it is legitimate.

In such a description of these religious phenomena how and where shall one begin? It has seemed to me possible to start from the fact that man is primarily an *active* creature. All development on the mental side has probably been preceded by some sort of active process. One friendly reviewer[2] found the chief limitation of the book in the narrowness with which it held to this point of view. But surely it makes for clarity and definiteness to adhere to one point of view rather than to be constantly shifting to others. I see no reason why the philosophy and psychology of action should not furnish as adequate a basis as any other for the examination of religious phenomena. At any rate, whether the point of departure is wisely chosen or not will have to be determined by the extent to which it is capable of illuminating a very intricate subject.

Starting in these studies with the concept of man as primarily an active creature, I have kept one question constantly in mind, namely, that of the bearing, the influence, of this primary human quality upon what has followed. Have the complexities of culture any relationship to the fact that man was first of all engrossed in trying to *do* something? In other words, it is the question of genetic relationships that has been uppermost in mind in this description of religious phenomena. To deal with such a question obviously requires much hypothesis, but hypothesis is legitimate in science, if the student does not forget that it is not the same thing as absolutely verifiable facts. This book presents, then, a hypothetical account of certain developmental and genetic phases of religion, which are some of the sub-problems into which the main problem of genesis resolves itself. Religion undoubtedly involves an appreciation and affirmation of certain values. What is the origin of this value-sense? Does it have any definite connection with man's active, projective tendencies? Primitive religion, and to some extent the religion of

[2] J. H. Leuba, Psychological Bulletin, vol. vii, p. 301.

the civilized races, expresses itself in certain active forms, rites, and ceremonies which are popularly supposed to be required of the worshipper by his deity or other higher power. Is it not possible, however, that these rites had another origin? May they not have some relation to the fundamental active tendencies of the group in which they appear? The striking similarity of these ceremonies to the more general play-customs and economic activities of the society suggest that they are extensions of these activities, that they first existed without any special religious significance and then in some way acquired a religious meaning, that they are to be regarded as contributing to the building up of the religious consciousness rather than as the expression of an already formed religious sense. This hypothesis assumes a definite relation between man's religious development and his active interests, and a careful study of the anthropological record shows that evidence is not wanting in support of such a view.

It will be noted that this does not assume an innate religious sense, but rather starts with something supposedly more primitive and general than an instinct. The question of absolute beginnings is always hard to deal with, but intricate though it may be the scientific student does not regard it as an improper question for him to grapple with. I am far from imagining that I have unravelled all the antecedents of the religious consciousness. In fact, a complete account was not attempted; I wished rather to illustrate the true method of the natural-scientist in this field. He must avoid assuming at the start that which he wishes to explain genetically. If he wishes merely to describe religion as a series of existing historical phenomena, he of course assumes that the religious consciousness exists. If, however, he is concerned with beginnings, he must make a real and not a pseudo-beginning. Many accounts of the origin of religion assume at the start the very things they propose to explain. Thus it is often said that man has a religious instinct, an irreducible something in his psychical make-up, such as "a sense of fitness," a harmonizing instinct, an innate religiosity, a perception of the infinite, and so on, and that this is the core or germ of religion, from which religion has naturally developed. It may be true that man as we know him possesses a germ of religion, an innate re-

ligiosity, but it is necessary for genetic science to try to get back even of that. The tendency of the biologist is to regard instincts not as ultimate data, but rather as temporary halting-places in the study of the development of a species. For him the instincts had a hypothetical beginning in something simpler. But when the student of the science of religion postulates a religious instinct, he is more than likely to use the term merely for the sake of covering up by a scientific terminology the non-scientific hypothesis that there is an irreducible something, a divine spark, in virtue of which we may know that religion is really divine and not a pure invention of priests or a delusion which has survived from an earlier period of culture. The "instinct-theory" in this latter sense is merely a modern version of the wide-spread opinion that all true religion is the direct outcome of a primitive revelation. If we take this view, instead of recognizing that the divinity in our lives inheres in every element rather than in some one of its aspects, we are not, to my mind, prepared to take a really scientific view of the matter. If, however, by the "religious instinct" we intend a stage in the journey backwards beyond which we are willing to go in case still simpler terms of statement should offer themselves, then the use of the phrase does not involve any *a priori* assumption, and we have not shut ourselves out from the sphere of scientific inquiry.

But even though it be legitimate to use the term instinct, I am not sure that very much is thereby gained. It is an open question whether we profit by trying to use biological concepts for the interpretation of the higher types of psychical activity. As a rough-and-ready, purely popular expression, it may do. We may freely grant that much of the content of religion, as of the rest of our lives, is built up out of a raw material of instinct, a term which in its turn may possibly yield to simpler statement. But to admit this is quite different from admitting a peculiar instinct out of which religion developed, and which is therefore, perforce, a religious instinct. To start with such an instinct would be to abandon the main portion of the territory that should belong to the science of the development of religion. In my book, as I have said, the main question is always as to how the religious consciousness of today came to be, and rests upon

the obvious fact that, whatever else may be said about it, the development of this consciousness has been inextricably interwoven with the evolution of man's *active* interests and with his *social* development. Not for a moment do I deny that we are today what we are because of an immeasurable inheritance from our forbears. The problem is how to state that relationship to the past in the most intelligible form, and I do not think that the concepts of biology, while helpful in a general way, are other than clumsy makeshifts when it comes to an exact description of the more complex processes of psychical development. I may remind those critics who have referred to my rejection of a religious instinct that they have overlooked a large and important use which I have made of this very factor in the attempt to show how all sorts of instinctive and play activities have been of fundamental significance in the development of ceremonials and in the origin and development of religious valuations themselves.

Professor Coe, if I understand him aright, takes the ground that there is a religious instinct because there is religious activity which, in turn, is the expression of a certain structure of the psycho-physical organism. I have no objection to admitting that there is such a structural background for the religious life. In fact a large portion of this book is taken up with the attempt to show just what this structure is, and the possible conditions of its development. This psycho-physical structure, of which, according to Professor Coe, religion is the expression, I have tried to show was not there to start with, but had a beginning, and this beginning, vague and shadowy though it may be, is here sketched in a hypothetical way. If, after such a structure is formed, any one wishes to call the resulting activity instinctive, I have no desire to dispute over a mere name. My last words should be that there are other less ambiguous terms, and certainly more illuminating ones, for describing the phenomena.

Coming back to the general starting-point, the philosophy and psychology of action, there are of course many unsolved problems here as everywhere else. It is at best only a working hypothesis, to be justified by its usefulness. I do not assume, as Professor Coe thinks, that the "psycho-physical organism acquires its psychical qualities first through its own 'overt' activities." I

do not know where the psychical comes from, nor do I know of anyone who has even approached a beginning of an answer to the question. That would be a legitimate object of scientific inquiry, but when we discuss religion, we must start somewhere, and to take up the question of the ultimate origin of the psychical would be fruitless in the present state of our knowledge.

I have tried, then, to show how man, who was an active creature, and possessed of a simple psychical life, acquired a more complex life as he grappled with his world, how the needs and values which arose in his consciousness were definitely related to the things he did. Among the various differentiations of consciousness one was religious. The relating of religion to activity and especially to social activity does not make of religion a mere by-product. I have spoken of the religious attitude as "appreciative" rather than "practical," and have tried to see in religious practices and the religious consciousness an extension of, or a development from, some more general social background, but this is not to deny to religion a real and vital place in the process of human development. The view of some functional psychologists that the appreciative side of experience is a mere by-product of practical life is not adequate to the facts of life, nor can any such view of religion be sustained. Religious practices are no more "a sort of 'aside' that has differentiated itself from the primary adjustment reactions" than is any other aspect of present-day human life. If it is permissible to call all the subtle aspects of present culture by-products of primitive biological reactions, religion may be put in with the rest, but in no other sense. Religion is by no means "a luxury rather than a staple food," nor are its activities merely "products of social forces." The whole process of human life involves the subtlest interactions, and religion has been a producer as well as a product. In fine, to call religion appreciative rather than practical and descriptive is not equivalent to the view that religion represents a side-tracking of human energy or that appreciation is necessarily unproductive. The appreciative side of life is fully as vital and important for the life-process as is any other aspect of that process.

Another subsidiary question which the general problem of the

genesis of religion is found to contain is that of the nature of the primitive belief in powers and spirits and the way in which this belief contributed to the origin and development of religion. Here there is need of distinguishing between belief in powers and belief in spirits. Neither belief is in itself religious, for religion does not differentiate itself from other attitudes according to the objects of belief. It is not the object but the inner valuating attitude which makes an act a religious act, or an object of belief a religious object, and the fundamental problem in the psychology of religion is to explain the origin and evolution of this inner attitude. Belief in superior powers is not religious in itself. Most religions are mixed up with various beliefs in powers and spirits, but we should not be misled by this fact to suppose that religion began in such beliefs. I cannot see that the primitive man is at all in a more religious frame of mind when he believes in a spirit than when he believes that he sees a rock or feels the wind blow. In the descriptions of the natural races may be found accounts of many spirit-beliefs that can only by a great stretch of the imagination be coupled with anything that savors of religion.

The distinction between the belief in spirits and the belief in power or powers is indeed disputed ground. The older school of anthropologists have held that the most primitive philosophy of the world was animism, the idea that every natural object is possessed of a personal spirit-part. The natural deduction from this hypothesis was that the first religion was also animistic, and had a belief in a multitude of spirits. According to some writers the belief in spirits has been the chief factor in the development of religion. But in recent years those who know the natural races intimately have brought to light many facts which raise a question as to whether the primitive philosophy was animistic after all. In many of those cases where a more superficial examination assumed that definite spirit-beliefs were present, what is really believed in now seems rather to be a vaguely conceived impersonal power. It is here a question of fact and not of theory. There is among certain primitive peoples a wide-spread belief in powers that are clearly impersonal. Among other peoples there is an intermixture of beliefs in impersonal powers

and in personal spirits. Among others, again, the beliefs seem to be only in personal spirits. The question now is as to whether the one or the other belief is the more primitive. At first it seems incredible that man should not originally have personified the forces of nature and all inanimate objects as well as animals. A good deal of the difficulty here grows out of an *a priori* philosophy. We have so long said that primitive man could think of the forces of the world only in terms of personal agents like himself that it is now hard to believe that anything else is possible. There is no doubt that under the dominance of this idea the beliefs of some savage peoples, and possibly of many, have been misinterpreted. The first missionaries among the North American Indians reported that they believed in a Great Spirit. The best-known name of this supposed spirit is *manitou*, but it now turns out that the idea conveyed by this term is very far from fixed, and that in most cases the word refers to a belief in a quite impersonal and quasi-mechanical essence.

The indications are that similar ideas prevail in widely separated regions of the world, and it is more than likely that they are present in what has ordinarily passed as animism. Whether this view of the world and human destiny as controlled by a quasi-mechanical, impersonal power is really the primitive view of things, or whether it represents a certain sophistication of mind, we can only speculate. In the first place, is it so natural as it has been assumed to be that the simple mind should personify forces? I have read a number of articles intended to prove that the little child is animistic in his beliefs regarding the world, but I have never heard of a single illustration of his supposed animism that could not easily be explained in some other way. Many of the illustrations offered only show how readily a child will adopt any interpretation at the suggestion of an older person. Most of the cases of animism in children are results of the animism into which we adults fall when we are called upon to explain something to them which we imagine they are incapable of understanding. When I have myself tried to observe indications of a tendency to an animistic view of the world in children who have always had natural phenomena explained to them in a naturalistic way, I have never once noted an inclination to look at natural phe-

nomena, objects, and animals as the abode of spirits. I have, however, noted something that has interested me greatly. When these children see a strange and somewhat alarming object or occurrence, they immediately assume what may be called a "take-care" attitude, as if they should say, "Look out; that object may hurt us; take care," but there is not the slightest thought of its being animated by a spirit. Now it seems to me that this "take-care" attitude is perfectly natural and primitive. Why should it not have been the attitude assumed by our ancestors when they were in the presence of what they did not understand? They felt vaguely that there was power of some sort present of which they must beware, or in the proximity of which they must needs be cautious. No doubt this belief assumed various forms, but in all cases it is easy to think of it as a natural unsophisticated reaction of the simple-minded savage to those aspects of his environment which excited his wonder, his caution, or his fear. This is speculation, of course, but it shows that the hypothesis of a primitive animism is not the only possible view of primitive man's attitude toward the world.

In this study of beginnings it has been necessary to go back of reflective thought, and back even of naïve philosophizing. When we pass from the most primitive level, reflection and speculation have unquestionably had a marked influence upon the development of the religious consciousness. In the higher forms of religion, for example in the evolution of the higher conceptions of the deity and at many other points, primitive philosophizing has played its part, even though the influence of reflection has been somewhat overdone in most accounts of the development of human institutions. Yet certainly the impulsive and playful activities, the random, or even chance, variations, the accidental associations, have occupied a place quite beyond that imagined by those who exalt man solely as a reasoning animal and conceive every step he has taken as preceded by conscious weighing of alternatives and thoughtful forecasting of results.

It is possible that there has been a tendency to over-work the social in our present-day thinking, and yet it seems to me difficult to exaggerate the influence of social factors upon the development of religion. In every stage of its development it bears the ear-

marks of social influences. Its values are distinctly social values. The duties it emphasizes are social. Its rites and ceremonies are the activities of social groups clustering around objects which have proved to be of concern to men in groups rather than objects of purely individual interest.

The social quality of religion comes out strikingly in comparing it with magic. Magic is essentially individualistic and private. Here alone can a satisfactory distinction be worked out. It is not true that religion is concerned with spirits, while magic uses mystic forces only. Magic also avails itself of spirits. The question is largely one of the evidence, not a speculative problem. If objection be made to the vague and uncertain character of the distinctions drawn between religion and magic, I can only say that no sharp line can be drawn between the two, as far as any external object or practice is concerned. It is wholly the attitude expressed in the practice that determines whether it should be regarded as religious or magical. The religious attitude is the socialized one, the magical is individualistic, secretive, and even malign.

The deity or deities of a religion are further evidence of its fundamentally social character. The deity of well-developed character and personality belongs to a correspondingly well-developed society. He represents for his worshippers the socialization of the universe. It is easier to think of the values which have come to consciousness in a social medium in some sort of social terms, or possibly we might say under a social symbolism. The account of the ultimate values of human life and aspiration through a social terminology need not be the only possible, or even the truest, account, but nevertheless such an account seems to render them more tangible and hence more available for the practical exigencies of life.

Any account of the origin and development of ideas of deities is of necessity hypothetical, and while social psychology cannot hope completely to solve the problem, it yet has something to contribute to the solution. It can at least say something of the conditions within a social group which would favor the development of ideas of deities. As far as I know, the problem has hitherto been attacked in a somewhat external way; the inner so-

cial and psychical motives and impulses have not been taken into account. Some have said that the first gods were stones, trees, snakes, great natural forces, spirits, ghosts, and so on. Even though these may have been primitive deities, that is, primitive objects of worship, we have not by such an admission explained the origin of the god. If we would approach the question on the psychological side, we must first recognize the reason why these objects attracted primitive man's attention. It was first of all because they were concerned in his elementary processes of food-supply, protection, and reproduction. For the same reasons man has always had a spontaneous interest in many kinds of animals. It is most important to note that there was a great diversity of these primitive objects of interest, and that one and all seemed to be related to the welfare of the savage in some quite acute manner. Possibly the first explanation of this relationship to his welfare was offered by the savage in terms of a "power" of some sort present in the object of interest. The rock protected him because there was a "power" in it. The serpent could escape him or injure him because of its "power." And so of every other object of primitive regard. But these objects of regard were not yet true deities, they were simply objects. Whence came the essential personal element? It might have come through a regard paid to actual men. Just as some natural objects and some animals attracted attention because of their influence upon his life, which he explained in terms of their "power," so some persons were interesting and had a vital influence upon the welfare of their fellows, and these also were believed to be possessed of the "power." The steps from the mere man who is slightly elevated above his fellows because of his "power" to the genuine deity may be worked out hypothetically from the study of the anthropological record. The first deity is little more than a "man-god," but the continued reaction of a social group upon the vague, plastic notion, when it once appeared, served to give it greater and greater definiteness and content. The "all-father" idea of the southeast Australians, and the "culture heroes" of the Indians, furnish interesting stages in the transition from the "man-god" to the full-fledged deity. It is possible also to show that the higher ethical deities were built up upon a social substratum of primitive morals and naïve reflection.

If I were to state in one word the message of this series of studies it would be that the religious consciousness of today is not an adventitious growth, merely modelled more or less generally upon the social life of various levels of culture, but rather an organic part of the great process of human development, built up in exactly the same way that human society has integrated, and capable of being interpreted satisfactorily only by constant reference to the social matrix within which it was formed.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT OF THEISM

GEORGE A. BARROW

Milford, Mass.

Construction rather than destruction is, in its time and place, a good motto, but to attempt a reconstruction without first clearing the ground is likely to make the resulting building unstable. In the last quarter-century we have been attacking one by one the received views in theology, and now we are ready for constructive work, but unfortunately, as many students know who are in theological seminaries, even some marked as "liberal," there is little fundamental criticism of the general basis of theism. Theology has made use of the philosophical progress, but has made comparatively little advance in its own field. So we find the traditional arguments for God's existence repeated in only very slightly modified form. It is in the attempt to bring home to us the necessity for a thorough-going criticism that this examination of one of the traditional arguments for God's existence has been undertaken.

It is well, to begin with, to restate the "moral argument" from a non-theistic point of view, to see what it means when put in words that do not imply its results. If the existence of morality in the world proves the existence of God, it is because morality involves the fundamental categories of being. If it does involve them, it is at least as fundamental a part of real being as the non-moral or physical world. We could rest here, if the two were two separate compartments of reality, each contributing its part. Instead, they are closely interrelated. What we do as moral beings affects physical nature, at the least moves our bodies; and physical nature, as represented by our bodies, aids or hinders our moral actions. If, then, morality involves as much of real being as does physical existence, or even more than as much, and if that real being is, as theism declares, one, then the two are in harmony, and the morality is a component part of the same world with the physical life. This view requires that physical

life shall not, in the last analysis, make morality impossible. That is the same as saying that the moral will shall have power to exist in the physical world. This statement of the problem shows it to be even more important than as a merely additional proof of the existence of God. We have to ask whether the fact and nature of morality prove that existence must be such that life is explainable only by One who is self-existent good, the guarantor of the power of morality in physical life.

We have, in treating first the nature of morality, to make somewhat clearer the idea of the morally good, and to inquire whether it involves power over the physical. For our purpose it is enough to point out that it is a human concept, that it involves the conscious will, that it is a social concept, and that it is finite, yet not necessarily involving physical powers.

In the first place, it originates with man. The conception of good comes to us from the life of man. We do apply the terms good and bad to physical events, but only when those events affect man. To call an earthquake evil, simply because it caused loss to man, when it may be the necessary outcome of conditions and the necessary preliminary to further events, is correct only if the good of the universe is coincident with the good of man To assume that it is so, is to beg the question. All that is essential in the idea of good is that it take account in some way of man's needs. Historically, the moral ideas have originated only among men. Even the highest animals below man seem to have no idea of it. Also good implies the existence of purpose and knowledge of an end. Nowhere in the universe known to us, outside of man, do we find anything but causal sequences. Animals seem not to have reflective actions. But even if they have, it would but extend morality to them, not to inanimate nature. What is good, then, if it is to be existent, must be found in that part of the world where man exists. If the concept then proves to include all existence, all is well, but it must be shown to be thus all-inclusive. The good, starting from the ideas of man's duty and best aim in life, can hardly be taken to imply good in everything. A concept cannot rise higher than its source. Of the things which man possesses in common with all existence, the idea derived from his experience will be valid for all, but in

those things which are peculiar to man the concepts must be limited by the limited field from which they are derived. Good, as a concept, does not include inanimate nature, so yields no inference as to any relation to it.

In the second place, the concept is one of will. If will ceases to exist, then the good must cease to exist. This brings to light the fact that the good must inhere in a will. We have too long dissociated the process and the result. The only thing that gives any concrete good its existence is that it is the object of some conscious will. It is because we must will something that the question, what is best to will, arises. If there is no will, there is no question, and no idea of good. In the world, then, where there is no conscious will, and only as such is the physical world known to us, there can be no self-existent good. What relation there is, is for metaphysics to say; it is not a deduction from the nature of good. The nature of the concept of good as involving conscious will also yields us no inference as to any power over non-conscious nature.

Thirdly, it is a social concept. To the possible objection that our argument about the origin of the idea of good with man has seeming validity only because of its confusion of the historical and genetic with the logical, we reply that the two cannot be entirely separated. Of course we cannot take the earliest forms of morality and call them typical, but neither can we take the moral ideals to concern simply the individual, when they have their principal significance only in the larger world where the individual must sink his private good for the good of the whole. The formal concept of the self-existent good must be a social concept. "Good for something" must tag every act of the human individual. It is only society which can enshrine a larger vision. But the will of society is even more held down to earth than the will of the individual. Unless we accept a theory of thought-transference, and this is hardly inherent in any ethical system, the social will must be mediated in terms of time and space. The good-in-itself, depending on the existence of some will, and effective only through a social will, can hardly rise and dominate those very laws of time, space, and causality in the physical world by which alone it can have being. To argue that it does, requires

the assumption that the whole universe is essentially moral. Again we are moving in a circle, and begging the question. The social nature of the idea of good, as well as the two former aspects, can yield no encouragement in an attempt to prove power over physical nature.

In the fourth place, morality is a finite idea. On the purely formal side, the good is not that which exists, but that which ought to exist. If placed in the world of time, it must lie in the future. Future finite existence depends for man on his will and purpose. Even the absolute good, then, to exist finitely, must depend on the creative will, and this, as we have seen, does not help the argument to prove power in the physical realm, and the existence of God. But of course, we are answered, it is eternal and infinite existence that the self-existent good possesses, and this is outside the world of time. Undoubtedly the fact that man seeks, requires that in the eternal world there shall exist the goal sought, whether attained or not. But here our objectors, if they wish their distinction to bear on our problem, miss the meaning of "exist in the world of eternity." Anything, we grant, which is necessarily implied in any existent thing, exists in the infinite timeless realm. But it exists there only because, logically, it first has also its foot in the world of our experience. Our dreams are facts of that larger universe, but only because they are somebody's dreams. In the same way the final goal of our endeavors has being, and being in itself,—it exists for nothing but itself,—but it has that kind of existence only because as such it is the goal of an existent finite will. Its timeless existence depending on its finiteness, it cannot cut loose and claim independence. There is, then, no help here toward any necessary infinite existence.

In the fifth place, moral good does not necessarily involve physical nature. It is perfectly possible to conceive that the good for man is not the good for the rest of the universe. This is really the underlying idea of a good deal of popular religion in all ages. Man must subdue the hostile world; man must endure a pilgrimage in the world with such help as God gives, in order to be finally taken from the world,—these ideas by no means assume that the physical universe is moral. They imply the opposite,

that the good for man is what the world by itself would never bring, that any power of good affects the world only by destroying it. The theologians of all ages have tried to argue away this practical dualism, but their success, so far as they have succeeded, is due to their idea of God's omnipotence. They undoubtedly, in many cases, allow evil as self-existent, for only a few would go the length of asserting that God created evil. We cannot, as did many of the saints of old, personify the world, for personification implies will, and it is just the absence of will that separates the rest of the world from man. Yet we can postulate an end, not willed, though foreseeable by man, in the physical world. All that makes to this end may be called physically good. Of course, except for man, there can be no physical evil in this sense, for progress, if man does not interrupt, is certain and sure to the impending outcome. This end may be anything, —for example, the complete disintegration of all solar and stellar systems into planetary dust, and even the scattering of this in infinite space so far that its finite energy would be exhausted before new systems could be formed. In such a hypothetical case the moral demands of man certainly are neglected. It would only be by postulating some other world, heaven or spirit realm, that moral endeavor, in face of the coming extinction of man, could have place or meaning. The good which man seeks now would still be a fact in the non-temporal world, but it would have no meaning in the world of time. The good or tendency of the universe, moving inevitably to its end, would be opposed to the demands of the self-existent good of man. There is nothing in the conception of good which can overcome this dualism. We may not accept it as final, but our reasons must be based on confidence in the ultimate power of reason in the universe, or on some conception of divine omnipotence. Monism may be held on other grounds, but as a deduction from the concept of goodness it is not valid. There is nothing inherent in goodness which insures its victory over the physical world.

Although the nature of morality does not insure its victory, and so prove God's existence, there is still the fact of its existence. Morality is not a physical concept, we say; is not, then, the good as existent, even though not physical, an argument

for the existence of the Omnipotent? This is the more usual form of the problem. If by it we mean to ask whether by a survey of our experience we can say that the world appears to include or promise more good than evil, and that this, since nature is by herself non-moral, requires the supposition of some personal power which makes this balance, we can foresee defeat at the outset. To hope to attain knowledge of such a power, even if it is not thought of as omnipotent, implies a close connection between goodness and finite existence, and falls into the same danger as do the arguments from the formal concept which we have just considered. To hope to prove the existence of a superhuman being by a survey of objective existence, assumes that the easiest approach to reality is through the judgment on facts. Let us suppose that the situation is more clear than it is,—that the world plainly lends itself to moral actions. The just and upright man always receives a due reward, and all the purposive actions of man, when moral, attain their ends as surely as the physical laws are now seen to work. The very inevitableness of such a situation might lead us to postulate that, instead of freedom and moral action, men were but automatons. Or, if not, that after all, true existence lay in seeing the right path, and that sin was ignorance, and morality simply common-sense in acting according to our best light. Man, then, making use of the moral laws as he does now of the physical, would no more need the assumption of a *deus ex machina* in the moral world than he does at present in the physical. The very laws which we seek to prove as showing the growing morality of existence may be, if we take them only objectively, as mechanical and non-personal as the fact that while one man cannot build a pyramid, thousands can; showing, indeed, co-operation to be wise, but proving nothing as to the reason why such co-operation is so fit. To hope to attain from a survey of the objective world of human morals to a knowledge of ultimate existence is as hopeless as to dream of finding the nature of matter from laboratory experiments, and for the same reason. Unless a thing is objectively given, argument from those things which are given must be mere hypotheses so long as objective existence alone is conceived. We say, the fact that man can be more or less moral in the world

proves that there are forces in the world working for morality. This statement is true within the limits of its terms,—in the finite world there are moral forces,—but we knew that in the beginning, for we knew men to be moral. As to any superhuman power, we have learned nothing. And as to the ultimate constitution of the universe we know less still. Looking only at the objective side, it seems more likely that man's systems of morality from the lowest to the highest will be shown to be biological, than that the biological, and still less the chemical and physical, laws will turn out to be deducible from the moral. Even perfection in the objective world, then, would not prove God's existence by the existence of morality. As to the imperfection which is the crux of our actual moral life, it is just the powerlessness of man before a nature which often seems careless of his moral needs that forms for us the problem of evil. Certainly imperfection cannot prove God's existence. The very fact of imperfection argues against God's existence, and even if the world were perfect, it would not need personality, even that of God, to explain it. Whether the world, then, is perfect or imperfect, it cannot lead us to God.

Leaving the question whether the world's goodness or badness requires a God to explain it, we may go further and approach the main question. Owing to the incomplete view which man has, he may not be able to prove God's existence from objective morality, and yet the bare existence of the idea of morality, the fact that man can and does make moral judgments, requires, we might conclude, that there be in control of the universe some power which must be called moral. Here we should carefully distinguish between two things, the moral will and the moral judgment. Closely as they may be interlocked, and in practice they are inextricable, they involve two distinct ideas. We may perhaps say that the moral judgment decides what is moral, what the content of our moral code shall be, while the will in the first place determines whether or not there shall be a moral judgment, and, after it is made, whether it shall be followed or not. Psychologically we may be able to resolve the last act, moral or immoral, into the first determination to make or to avoid a decision, but logically these are distinct. Will makes ideals actual, but in

our life the constant falling short of the ideal proves there can be an ideal which does not become actual. Likewise we may decide what is right, and then not do it. Whether this becomes our will through lack of attention or not, the process cannot obscure the fact that we made a judgment which it did not suit us to carry out. Yet, some would say, the will to make such a judgment is the fundamental thing, so we come back to will in any case. It must be admitted that we are in this discussion using "will" in a somewhat vague sense. Will is not simple, and is not separated from intelligence so as to be absent even from judgments of truth. This is due, however, to the broad scope of the word "will," not to the identity of the processes. When I will to walk, there may be something in common with the will to classify the trees I pass, but the two wills, though both involving somewhat similar nerve action, result differently. The result of one remains, for the most part, if no word is spoken, with the brain or at least the nerve centres, while the other has most of its effect outside those nerve centres. This difference of result justifies us in a difference of classification. We therefore distinguish between the will to do and the will to think. Under this last falls the moral judgment. When we analyze our attitude towards the moral code, we see that it is relatively exterior. The will to decide is rather a will to recognize. The attempts to deduce our concrete moral criteria from the *a priori* idea of right inevitably mix with the deduction a consciousness of what mankind judges to be right. When we ask ourselves whether we ought to do a given thing, and are in doubt, the hesitation is not, in general, as to the agreement of this act with the ultimate basis of life, but as to its agreement with some pre-established moral standard, whether our own or the world's. Moralists and philosophers may wish this were otherwise, but even they do not stop to deduce their judgment *a priori* before they come to a decision as to the right in a given crisis. The moral judgment, therefore, as we find it among men, is a judgment of the agreement or disagreement of a contemplated act with some standard of action. To say whether the existence of moral ideas proves the existence of God, we must divide the inquiry, and take first the question of the existence of the moral judgment, and second the fact of the moral will.

In one sense we are beginning backward, for the will to judge is only one phase of conscious will, and God's existence, if provable from the fact of will in general, is of course equally shown in the moral will. Yet our smaller problem still has a place. Even if God is known to exist because of man's possessing a will, there would still remain the question whether the moral judgment is an essential part of God's life. Not even the answer to this is what we are seeking, but only whether the good is so essential that, whatever other manifestation of will there may be, it requires God's existence. In other words, is morality fundamental or derived? Analyzing our attitude when we judge a thing to be right, we find that it is somewhat the same as willing to find the truth about anything. We may judge the righteousness of another's act as well as of our own act, and in that case no will of ours is involved except the will to judge. Taking this case, we say that the act was right,—right because it agrees with our view of morality, either codal, or in general as befitting a man, or as serving God. The judgment is one of agreement or disagreement. When we come to ourselves, there is no essential difference. The view of conscience which makes it, so far as the possessor goes, instinctive, is the very view which makes its proof of God impossible. As instinctive, man cannot tell its origin except in objective terms, and these cannot be valid beyond the limits of experience. Any God deducible from the existence of an instinct may very well be a God limited to humanity, and this is not what we mean. Conscience, or the feeling of duty as exerting a power over the individual, arises from the will of man to decide. He wills to lay out for himself a plan of action, and when it is laid out, because it is a plan for his action, it exerts influence upon him. This is not confined to moral judgment. The disinclination of men to desert their political party arises because of the power over them of that plan of action which they either inherited or formerly thought out. Any plan, willed to be regarded as a possible act of ours, has power over us. This is the explanation of many of the imitative crimes. The account in the daily paper gives rise to the idea that this man could do it too, and finally he does it. All that we have to consider, then, is whether the will to judge right and wrong is proof of God's

existence. Here the peculiar nature of the moral judgment must be taken into account. It is not a question of means to an end, but of logical disagreement. How we shall accomplish the desired moral result we must plan, but that is not a moral question. If it is right for me to attend a certain meeting, and I have plenty of time, whether I walk or ride is not involved in the decision that I ought to attend, however much walking may be right to improve health. We can hardly say that man's ability to discriminate proves a power beyond man, for the animals have in many ways, especially where the senses are concerned, a finer sense of discrimination than we possess. Nor can the abstract nature of the judgment prove it, for man may abstract as much as he pleases, and while his abstractions may be valid, they prove nothing more than his ability to include in one whole more of the world than do the lower animals. That they prove that there is a being who can include more still is not a logical deduction. But—we hear—it is not the fact that man can call a thing right and wrong when he has a code of morality already fashioned that matters; it is the existence of that code that is crucial. Historically, we can hardly call this true. The moral codes have arisen through two factors, the instincts—family, self-preservation, and desires for social life—and reflection on the experience as individuals in the family and race. What is right is by the common run of men taken pre-eminently to mean what experience shows to be best. The idea of a revealed code has weakened this somewhat, but even here we really conceive that God tells us what is best. Apart from the question of man's ability not to follow the code to which he owes allegiance, a moral code seems hardly different from any other. The code of modern hygiene arises from similar instincts and reflection upon them. If a man wills to plan for himself what is most healthy, he tends, unless some stronger motive intervenes, to follow that plan. To this the dietetic cranks and others bear witness. As far as abstraction goes, the abstractions of mathematics are far more subtle than those of morality, yet I do not know of any proof of God's existence based on man's ability to develop mathematics.

There may perhaps be a last objection on this point, that what

counts is man's making a judgment on such things as his actions at all. It is true that this is peculiar to man, yet it may very well have arisen because of the opposition of nature. Man finds that his own natural desires followed out will not allow him to live in this world. Lack of self-control in the plenty of summer means, to the inhabitant of any but the tropics, starvation in the barrenness of winter; so self-control becomes imperative if he is to live. It is here the opposition of his instincts to natural laws that forces him to at least one step in morality. This would not prove the existence of a moral being having power over physical nature, but only man's bowing to physical laws. So of those acts which would destroy the family or the tribe. Even in the lower animals we find some approximation to this. Man is so made that, for the family life to continue, he must yield his natural inclination of self-betterment to those laws which govern community life anywhere in nature. This is more true of the ants or bees than it is of man. It is man's ability to disobey those laws which really distinguishes him from the bees and ants. Man must make a judgment as to the agreement of his contemplated acts with those natural laws under which he lives. That he makes the abstract judgment that he does marks him off from the lower animals, but that he make some kind of moral judgment is forced on him as a finite being living a physical life. The fact, therefore, of the moral judgment proves not to involve or require the existence of an infinite or superhuman personality.

The element in the nature of man which makes by far the greater part of his power over nature is his will. It is this which leads to the control of nature to his own ends. However much in the first place his nervous structure may have given him the advantage over other living things, it is his ability to plan, and to bring all his powers to one end, that makes him indifferent to slight disturbing sensations, such as often lead a dog, for instance, to drop his present intention. It is in the will, then, that we may expect to find the necessity for a God. If the argument from the existence of morality has any validity, the fact of the will to do right must point the way to God. If, however, the moral will is not essentially different from any other will,

the only thing that matters is the existence of will in any form, and we are no longer concerned with morality simply. It is only if the moral will adds something to the argument from will in general that we are at present interested. In one sense, of course, any will is, or ought to be, moral. Whatever we do, if we accept a certain idea of right, should be directed to perfecting ourselves. Even in amusement there is the duty to refresh ourselves as much as possible in order to fit ourselves better to take up our serious work. Here everything is either moral or immoral. But this is an ideal which no one has reached. We distinguish, ordinarily, those purposes which are and those which are not moral. There are certain things which it is neither our duty to do nor our duty not to do. The actions have no moral significance. It may be my duty to walk a mile to regain health, or it may be just a matter of pleasure whether I take the walk or not. In one case, so far as my consciousness is concerned, I do wrong to ride. In the latter case, I cannot do wrong, whatever my decision may be. When we ask ourselves whether there is any fundamental difference between the purpose in the two cases, we see that the difference lies in the motive. Duty, as we have seen, is the appeal of the result of my judgment that a certain contemplated act is in accordance with a certain standard. The purpose to walk to enjoy myself is the result of a judgment, perhaps in the background of consciousness, that such action conforms to the standard of ideas of enjoyment. In both cases the act follows because it is the outcome of a previous will to be moral or to have pleasure. If there is any fundamental difference, therefore, it lies in this difference of the judgment of pleasure and of right. We cannot rightly say that one of these invokes an inner and the other an exterior standard, for the moral standard by being accepted becomes internal, and that standard may, as in certain forms of hedonism, be conceived as identical with the will to enjoy ourselves. This fact, that for hedonism and for perfectionism all will becomes moral, shows that there is not any uncrossable gulf. We have, then, two possible alternatives, either all will is moral or all will is, or can be, moral when at its purest. In the first case, to infer God's existence from the phenomena of will implies the power of all will

over nature,—God exists because the will to believe this has power, which may be taken as a very crude statement of a certain form of pragmatism; in the second case, it assumes that will, when pure, is the true manifestation of the inner being of the universe. In the first case, the moral element cannot be analyzed out, for the will is taken as a whole, and nowhere has there existed the ideal of every purpose being moral. We must take will as we find it, mixed of many elements. The will to believe in God, moreover, cannot be put to a universal objective test, and only such would prove it of universal validity. It may have power, as William James in his idea of pluralism implies, only in a limited sphere. It is in this case no argument for Christian theism. By the word "God" we do not mean merely a power larger than the individual, though that is justifiable from the usage of lower religions, but we mean an absolute, or, better, an infinite unlimited power. Hence any argument which has only conditioned application does not apply to this idea of God. Therefore, since either morality cannot be used as a separate element in will, or, if it is, must be limited in application, the first alternative does not help us to prove God's existence.

The other alternative, that will is the true form of being, is not based on a narrower view of its moral character, but on its general character. If God is personal, it might be that even then he is not moral, or, putting it in another way, the basis of his decisions may be entirely subjective. It might be possible to make the idea of morality absorb this subjective element, but we have seen that, as we use the concept, it is objective, and depends on a conscious judgment of agreement with a (possibly self-made) standard. If the divine consciousness works more like our instinctive or unhesitating decisions, and this is conceivable, then what we call the moral element is not present. Conceivably, then, will may argue God's existence. He may be conscious of his decisions and purposes, but, just because he is not hemmed in by time or other subjects, not feel what we know as moral compulsion. To prove that this is or is not true, we should have to analyze the whole nature and concept of will, and then see whether or not it involved the idea of good. But all this is very different from taking the existence of the moral will to prove

God's existence; it is deducing morality from a preconceived concept, that of God's will, not the induction to that concept. It is asking the question, "Is God, a God in whom we already believe, good?" not, "Must there be a God?" So we lay this alternative aside.

What, then, we are rightly asked, will become of the important problem? It might seem that a negative answer has been implied, and morality declared to have no sure hold on reality; that it is subordinate to physical reality. This is by no means a necessary conclusion. The problem, however, must be restated. It is not now a question of proving God's existence, but of defining the extent and relations of the moral will in man. To indicate the status of the question, a short consideration of it in closing will make the whole argument clearer. The solution to the more limited problem may be sought in either of two ways, the subjective or the objective. On the subjective side we have the deduction, already referred to, from the general nature of man's conscious will. This requires the proof or acceptance of the position that the will is a true revealer of essential being. With this, or instead of it, there is possible an objective argument of the moral quality of the universe. Since the question is no longer one of infinite existence, but only of the world as it appears to us, such an objective study has its proper place. There are, then, these two lines of approach,—the study of what the will involves and the account of what the world offers to the will.

Taking the last first, the primary question is, How do the laws or theories of organic evolution square with a moral interpretation of the universe? This is not the same as the demand for an evolutionary theory of ethics, for that is concerned only with the world after man appears: there is still the larger problem, Is man's morality the expression of the laws which evolved him, or is it a chance variation? In either case, is it useful to him outside the bounds of society? Within society there can be little question. Man must be moral, if he is to live in contact with his fellows. So much hardly needs argument. Yet if the only usefulness of moral action is to build up the racial life, then many things, such as self-perfection, which we now value, drop out

of sight, and the only things that count are the exterior virtues of courtesy, mutual forbearance, and honesty, with the virtues necessary to keep up the family. For many men this is all that there is of morality. The Christian virtues, if we may call them so, of otherworldliness, of devotion to a good not expressible in material terms, have no place in such a system, as they have no place in the lives of a majority of the people even of Christian lands. If a man is to believe that he may be called upon to sacrifice his life to the good of the pursuit of truth, which may, if the truth is unpopular, make him an outcast, he needs something more than the assurance that such acts help his life among men. He knows that they do not, and gets his impetus from the conviction that even the social life is not the highest, but that the universe requires a man to devote himself to truth. His morality requires the assurance that in some way the universe is moral enough to respond to his performance of duty. This assurance remains a mere trust, more or less blind, unless the working of the world of existence can be shown to point at least to this result. Certainly this has not been done. In fact we find many of our leading teachers of ethics admitting that there seems in the sacrifice of life, even for the best cause, something irrational and unnatural. If it is so, then such self-sacrifice, instead of being exalted, should be decried. It is no wonder that, with this view, many find no place for a theory of vicarious atonement. If God is righteous in the Christian sense, and the sacrifice on the Cross not an unavailing protest against a non-moral universe, the world must have a place for vicarious sacrifice and the problem must be faced, "Do the laws of nature tend to this end?" Our negative answer to the argument for God's existence does not yield a positive answer to the problem one way or the other. To really enter on its solution may disarrange some theories in both the biologic and the religious world: in the biologic, for it is certain that biologists have as yet given no place to morality, even in man, except in the modified social sense; and in religion, for to both the old orthodoxy and modern liberalism, religious ethics are non-natural. Both agree that the atonement is opposed to nature. Not to assume its naturalness and try to prove God's existence from it, but to prove this assumption, is the task set before modern religious thought.

What we have been saying of the question of God's righteousness may be summed up by saying that the concept of goodness should not be separated from the idea of personality. Returning to the second alternative as to the nature of will, we see that only in connection with a conscious will, which is essential to personality, can goodness reveal reality. The question, therefore, whether goodness is inherent in reality can only be finally answered from the standpoint of will. The line of attack of which we spoke in the last paragraph may connect with the biological theories, but it cannot prove reality. It is needless to say that such an inquiry into the nature of will is necessary to support modern theological claims. As we have seen, goodness cannot be proved by itself to be in God's nature; if it is his nature at all then, it must be deduced from it. The problem is also necessary to ethics. Those who consciously or unconsciously pin their whole faith to induction will oppose this, but there is some consolation for them in the fact that we are really only taking the last half of a circuit. One of the elements in will is the ability to judge and to act according to moral standards. This is the inductive part of the process. When we have gone thus far, we then have to ask the relation of this element to the others, and this can only be by deduction. While we insist that the idea of righteousness shall take account of the active will, we also insist that the will take account of morality. Yet even this, it may be said, is not the main point, but by so relating this concept to the whole idea of personality we make the proof of God's existence depend on one line of argument alone. It is not that this weakens the proof, but that it forces us by the terms of the problem to monism, and this is at least settling the question beforehand. In the first place we must note that if the presence of will in the world proves the existence of God, it can only be because will is of the true nature of being. In such a line of argument, if we are to come to Christian theism at all, monism is either assumed or proved. Much of the modern discontent in theology is due to a forgetfulness of this. Many hope to prove a God who exists in a pluralistic or at least not completely unified world. If God's existence is so limited by other existences, all that we mean by "God" is the highest expression of humanity taken as a whole. This

is not historical Christian theism, but it may be possible, and it rests with the students of philosophy to consider the question. This possibility must be kept in mind; the problem is necessary to any attempted solution of the nature of goodness, and upon the answer to it depends our answer as to the place of morality in existence. If God is not omnipotent, if good is not efficient outside a limited human area, then our ethics must acknowledge this, and take the natural laws as not interpretable in ethical terms; if God is the Absolute, then ethics has the right to claim the moral life to be the true being, and inherent in the self-existent. We may rest content in this discussion if we have shown that the moral argument for God's existence is secondary, but necessary to determine the rightful place of ethics. It is really the question, "Is God good?" which comes after the question, which must be answered on other grounds, "Does he exist?" In this more limited task we may hope that the "moral argument" will find its true place. The usual solution is no real answer to the problem as we stated it in the beginning, whether or not physical nature gives a place to morality.

HEBREW OSTRACA FROM SAMARIA[1]

In 1908 Harvard University began the exploration of the large hill in central Palestine which marks the site of the ancient Hebrew capital Samaria. The chief results of the year's work[2] were the discovery of a Roman statue of heroic size (probably representing Augustus), a well-preserved Roman altar, an imposing stairway, about eighty feet broad, and the massive foundation-walls of a large building, the connection of which with the Herodian temple to Augustus was considered possible.

The campaign of 1909,[3] in charge of Professor George A. Reisner, aided by Mr. Clarence S. Fisher, furnished the proof that the temple just mentioned, at the summit of the hill, was really the work of Herod. Underneath these Roman remains was recovered part of a massive Hebrew structure, believed to be the palace of Omri and Ahab, consisting of a series of chambers grouped around courts. On the western side of the hill the gateway, flanked by two round towers, was investigated, and was found to be Roman work resting on older square towers of the Greek period, which in turn occupied the site of still older Hebrew towers. On the eastern side of the hill the extensive ruin, with its monolithic columns still in position, was shown to be a basilica adjoining the forum of the Herodian city.

In 1910 the explorations were continued at all the points named, but especially in and about the palace building at the summit. This building, though not yet completely explored, is now known to have covered more than one and a half acres, and shows four periods of construction, tentatively assigned to Omri, Ahab, Jehu, and Jeroboam II.

The belief that the building was originally erected by Omri and Ahab was based on archaeological grounds, and seems greatly

[1] Based on a special report from Professor George A. Reisner.

[2] See this Review for January, 1909.

[3] See this Review for April, 1910.

strengthened by the discovery of an alabaster vase inscribed with the name of Ahab's contemporary, Osorkon II of Egypt.

Of unusual interest is a series of ostraca found during the past summer at the level of the Osorkon vase, and comprising some seventy-five fragments of pottery inscribed with records or memoranda in the ancient Hebrew character.

That these inscriptions were originally written not on jars but on fragments appears from several considerations: (1) The beginning and ending of the successive lines of writing were nicely adapted to the size of the fragment, which in many cases involved crowding at the end of a line or carrying part of the word to the next line. (2) The writing crosses the turning lines on the fragments at various angles, whereas labels on jars are regularly written horizontally. (3) Several fragments, each with a separate inscription, fit together, and were therefore originally parts of the same vessel, whereas it is obvious that the same jar would not need more than one label. (4) In two cases the inscriptions seem to be labels written on jars before breaking, but these are distinguished by great brevity and by the large amount of unwritten surface.

The script in which these ostraca are written is the Phoenician, which was widely current in antiquity. It is very different from the so-called square character, in which the existing Hebrew manuscripts of the Bible are written. It is practically identical with that of the Siloam Tunnel inscription, and this fact settles at a stroke the disputed question whether that inscription can be as old as the time of Hezekiah. It is also the same as that of the Moabite Stone of Mesha dating from the ninth century B.C. This correspondence would suggest the eighth or ninth century as the date of the ostraca, and this view is confirmed by the place of discovery, which would cause them to be assigned to the time of Ahab.

The inscriptions are written in ink with a reed pen in an easy, flowing hand and show a pleasing contrast to the stiff forms of Phoenician inscriptions cut in stone. The graceful curves give evidence of a skill which comes only with long practice.

In many of the inscriptions the ink is so well preserved that the readings are subject to no doubt, and in only a few cases is there

uncertainty. Such distinctness after twenty-eight centuries in a damp soil is a marvel.

The reading of the ostraca is facilitated by the dots or strokes of ink, which in accordance with ancient usage divide the words from one another. There is much sameness in the records, so that on many of the broken ostraca the missing portions can be supplied with certainty.

With two exceptions all the ostraca seem to have been dated, though the date is in some cases broken away. This date, composed of the words "in the year" followed by a numeral, stands nearly always at the beginning. The years mentioned are the ninth and tenth, which are always spelled in full, and two others, apparently the eleventh and the thirteenth, which are always expressed by figures. No day or month is given, nor, from the nature of the case, is any needed, because in stating the age of wine or oil the year alone is sufficient. The king's name also is not given, but doubtless the years of the reigning king are meant. In all probability this was Ahab, as we have already seen.

In content the inscriptions are brief memoranda concerning oil and wine. The name of the owner is usually given, as well as that of the person or place from which the object came. The translation of a few of the ostraca will make this clear[4]:—

No. 5. *In the tenth year. For* [*i.e.* belonging to] *Shemaryô.*[5] *From the Tell. A jar of fine oil.*

No. 6. *In the tenth year. Wine of the vineyard of the Tell. With a jar of fine oil.*

No. 8. *In the tenth year. From Saq. For Gadyô. A jar of fine oil.*

No. 12. *In the tenth year. From Yaṣat. A jar of fine oil. For 'Akhino'am.*

[4] The numbers given refer to the enumeration in Professor Reisner's special report on this subject.

[5] It is of course often doubtful what vowels to supply in reading these names, and the doubt is increased by the infrequency of the vowel letters. Where the same name occurs in the Old Testament, the vowels represented by the masoretic points have usually been inserted.

No. 13. *In the tenth year. From 'Abi'ezer. For Shemaryô. A jar of old wine for 'Asâ. From the Tell.*

No. 19. *In the 11th year. From Shemîda'. For Kheleṣ, 'Aphṣakh, Ba'alâ* [and] *Zeker.*

No. 33. [In] *the 11th year. From Sarar. For Yeda'yô, Maranyô, Gady*[ô]. . . .

No. 42. *In the ninth year. From Shaphtan. For Ba'alzamar. A jar of old wine.*

No. 47. *In the 11th year. From 'Abi'ezer. For 'Asâ, 'Akhimelek,* [and] *Ba'alâ. From 'Elnathan.*[6]

No. 49. *In the 11th year. From Kheleq. For 'Asâ, 'Akhimelek, Ba'alâ,* [and] *Ba'alme'onî.*

No. 50. *In the ninth year. From Yaṣat. For 'Abino'am. A jar of old wine.*

No. 51. *In the 11th year. For Badyô.*[7] *The vineyard of the Tell.*

Simple as is the reading of these records, the interpretation is not always so certain, especially when the names of several men are mentioned. But in general the ostraca seem to be labels attached to jars, or groups of jars, in the cellar or store-house, giving date, ownership, and origin of the jars, with the nature of their contents. Where no owner is mentioned, as is the case with most of the jars from the Tell, the palace is probably the owner. This Tell, or Vineyard of the Tell, was perhaps one of the royal vineyards. Where several names of men are mentioned, we have perhaps cases of joint ownership, whether of a single jar or of a

[6] The copy of the ostracon reads *m* as the third letter of this name, but there is a break of the fragment across the letter. Since *m* and *n* are very much alike, it may be suspected that the break has obscured the reading. If, however, *m* be the correct reading, we may have here an error of the Hebrew scribe; of such errors at least two others seem to occur in the ostraca. *'Elnathan* seems the more likely form of the word.

[7] The reading of the first letter in this name is doubtful.

group of jars of wine or oil. In this regard No. 14 is instructive, the names of several owners being followed by the number of jars belonging to each.

Of special interest are the proper names found on these ostraca. From the nature of the records the names of gods appear only as elements in the formation of the names of men. Thus the general word for God, *'El*, occurs in *'Elîsha'*, *'Elnathan* (see note 6, preceding page), and possibly in *'Elîsh* (abbreviated from *'Elîsha'*(?)), *'Elbâ*, and *'Elâ*. The quiescents being rarely expressed in these ostraca, the pronunciation must in many cases be considered as tentative only.

As might be expected, *Ba'al* occurs in several names, as *Ba'alâ*, *Ba'alzamar*, *Ba'alâzakar*, [8] *Ba'alme'onî*, and *'Abiba'al*. The Book of Kings reports a great development of Baal-worship in Israel during the reign of Ahab, whose queen, daughter of Ethbaal, king of Tyre, was specially devoted to this cult.

The name of Israel's god occurs with about equal frequency. Naturally it nowhere occurs in the full form *Y H W H*, any more than in Biblical compounds. But the form *Y H W*, common in Biblical compounds, and the form *Y H*, found both separately and in compounds, are also absent in the ostraca. If the *W* is consonantal, the pronunciation may have been *Yawa;* if vocalic, it was probably *Yô*, as in so many Biblical names.

In two names the *Y W* forms the first half of the word, namely, *Yôyada'* and *Yôyashib*. In six others it is the second element, as *Badyô*, *Gadyô*, *Yeda'yô* (the same as *Yôyada'* just given, the two elements of the name being reversed), *Maranyô*, *'Egelyô*, and *Shemaryô*. Of these names *Gadyô* occurs on twelve of the ostraca, *Yeda'yô* on two, and *Shemaryô* on four.

Of names of men a considerable number are found, many of them having Biblical equivalents. A selection of these is here given, and in the parallel column the equivalents, or words of similar formation, from the old Testament:—

[8] The first element is written here *Ba'ala'*, with final *'ain*, which seems to be a scribal error for *Ba'alâ*, with final *'aleph*.

Ostraca	Bible
'Abiba'al	*'Abî'el, 'Abîyah*[9]
'Abi'ezer	*'Abî'ezer*
'Akhimelek	*'Akhîmelek*
'Akhino'am	*'Akhîno'am*
'Elâ	*'Elâ*
'Elisha'	*'Elîsha'*
'Asâ	*'Asâ*
Ba'alâ	
Ba'alzamar	
Ba'alâzakar	*Zekaryah*
Ba'alme'onî	*Ba'alme'ôn*
Gadyô	*Gaddî'el*
Gerâ	*Gerâ*
Kheleṣ	*Kheleṣ*
Khanan	*Khanan*
Khanan'am	*'Elî'am*
Yeda'yô	*Yeda'yah*
Yôyada'	*Yôyada'*
Yôyashîb	*Elyashîb*
Yo'ash	*Yô'ash*
Meriba'al	*Merîba'al*
Maranyô	
Nathan	*Nathan*
'Abdâ	*'Abdâ*
'Egelyô	*'Arî'el*
'Uzzâ	*'Uzzâ*
Raphâ	*Raphâ*
Sheba'	*Sheba'*
Shemîda' (*Shemyada'*?)	*Shemîda'*
Shemaryô	*Shemaryah*

It is interesting to note that, while some of these names are mentioned several times in the Bible, a great many of them occur in the account of the reign of David. But this is not surprising, since the interval between David and Ahab is only about one century.

Of the names of places mentioned in the Ostraca *SKM* must be *Shechem*. Other place-names seem to be *Khaṣoreth*, *Shaphtan*, *'Azâ*, *Yaṣat*, *Qaṣah*, and *Saq*.

[9] The letters *a*, *i*, *o* with circumflex above them (*â*, *î*, *ô*,) are used in the transliteration of names in this article to indicate the presence of *'aleph*, *yod*, and *waw* respectively.

Now it is evident that these ostraca have great interest for the epigraphist and the Hebraist. They are the earliest specimens of Hebrew writing which have ever been found, and in amount they exceed by far all known ancient Hebrew inscriptions. Moreover, they are the first Palestinian records of this nature to be found. Of particular interest, too, are the proper names, especially those compounded with the names *Ba'al* and *Yô*.

It is not improbable that thousands of such records may exist at Samaria. In some part of the hill, less overturned than the summit has been by the burrowing of later builders, it is likely that multitudes of business documents await the explorer, documents giving records of sale, barter, contract, and all phases of private and social transactions.

More than this, may we not even hope for historical records? We know that the kings of Israel had their court annalists. And while we may be sure that their work was committed mainly to perishable material, other parts of it may have been written on stone, pottery, or clay. Such possibility is enough to kindle the imagination of every student of Palestinian history.

With this year's campaign the first Harvard expedition to Samaria closes. The work of preparing the results for publication is now well advanced. Including the publication, the cost of the undertaking has been sixty-five thousand dollars, which is fifteen thousand dollars more than the original gift for this purpose. By these generous gifts, which have made possible this first expedition, Mr. Jacob H. Schiff has added another to his notable contributions to the cause of learning.

But so large is the area of ancient Samaria, that the great bulk of the exploration still remains to be done. While the hill has been mainly attacked at what is probably its most complicated, and architecturally its richest, portion, and while the results in certain directions have far exceeded our expectations, it is usually the unexpected that happens in exploration, and the other parts of the hill may yield treasures more surprising than Herod's temple, Ahab's palace, or the ostraca records.

It is therefore earnestly to be hoped that the work may not stop with this first expedition, but that other patrons of research may see the opportunity for further discovery which the hill of

Samaria presents. The claim of Samaria, in comparison with Greek and Roman sites, is particularly strong, since remains from classical antiquity are already abundant, whereas, notwithstanding much excavation in Palestine, the work at Samaria is the first to bring to light important remains of the early Hebrew times.

David G. Lyon.

Harvard University.

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